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ABSTRACT

LEARNING SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES IN REPEATED
GENERAL-SUM GAMES

Jacob W. Crandall
Computer Science
Doctor of Philosophy

Many environments in which an agent can use reinforcement learning techniques
to learn profitable strategies are affected by other learning agents. These situations
can be modeled as general-sum games. When playing repeated general-sum games
with other learning agents, the goal of a self-interested learning agent is to maximize
its own payoffs over time. Traditional reinforcement learning algorithms learn myopic
strategies in these games. As a result, they learn strategies that produce undesirable
results in many games. In this dissertation, we develop and analyze algorithms that
learn non-myopic strategies when playing many important infinitely repeated generalsum games. We show that, in many of these games, these algorithms outperform
existing multiagent learning algorithms. We derive performance guarantees for these
algorithms (for certain learning parameters) and show that these guarantees become
stronger and apply to larger classes of games as more information is observed and used
by the agents. We establish these results through empirical studies and mathematical
proofs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Motivation

As technology advances, so does the need for artificial agents that can operate
successfully in complex environments. However, obtaining successful behavior from
artificial agents is a daunting task, since many of these environments are dynamic,
complex, and may not be known in advance. Giving these agents the ability to learn
is one way to overcome such challenges.
Endowing artificial agents with the ability to learn successfully in arbitrary situations is challenging. One reason for this difficulty is that many environments are
non-stationary, such as those in which an agent interacts with other learning agents.
Learning is particularly difficult in such environments since the consequences of an
action may change over time. Additionally, an agent must determine how its actions
affect the subsequent actions of other learning agents. Predicting these consequences
is challenging because agents differ widely in the ways that they learn.
One common characteristic of real-life situations is that they repeat, sometimes
many times, which results in repeated interactions between agents. These repeated
interactions, whether between humans or machines (or both), should lead to improved
behavior, since they give agents opportunities to learn. Thus, in many situations,
multiagent learning inherently involves repeated play1 . In these situations, agents
should learn to act in ways that improve their own payoffs over time, which means
that agents must be concerned not only with the immediate consequences of their
actions, but also with their long-term effects.
The situations in which agents repeatedly interact vary widely. A common situation (or game2 ) is one in which a loss to one agent is the gain of another agent. These
games are called zero-sum games. A second kind of situation arises when the joint behavior of the agents favors all agents equally. Such games are called fully cooperative
games, and require only that agents learn to coordinate their actions appropriately.
Between the two extremes of zero-sum games and fully cooperative games are a large
class of games in which agents have conflicting interests. Frequently, such games
1

The term repeated play is a term from game theory that suggests that the same game is played
repeatedly by the same agents.
2
We assume, as in game theory, that real-world situations can be encoded as games.
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mean that learning agents must learn to cooperate with each other if they want to
be successful. These three kinds of games constitute repeated general-sum games.
Regardless of the game structure, the goal of a (self-interested) agent in a repeated
game is to maximize its own payoffs over time. Thus, three qualities determine the
success of a learning agent: a) the quality of the strategies the agent eventually
learns to play, b) the speed at which the agent learns them, and c) the classes of
agents with whom the agent can effectively associate. While all three criteria are
important, performing well in one criterion may come at the expense of one of the
others. For example, an agent may choose to learn slowly in order to ensure that it
learns correctly.
In addition to the three criteria just mentioned, a critical attribute of a multiagent
learning algorithm is the knowledge that it requires of its environment. Due to sensor
quality, among other things, an agent may not be able to know the actions taken by
other agents, the learning methods used by other agents (if the agents are learning at
all), the payoffs received by other agents, or even the payoffs that it receives itself3 .
Nevertheless, if an agent desires to learn successfully in these environments, it must
be able to do so despite various knowledge deficiencies about its environment.
To date, multiagent learning algorithms have been largely unsuccessful at learning in general-sum games as a whole [52]. One reason for this failure is that most
multiagent learning algorithms have been designed with the purpose of learning game
theoretic solution concepts. While these solution concepts are important, they often
make assumptions that do not apply to all infinitely repeated games between learning agents. As a result, these multiagent learning algorithms often learn myopic (and
unprofitable) behavior in many theoretically important repeated games.
In this dissertation, we will discuss and develop multiagent learning algorithms
that learn less myopic (and, thus, more profitable) solutions in infinitely repeated
general-sum games.
1.2

Thesis Statement

When playing repeated general-sum games with other learning agents, the goal of
a self-interested learning agent is to maximize its own payoffs over time. Algorithms
can be developed that learn (when associating with other learning agents) to play
strategies that produce significantly higher average payoffs over time than existing
algorithms in many important infinitely repeated general-sum games. Performance
guarantees for these algorithms can be established for certain learning parameters,
and these guarantees become stronger and apply to larger classes of agents as more
information is observed and used by the agents. These results can be established
through empirical studies and mathematical proofs.
3

We maintain that, if an agent is to learn, it must be able to determine the payoffs that its actions
yield. However, the degrees to which an agent knows its payoffs may vary.
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1.3

Contents

The outline of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, we give important background information and review related work. Specifically, we discuss game theoretic
concepts and other related topics, review existing multiagent learning algorithms, and
discuss general-sum games in more detail.
In Chapter 3, we consider the case in which an agent knows its own actions and
can observe its own payoffs, but not those of its associates. We analyze an existing
algorithm from the literature [70], and prove that it converges with high probability
when associating with copies of itself4 to near pareto efficient5 solutions in all generalsum matrix games, provided that specific conditions are met. We show that these
conditions can be satisfied in most infinitely repeated general-sum matrix games (and
all 2-player matrix games). A preliminary version of this work was published in [24].
In Chapter 4, we present a trembling-hand version of the algorithm discussed in
Chapter 3. We show (empirically) that this algorithm learns in self play to satisfy the
conditions necessary for convergence (with high probability) to near pareto efficient
solutions in general-sum matrix games if a) the conditions can be satisfied and if b) all
agents benefit from doing so. Preliminary work for this chapter was published in [24].
We consider in Chapter 5 the case in which an agent can observe the actions of
other agents. Under these conditions, a learning agent should possess two properties.
First, an agent should never learn to play a strategy that produces average payoffs
less than the minimax value of the game. Second an agent should learn to cooperate/compromise when doing so increases its payoffs. No learning algorithm from
the literature is known to possess both of these properties without having knowledge
of the payoffs of other agents. We present a reinforcement learning algorithm that
provably satisfies the first property in all general-sum matrix games and empirically
displays (in self play) the second property in a wide range of games. This chapter
is an extended version of a paper published in the 22nd International Conference on
Machine Learning [20].
The algorithm presented in Chapter 5 is designed only for matrix games. In Chapter 6, we extend this algorithm to the more general case of stochastic games. We show
(empirically) that this algorithm continues to possess the same two properties (i.e.,
security and cooperate/compromise) in several important stochastic games. Multiagent learning algorithms in the literature do not satisfy these properties in many of
these games.
In Chapter 7, we summarize the results from the previous chapters and discuss
future work.
In the main body of the dissertation, we do not consider the case in which an agent
4

We refer to situations in which an agent associates with copies of itself as self play.
We will describe this term in more detail in Chapter 2. In short, a solution is pareto efficient if
no other solution benefits one agent without hurting another agent.
5

3

knows the payoffs of other agents. However, when this information is available, an
agent has the possibility of learning/associating more effectively with a larger class of
agents. In Appendix A, we present a separate algorithm for such situations and show
empirical results that suggest that this algorithm can learn pareto efficient solutions
with a much larger class of agents. As this work is still considered preliminary in
nature, we do not include it in the main body of this dissertation. This work was
published in [22].
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we give necessary background information for the work of this
dissertation. Additionally, we will review some of the more relevant work found in
the literature.
Specifically, this chapter will proceed as follows. In the next section, we formally
define the multiagent learning problem. Many of the central issues of the multiagent
learning problem are related to game theory. Hence, we review important aspects
of game theory in Section 2.2. However, game theory assumes that all agents are
rational, which is certainly not true of all learning agents. Thus, in Section 2.3, we
outline some alternate perspectives of decision making. In Section 2.4, we review past
related work in multiagent learning. We review general-sum games in more detail in
Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, we discuss the kinds of important information an agent
may or may not know when it is learning. Finally, we provide a brief discussion about
the current state of multiagent learning in the last section of this chapter.
2.1

The Multiagent Learning Problem

In this section, we formalize the multiagent learning problem. Let I be a set
of n agents. Each agent i can choose from a set of actions denoted by Ai . Let
a = (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ), where ai ∈ Ai , be a joint action for the n agents specified by I,
and let A = A1 × · · · × An be the set of possible joint actions of these agents. Let
ati ∈ Ai denote the action played by agent i at time t, and let at = (at1 , at2 , . . . , atn ) be
the vector denoting the joint action played by the n agents at time t. Also, let at (J),
where J ⊆ I, be the joint actions of the |J| agents in J. Let a−i be the joint actions
of all agents except agent i.
Central to multiagent learning is the payoff matrix. Let R = {R1 , · · · , Rn } be the
set of payoff matrices of the game, where Ri is the payoff matrix of agent i. Let ri (a)
be the payoff to player1 i when the joint action a is played, and let rit be the payoff
to player i at time t. Also, let ri (ai , a−i ) be the payoff to player i when it plays ai
and the rest of the agents play a−i .2
1

We use the terms player and agent interchangeably.
More general definitions related to payoff matrices can be given. This definition assumes a
deterministic payoff matrix. However, this definition will suffice for motivating the work of this
dissertation. We will discuss a more general definition in Chapter 5.
2
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A
B

a
b
1, 1 -1, 2
2, -1 0, 0

Table 2.1: An example of a 2-agent, 2-action matrix game.

We are now ready to formally define what is meant by the term matrix game.
Definition 2.1. (Matrix Game) A matrix game is the tuple (I, A, R), where I, A,
and R are defined previously.
As we will be referring to matrix games extensively throughout this dissertation,
we will display them in the format seen in Table 2.1. In this matrix game I =
(player 1, player 2). Player 1 is referred to as the row player and player 2 is the
column player (since player 1 selects a row and player 2 selects the column). Thus,
A1 = {A, B}, A2 = {a, b}, and A = {(A, a), (A, b), (B, a), (B, b)}. Each cell in the
game matrix (shown in Table 2.1) shows the payoffs that are rewarded to the agents
for the unique joint action specified by the row and column. The payoff to the row
player (player 1) is listed first, followed by the payoff to the column player (player
2). For example, if the row player plays B and the column player plays a (which is
the joint action (B, a)), then the row player receives a payoff of 2, while the column
player receives a payoff of -1. Thus, the individual payoff matrices for this game (R1




1 −1
1 2
and R2 ) are R1 =
and R2 =
.
2 0
−1 0
A strategy for agent i is a distribution πi over its action set Ai . Such a strategy
may be a pure strategy (where all probability is placed on a single action) or a mixed
strategy (otherwise). The joint strategy played by the n agents is π = (π1 , π2 , . . . , πn )
and, thus, ri (π) is the expected payoff for agent i when the joint strategy π is played.
A solution (or outcome) is a particular joint strategy3 .
The task of a learning agent is to learn to play a strategy πi such that its average
payoff over time (denoted r̄i for agent i) is maximized. Let r̄i be given by
T
1X
r̄i =
ri (πit , π t−i )
T t=1

(2.1)

where πit is the strategy played by agent i at time t, π t−i is the joint strategy played
by all the agents except agent i, and 1 ≤ T ≤ ∞ is the number of episodes in the
game.
We consider the case in which each round of the game is played between the same
agents. Thus, the length of the game (i.e., T ) is important since it affects how an
3
While a solution is a joint strategy, we often refer to a solution as the joint payoff that it
produces.
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agent should behave. For example, in the one-shot game (i.e., when T = 1) the agents
need not consider how their current action will affect the subsequent actions of the
other agents. Thus, they should play so as to maximize the reward that they will
receive in that round. On the other hand, if T → ∞ (known as an infinitely repeated
game), the agents should consider how their actions will affect the actions of the
agents in subsequent rounds. When T is somewhere in between these two extremes,
the agents must find a balance between maximizing rewards in the current episode
and considering how actions will affect subsequent rewards. We note that the agents
may not know T . In these situations, the agents may believe that play will terminate
with probability γ after each episode.
While successful agents should have the ability to learn to act successfully for all
values of T , we focus in this dissertation on infinitely repeated games or games in
which the probability that play will continue after each episode (i.e., γ) is close to
unity.
In this dissertation, we only consider simultaneous move games. In each episode4
of a simultaneous move matrix game, each agent selects an action without knowledge
of the actions selected by the other agents. The agents are then rewarded based on
the resulting joint action. We note that a second kind of game is a turn-taking game
in which the agents take turns selecting actions. While some argue that turn-taking
games are more representative of real world situations [10], we note that stochastic
games, which we will discuss in Chapter 6, can be designed so that agents must
consider both simultaneous and sequential (turn-taking) decision making.5
2.2

Game Theory

Game theory seeks to explain how agents (should) act so as to maximize their
payoffs when they are associating with other agents. As such, it is relevant to the
multiagent learning problem (at least to the degree that it does explain how agents
should act). In this section, we give a brief overview of the concepts and results that
have had the most influence on the multiagent learning problem to date. A more
in-depth treatment of game theory can be found, among other places, in [35].
2.2.1

Game Theory’s Big Assumption: Rationality

In game theory, all agents are assumed to be rational. That is, game theory
assumes that each agent will play so as to maximize its own payoffs over time. Implicit
with this assumption is the assumption that agents have unlimited resources for
4

An episode of a matrix game is simply the play of a single joint action and the assignment of
the subsequent payoffs
5
Stochastic games can represent (if designed as such) a combination of simultaneous and turntaking games only when the actions of other agents can be observed after each joint action taken by
the agents.
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determining a course of action. This assumption is frequently violated. As a result,
an agent’s associates often behave (seemingly) irrationally. Thus, game theoretic
concepts may dictate behavior that results in low average payoffs over time.
A second drawback of game theory (and its assumption of rationality) is that
it cannot always define what is best. This is because many situations have multiple
equilibria6 . In such situations, the agents may not agree on which equilibrium rational
agents should learn to play. Thus, rationality does not always define how an agent
should behave.
Despite these drawbacks, game theory has played an important role in many multiagent learning algorithms. Specifically, the behavior of these algorithms can sometimes be described by game theory. Additionally, game theory has defined important
goals for multiagent learning algorithms to attain.
2.2.2

Equilibrium Concepts

Central to game theory are equilibria. That is, the play of rational agents should
converge to some strategy. Perhaps the most important of these equilibrium concepts
is the Nash equilibrium.
The Nash Equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium (NE) has had the most impact on the design and evaluation
of multiagent learning algorithms to date. The concept of a Nash equilibrium is closely
tied to the best response. Formally, the strategy πi∗ is a best response for agent i if
ri (πi∗ , π −i ) ≥ ri (πi , π −i ) for all possible πi . When all agents play best responses to
the strategies of other agents, the result is an NE. Thus, in an NE, no agent has
an incentive to unilaterally change its strategy. Nash showed that every game has
at least one NE [60]. However, there is no known algorithm for calculating NEs in
polynomial time [61].
While a self-interested agent should play a best response to the strategies of other
agents (and, thus, all agents should play a best response resulting in an NE), many
games have multiple NEs. In fact, many games have an infinite number of NEs of
the repeated game (rNEs), which we will discuss shortly. Thus, the task of a learning
agent does not end with learning a best response. Rather, a learning agent must
influence its associates to play so that its best response is as profitable as possible.
One-Shot Nash Equilibrium
When only the payoffs of the current episode (in matrix games) are considered,
an NE is said to be a one-shot NE. While the one-shot NE is meant in general for
one-shot games, it has frequently been a goal of multiagent learning algorithms in
6

We discuss equilibrium concepts shortly.
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repeated games (e.g., [9, 41, 52, 18, 8]). This is not completely without justification,
as all one-shot NE are NEs of the repeated game7 .
Minimax
Like the one-shot NE, the minimax solution, another central result of game theory,
is calculated over the payoffs of the game matrix. The minimax solution (or strategy)
for agent i (denoted πim ), which is the strategy that maximizes the minimum payoff
that an agent can receive, is given by
πim = argmax min ri (πi , a−i )
πi

a−i

(2.2)

Note that the minimax solution can be a pure or mixed strategy. However, the min
operator need only be over pure strategy solutions (i.e., the joint actions in the set
A−i ). The minimax value for agent i (denoted mi ) is the average payoff received by
agent i when it plays its minimax strategy and the other agents seek to minimize its
payoffs. Formally, the minimax value for agent i is given by
mi = max min ri (πi , a−i )
πi

a−i

(2.3)

The minimax solution is intriguing for several reasons. First, in constant-sum
games (games in which the payoffs of the agents for any given strategy sum to a
constant), the minimax solution is the unique NE of the game (regardless of whether
the game is repeated or one-shot). However, the minimax solution is not a one-shot
NE in all general-sum games, although it is an NE of the repeated game. Nevertheless,
the minimax value is the highest payoff an agent can expect to receive without the
cooperation of its associates, regardless of the game.
Unlike the NE, the minimax solution and value can be computed via linear programming [51].
Pareto Efficiency
Before discussing rNE, we must first discuss the concept of pareto efficiency. To
do so, we first define what it means to be pareto dominated, a term we will use to
define pareto efficiency.
Definition 2.2. (Pareto Dominated) A solution π is strictly pareto dominated if
there exists a joint action a ∈ A for which ri (a) > ri (π) for all i and weakly pareto
dominated if there exists a joint action a ∈ A for which ri (a) ≥ ri (π) for all i.
Definition 2.3. (Pareto Efficient) A solution π is weakly pareto efficient (PE) if it
is not strictly pareto dominated and strictly PE if it is not weakly pareto dominated.
7

This result can be obtained from the folk theorem, which we discuss shortly.
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cooperate
defect

cooperate
1, 1
2, -1

defect
-1, 2
0, 0

Table 2.2: Payoff matrix for prisoner’s dilemma game.

We note that these definitions specify that the solution π need only be pareto
efficient with respect to pure strategies in order to be considered pareto efficient.
This means that the joint payoff corresponding to a pareto efficient solution π may
very well reside in the interior of the game’s convex hull.
Another point about pareto efficiency that deserves mentioning is that pareto
efficiency should not, ultimately, be the only goal of a self interested agent. This is
because many pareto dominated solutions can give a single agent higher payoffs than
some pareto efficient solutions. However, in games between successful learners, play
should converge to pareto efficient solutions. This is particularly true of self play.
Otherwise, the average expected payoff of an agent will be lower than it need be. We
note several learning algorithms have included pareto efficiency as a goal, including
those described in [67, 62]).
The Folk Theorem and Nash Equilibrium of the Repeated Game
The folk theorem for repeated games is an important part of game theory (although
it has been largely ignored in portions of the multiagent learning community until
recently). A good description of it can be found in, among other places, [35]. Here, we
review it and discuss its implications to multiagent learning in repeated general-sum
games.
Consider the prisoner’s dilemma matrix game shown in Table 2.2. The joint payoff
space of the prisoner’s dilemma game is shown in Figure 2.1. In the figure, the xaxis shows the payoffs to the row player and the y-axis shows the payoffs to the
column player. Convex combinations of the various joint payoffs of the game form
the game’s payoff space (defined by the game’s convex hull), which is the union of
the shaded regions (light and dark) in the figure. Since each player can guarantee
itself a non-negative payoff by playing defect, neither of the players has incentive to
receive an average payoff (over time) less than 0. Thus, the darkly shaded region
in the figure shows the set of joint payoffs that the agents may possibly accept as
reasonable average payoffs per episode of the game. The folk theorem says that any
joint payoff in this region can be sustained by an rNE, provided that the discount
rates of the players are close to unity (i.e., players believe that play will continue with
high probability after each episode).
More formally, let C be the set of points contained in the convex hull of the game.
Any joint payoff (r1 , r2 ) ∈ C such that r1 ≥ m1 and r2 ≥ m2 can be sustained by an
10

Figure 2.1: Payoff space of the prisoner’s dilemma game shown in Table 2.2.

rNE provided, again, that the discount rates of the players are close to unity. Note
that this means that all one-shot NEs are rNEs, as all one-shot NEs do not give an
agent a payoff below its minimax value. The folk theorem can be extended to games
of more than two players [35].
The folk theorem shows that there are an infinite number of rNEs in all games
in which the joint payoff m = (m1 , m2 ) is not pareto efficient (which constitutes
a large portion of general-sum games). Thus, while the folk theorem identifies the
existence of rNEs, it does little to identify which equilibrium (and strategies) that
agents should learn to play. It does, however, help to identify the types of payoffs an
agent can expect to receive. Since a self-interested agent should seek to maximize its
own payoffs over time, it should not, in most cases, be content to play its part of an
NE in which it only receives its security level (mi ). Whether this is the case largely
depends on its associate(s), but in many games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, all
agents may achieve payoffs higher than their security levels if they are willing to
cooperate. In most circumstances, we believe that, if all agents learn successfully,
they should learn to play a pareto efficient rNE.
Littman and Stone [53] give an algorithm to compute, in polynomial time, a
particular rNE for two agent games. In their algorithm, they select an rNE that
yields payoffs that maximize the product of the agents’ advantages8 . This type of
equilibrium solution is suggested by Nash [59].9
While maximizing the product of the agents’ advantages is a reasonable target
rNE (it is pareto efficient and produces reasonably high payoffs for each agent), it
may not be the solution that a self-interested agent would want to adopt. To see
this, consider the matrix game chicken shown in Table 2.3. The game’s payoff space
8

Littman defines agent i’s advantage for the joint action a as ri (a) − mi .
The Nash bargaining solution depends on four axioms, one of which is the independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Littman’s algorithm appears to violate this axiom.
9
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swerve
straight

swerve

straight

3, 3
3.5, 2

2, 3.5
1, 1

Table 2.3: Payoff matrix for the game chicken.

Figure 2.2: Payoff space of the game chicken shown in Table 2.3.

is shown in Figure 2.2. In chicken, each agent can guarantee itself at least 2 points
per episode if it always plays swerve. The one-shot NEs of chicken are for the row
player to play swerve and the column player to play straight and vice versa (labeled as
points C and B in Figure 2.2, respectively). However, when the game repeats many
times, a self-interested agent might be a fool to always accept a payoff of 2, since there
are many rNE that give it higher payoffs. Littman’s algorithm calculates that both
agents should always swerve resulting in a payoff of 3 for each agent (labeled A in
Figure 2.2). However, if the column player will continue to swerve as long as the row
player plays straight no more than every fifth play, then the row player should learn
to play straight every fifth play. This would result in the more desirable (for the row
player) average joint payoff of (3.1, 2.8) (shown as point D in Figure 2.2). However,
learning to play straight every fifth play could result in lower payoffs to the row player
over time if the column player will not “accept” this behavior. Therefore, the solution
that the row player should learn to play is unknown without an understanding of how
the column player will behave.
Correlated Equilibrium
Another powerful equilibrium concept is that of correlated equilibrium (CE) [1].
To understand CEs, consider the case in which each agent observes a signal. The
signals observed by the agents may be correlated or independent. If each agent plays
a best response to the strategies of the other agents given its observed signal, then
12

the resulting strategy is a CE. Thus, in a CE, the signal dictates which strategies the
agents should play. A simple example of a CE is a traffic signal. When two agents
meet at an intersection (going in orthogonal directions), the agents receive the signal
(from the traffic light) of either <GO,STOP> or <STOP,GO>. It is a CE for each agent to
obey its signal, as it is a best response (given that the other agent obeys its signal) for
each agent to do so. A formal definition of CEs is given in [1] (among other places).
When the signals observed by the agents are not correlated, CEs are NEs. Thus,
CEs are a superset of NEs. However, unlike NEs, CEs can be computed via linear programming. Additionally, while no algorithm is known to converge to NEs in general,
no-regret algorithms (which we will discuss shortly) [31] do converge to CEs [40].
2.3

Alternate Perspectives

While game theory is a powerful method for describing the behavior of rational
agents, not all agents are rational (at least from the perspective of game theory).
However, many seemingly irrational agents are successful; more so, sometimes, than
rational agents (which calls into question the rationality of so called rational agents).
One such agent is copy-cat algorithm tit-for-tat (TFT) [2], which was designed
for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In this game, TFT simply plays the action its
associate played on the previous episode. This strategy is, from the perspective of
game theory, irrational, since it would cooperate even when it would be beneficial
for it to defect. However, Axelrod found that TFT performed very well in iterated
prisoner’s dilemma tournaments when associating with a large class of agents. In
fact, in the tournaments conducted by Axelrod, TFT came out the winner.
Because of repeated examples (such as that of TFT) of seemingly irrationality
among successful agents, alternate theories of decision making have been developed.
Some of these theories seek to do completely away with the rationality assumption.
Others seek to modify it slightly or to add to it. In the rest of this section, we present
several of these alternate theories for decision making.
One alternate theory of decision making is known as bounded rationality, a term
coined by Herbert Simon [68]. Bounded rationality says that an agent’s rationality is
bounded by time and knowledge constraints. Thus, rather than seeking to maximize
payoffs, agents seek instead to obtain payoffs that are good enough, or satisficing.
Stirling furthered the notion of satisficing by defining a satisficing equilibrium [74].
A satisficing equilibrium is a joint strategy that yields a result that is good enough for
all agents (i.e., a joint strategy that is satisficing to all agents). While Simon uses an
aspiration-based model, Stirling and his associates argue for a satisficing model with
dichotomous attributes [74, 73, 58, 38].
Satisficing with dichotomous attributes is related to the idea of suspending judgment presented by Levi [48, 49]. Levi argues that when an agent is presented with

13

two conflicting criteria, it must withhold making a judgment (i.e., keep the two criteria separate) until sufficient information can be gathered to resolve the conflict.
This methodology flies in the face of traditional approaches, which combine the two
criteria into one before making a decision.
Many have argued that bounds on rationality mean that agents must use heuristics (based on what they already know) to make decisions [34, 64]. Related to this
argument is Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis which discusses the role of emotions
in the decision making process [25, 26]. Other theories for decision making include
psychological game theory [17], behavioral game theory [11], and Frank’s commitment
model [32]. Others argue that altruistic behavior, not self-interest, largely governs
agents within societies. This, they argue, helps explain why agents cooperate when
they do not necessarily benefit from doing so. A large collection of articles on this
subject can be found in [30].
2.4

Existing Learning Algorithms

In this section, we overview related work in multiagent learning. Because of
the vast number of multiagent learning algorithms found in the literature, we must
restrict our attention to those that have had the most impact on the multiagent
learning community as well as to those that seem to be particularly connected to the
work presented in this dissertation. We divide the learning algorithms that we review
into four different (although related) categories: belief-based learning, reinforcement
learning, no-regret learning, and principle-based learning.
2.4.1

Belief-based Learning

Belief-based agents construct models of the strategies employed by their associates. They then use these beliefs to calculate an optimal policy. Many such algorithms exist, the most studied of which are Fictitious Play [33] and Bayesian learning
(see, for example, [45]).
Fictitious Play
A fictitious play agent models the strategies of its associates by recording the
empirical distribution of their actions. The agent then plays a best response to its
beliefs about the other agents’ strategies. It provably converges (in self play) to a
NE in games that are iterated dominance solvable10 , and does fairly well in learning
one-shot NEs in other games as well (see, for example, [43]). However, it is known
to not converge in games such as Shapley’s game (which is shown in Table 2.4). A
number of other drawbacks of fictitious play include a) it assumes that transitions
10

Iterated dominance solvable games are games that can be solved by iteratively removing actions
that are dominated.
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A
B
C

a
b
c
0, 0 0, 1 1, 0
1, 0 0, 0 0, 1
0, 1 1, 0 0, 0

Table 2.4: Shapley’s Game.

and reward functions are known for all players (i.e., huge knowledge requirements),
and b) it, like many other multiagent learning algorithms, generally performs poorly
in repeated general-sum games in which no one-shot NE is pareto efficient.
An interesting result regarding belief-based agents such as fictitious play is given
in [71]. In this work, Stimpson et al. show that learning models such as fictitious
play are unable to adapt their behavior to the strategies of associates in a specific
public goods game [11]. Thus, the behavior of such agents in this game is essentially
reduced to a purely random strategy.
Bayesian Learning
Fictitious play is a special case of Bayesian learning [33]. General cases of Bayesian
learning have been studied in multiagent systems, perhaps most notably in [45]. In
this work, Kalai and Lehrer show that Bayesian learners that know their own payoff
matrices must eventually play according to an rNE, as long as the individuals’ initial
beliefs about the play of their associates are compatible with the true strategies chosen
their associates. However, no guarantee is placed on which rNE they will learn to
play.
Another important (earlier) work on Bayesian learning is given by Aumann [1]. In
this work, Aumann shows that Bayesian learning leads to convergence to correlated
equilibria.
2.4.2

Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning [44, 75] has frequently been used in multiagent learning
algorithms. However, the use of reinforcement learning algorithms in multiagent environments is not justified mathematically since multiple learners make the environment non-stationary. These environments are non-stationary because the strategies of
learning agents change over time. Nevertheless, reinforcement learning has frequently
been used in multiagent contexts, and not without success (e.g. [16, 66]).
Q-learning
The most commonly used (and extended) reinforcement learning algorithm in
multiagent learning has been Q-learning [76]. Since many of the algorithms we discuss
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in this dissertation are based (to some degree) on this algorithm we now discuss it
briefly.
In Q-learning, an agent seeks to learn the true expected discounted reward Q∗ (s, a)
that it will receive for taking an action a from a particular state s. It does so by
maintaining a Q-estimate Qt (s, a) for each state action pair (s, a). Each time that
action a is taken from state s, the Q-estimate Qt (s, a) is updated using the following
equation:
Qt (s, a) = (1 − α)Qt−1 (s, a) + α[r + γ max Qt−1 (s0 , b)]
b

(2.4)

where r is the immediate reward received, α is the learning rate, s0 is the agent’s
subsequent state, and γ is the discount factor. It has been shown that, as long as
each state-action pair (s, a) is visited/taken infinitely often and the learning rate is
decreased slowly but not too slowly, Qt (s, a) will converge in stationary environments
to Q∗ (s, a) [76]. However, since environments affected by multiple learners are nonstationary, these convergence guarantees do no apply to Q-learners associating with
other learners in repeated games.
While Q-learners typically learn slowly, they require little knowledge of their environment. A Q-learner requires only that it know the actions it can take from each
state and the immediate rewards that it receives when it takes those actions. It does
not require a model of its environment (i.e., state transition probabilities and reward
structure).
Like fictitious play, Q-learning agents and their variants do not typically learn
desirable policies when they play (with other learners) repeated games in which no
one-shot NE is pareto efficient. One exception to this is found in a Q-learning algorithm designed by Sandholm and Crites [66] for use in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma.
Sandholm and Crites showed that the Q-learning algorithm can be made more effective when the actions of other agents are observable, since these actions can be
incorporated into the agent’s state (see also [16, 57]). In such cases, they found that
Q-learners are sometimes able to learn mutual cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma in self play (although their results show that defection is still frequently
learned by these learners).
Because Q-learning is not suited for multiagent environments, a number of extensions of the Q-learning algorithm to multiagent domains have been attempted. We
now review these algorithms11 .
Minimax-Q
Since Q-learning is not mathematically designed for multiagent contexts, it has
been adapted in several interesting ways. The first of these adaptations, called
11
We note that these algorithms are joint-action learners [16]. Joint-action learners learn based on
the joint strategies of the agents rather than their individual strategies. Joint-action learners must
be able to observe the actions of other agents.
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minimax-Q, was presented by Littman [51] for two-agent zero-sum games. Littman
replaced the max operator in Equation (2.4) (i.e., maxb Qt−1 (s0 , b)) with a minimax
operator over the Q-values of the subsequent state s0 . He proved [55] that this technique converges to the game theoretic optimal value (minimax solution) for two-agent
zero-sum games. It is not, however, effective in exploiting inferior agents.12 MinimaxQ also requires knowledge of the actions of other agents.
Nash-Q
A second variation of Q-learning, known as Nash-Q in the literature, was proposed
by Hu and Wellman [41]. Hu and Wellman targeted multiagent learning in general
sum games by replacing the max operator in Equation (2.4) with the payoff associated
with a NE of the Q-values of the subsequent state s0 . In order to do so, they required
that the payoffs and actions of all agents in the game be known (so that the Q-values
of all agents in the game can be calculated). The algorithm provably converges to a
one-shot NE solution (again, over the Q-values) in a limited set of games [41, 7].
Friend-or-Foe Q-learning
A third variation of multiagent Q-learning, called friend-or-foe Q-learning, was
proposed by Littman [52]. Friend-or-foe Q-learning targets adversarial and fully cooperative games. In this algorithm, an agent labels each associate as a friend or
a foe. If an agent is a foe, then Q-values are updated as in the minimax-Q. If an
agent is labeled a friend, then the max operator in Equation (2.4) is replaced with
maxa1 ∈A1 , a2 ∈A2 Q(s0 , a1 , a2 ) (for two agent games), where A1 and A2 are the set of
actions in state s0 available to agents 1 (self) and 2 (friend) respectively. If associates are labeled correctly, the algorithm is guaranteed (in self play) to converge to
a one-shot NE in both adversarial and fully cooperative games. In fully cooperative
games, friend-Q learns (again, in self play) to play the one-shot NE that yields the
highest payoff to all agents. Friend-or-foe Q-learning requires the same knowledge of
the environment as minimax-Q.
Correlated Q-learning
A fourth variation on the Q-learning algorithm generalizes friend-or-foe Q-learning.
This variation, by Greenwald and Hall [39], replaces the max operator in the Q-update
equation with a mechanism that calculates a correlated equilibrium. While somewhat
promising in some contexts, correlated Q-learning can lead to convergence to unprofitable equilibria. Additionally, calculating an appropriate correlated equilibrium is
awkward and requires large knowledge requirements. These knowledge requirements
include knowledge of the actions and payoffs of all agents.
12

Traditional Q-learners are sometimes successful at exploiting inferior agents.
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Wolf-PHC
An important work by Bowling and Veloso [9] further shows the difficulties associated with multiagent learning in general-sum games. Bowling and Veloso proposed
two desiderata that a multiagent learning algorithm should be able to achieve: a) rationality, which they define as learning to play a best response to the stationary
strategies of associates/opponents and b) convergence to a stationary policy. None
of the previous algorithms presented in the literature fulfilled these two qualities in
general-sum games. They proposed an algorithm, called WoLF-PHC (Win or Learn
Fast Policy Hill-Climbing), that fulfills these properties in some important games (in
self play). An agent need only know the actions it can take and the rewards that it
receives in order to implement WoLF-PHC.
This work by Bowling and Veloso has given rise to a large variety of new algorithms, including those that seek to fulfill the rationality and convergence properties
(of which [18] is a notable example). Additionally, this work has led to discussions
of exploiter agents [14, 5], as well as a proposed improvement to the WoLF-PHC
algorithm [4].
Learning Aspirations via Reinforcement Learning
While most reinforcement learning algorithms learn the payoffs associated with
specific actions, a separate vein of reinforcement learning has focused instead on
learning aspiration levels and then using the principle of satisficing to generate strategies [46, 72, 70, 71, 24]. This approach has lead to algorithms that learn near pareto
efficient and fair solutions. We discuss these approaches in more detail in Chapters 3
and 4 of this dissertation.
2.4.3

No-regret Learning

No-regret algorithms (also known as universally consistent algorithms [33]) are
becoming increasingly popular in the literature. Loosely, regret compares an algorithm’s performance with that of its best strategy (or expert [50]). An algorithm is
said to have no-regret if it performs at least as well (in the limit) as its best strategy.
A formal description can be found in [31].
No-regret learning converges to NEs in dominance-solvable, constant-sum, and
2 × 2 general-sum games, but does not converge in Shapley’s Game [43]. This result is
reminiscent of fictitious play. However, no-regret learners require much less knowledge
of the environment than does fictitious play.
A challenge of no-regret algorithms is determining the performance of unplayed
strategies in order to measure regret. This is done by comparing a strategy against
the empirical distribution of associates’ actions. However, this approach often leads
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c
d
C 3, 3 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1

Figure 2.3: Average payoffs over time for GIGA-WoLF [8] (in self play) in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma game shown at left. The payoff matrix played by the agents is
shown at left.

to myopic behavior since it assumes that an agent’s actions do not affect the future strategies of its associates. This assumption is not true of play between learning agents. Figure 2.3 demonstrates this myopic behavior in the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma for the no-regret learning algorithm called GIGA-WoLF [8]. The figure
shows that GIGA-WoLF (quickly) learns to defect in self play, which yields a payoff
of 1 to both agents. We note that this myopic (and pareto dominated) behavior is
typical of most of the algorithms we have discussed in this chapter, and is not limited
to no-regret algorithms.
Algorithms have been developed with intentions to overcome this problem while
maintaining properties of no-regret [27, 15]. However, these algorithms have been
primarily validated for games played with static agents (such as TFT) rather than
games played with other learners.
2.4.4

Principle-based Learning

Of late, a number of algorithms have emerged that select strategies based on
various principles other than on the best response. We make particular mention of
algorithms using the (interconnected) principles of reputation, signaling, and teaching. Below, we outline some justifications for the use of these principles in multiagent
learning as well as some algorithms that follow them.
Reputation
When multiple learning agents interact in repeated general-sum games, reputations [47, 56] may be established to improve payoffs (or decrease them, if undesirable
reputations are established). However, agents must be careful that the signals used
to build reputations can be perceived by the other learning agents, since attempting

19

to construct such reputations may be costly if they are not perceived [32]. We have
done some preliminary work on the role of reputations in multiagent learning [23, 21].
Signaling
Agents send signals (whether explicitly or implicitly, intentionally or unintentionally) that establish their reputations. In his book The Stag Hunt [69], Skyrms
identifies signaling as one of the three important issues for play to converge in social
situations to mutually beneficial equilibrium points (rather than undesirable ones).
Skyrms discusses how signals that contain sufficient information lead to the selection
of certain equilibrium solutions over others. He calls such systems signaling systems.
Work on determining the importance of signals has been plentiful. Of particular
relevance is [65], which analyzes the effect of signaling on pigeons playing the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. However, the application of signals in multiagent learning
algorithms has not been abundant, although Sen et al. [67] does address the matter.
We have done some preliminary work involving implicit signaling in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma [36, 23, 21]. We note also that work on correlated equilibria is tied
closely to signaling.
Teaching
The principles of signaling and reputation both tie in closely to the principle of
teaching. When a learning agent acts in repeated environments with other learners,
it also acts as a teacher to the other agents in the system. However, most multiagent
learning algorithms developed to date have not taken this into account, probably
because of the complexity it appears to add to the learning process. However, teaching
techniques have been used with success by non-learning (static) algorithms.
Littman and Stone [54] demonstrated how a couple of different kinds of “leader”
algorithms can teach best-response learners to play various strategies in two-agent,
two-action canonical games. The first, called Bully, calculates a strategy that induces
best-response agents to play the Nash equilibrium of the stage game most suited to
the Bully agent. The second agent, called Godfather, computes a revenge strategy
(tit-for-tat in the prisoner’s dilemma) to be used if the other agent does not play
cooperatively. Both leader algorithms demonstrate superior performance in selected
games against certain associates, although they both can perform poorly in self-play.
In concluding their paper, Littman and Stone conclude that combinations of leader
and best-response qualities should be incorporated into learning agents. This work is
the foundation for several learning algorithms in the literature [63, 62, 22].
Other examples of teaching in the literature include Camerer et al.’s strategic
teacher [12], work by Baker and Rachlin [3], and TFT. In all these cases, the “teaching” is done by a static agent rather than a learner. We have presented other preliminary results on how teaching methods can be incorporated in learners in [23, 21, 22].
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Matching Pennies

Rock, Paper, Scissors

a
b
A 1, -1 -1, 1
B -1, 1 1, -1

R
P
S

r
p
s
0, 0 -1, 1 1, -1
1, -1 0, 0 -1, 1
-1, 1 1, -1 0, 0

Table 2.5: Two simple competitive matrix games, called zero-sum games. The loss
to one agent is the gain to the other.

We note that a serious drawback of algorithms using these principles is that they,
like game theory, often assume knowledge of the actions and payoffs of other agents.
2.5

General-Sum Games

In this dissertation, we will analyze multiagent learning algorithms in repeated
general-sum games. As we mentioned in Chapter 1, general-sum games can be divided
into three classes or categories: competitive games, cooperative games, and games of
conflicting interest. In this section, we briefly discuss the main characteristics of
each category. We also provide example matrix games for each category that have
generated particular interest in the literature. While we present only matrix games
in this chapter, we note that versions of many of these games also exist in stochastic
(multi-state) games, which we discuss in Chapter 6.
2.5.1

Competitive Games

In competitive games, a loss to one agent is the gain of another agent. Competitive
games have no solution in which all agents receive an average payoff greater than their
minimax value mi . Two simple (yet popular) examples of competitive matrix games
are shown in Table 2.5. Both of these games have a single rNE (a one-shot NE) which
is the minimax solution. Thus, in these games, an agent should receive an average
payoff of mi (provided, of course, that its opponent is unexploitable).
2.5.2

Cooperative Games

Cooperative games are exactly opposite of competitive games. In these games,
all agents share common goals, some of which may be more profitable than others.
Table 2.6 shows a fully cooperative game with two one-shot NEs ((A, a) and (B, b)),
and an infinite number of rNEs. The NE (A, a) is the most desirable outcome.
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a
b
A 4, 4 0, 0
B 0, 0 2, 2
Table 2.6: A fully cooperative matrix game.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
C
D

c
d
3, 3 1, 4
4, 1 2, 2

Staghunt
C
D

c
d
4, 4 1, 3
3, 1 2, 2

Chicken
C
D

c
d
3, 3 2, 4
4, 2 1, 1

Battle of the Sexes
C
D

c
d
1, 1 3, 4
4, 3 2, 2

Tricky Game

Shapley’s Game

a
b
A 0, 3 3, 2
B 1, 0 2, 1

a
b
c
A 0, 0 0, 1 1, 0
B 1, 0 0, 0 0, 1
C 0, 1 1, 0 0, 0

Table 2.7: Six games of conflicting interest. In these matrix games, agents must offer
and accept compromise to be successful when they associate with other successful
learners.

2.5.3

Games of Conflicting Interest

In games of conflicting interest, agents do not necessarily agree on the solution
that should be played. However, the agents need not compete. In fact, in these
games, agents can offer and accept compromises to increase their average payoffs over
time. Table 2.7 shows six games of conflicting interest. We now discuss these games
since we we will be discussing the performance of learning algorithms in these games
throughout this dissertation.
Prisoner’s Dilemma The prisoner’s dilemma is perhaps the most studied social
dilemma (e.g., [2, 13]), as it appears to model many social situations. In the prisoner’s
dilemma, defection (D for player 1 and d for player 2) is each agent’s dominant13
action. The joint action in which both agents defect is pareto dominated (by the
solution (C, c)). Both agents can increase their payoffs by coaxing the other agent
to cooperate. To do so, an agent must (usually) be willing to cooperate (at least
to some degree) in return. An n-agent, m-action version of this game is given by
Stimpson [70, 71].
Chicken The game chicken has been shown to model the Cuban Missile Crisis [13]
among other real-life situations. The game has two one-shot NEs ((C, d) and (D, c)).
13

A dominant action produces a higher payoff (to the agent playing the action) than any other
action regardless of the actions played by associates.
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However, in a repeated game, either agent may be unwilling to repeatedly receive a
payoff of 2 (its minimax value) when much more profitable solutions are available.
Thus, in such cases, compromises can be reached, such as the rNE (C, c) (among
others).
Battle of the Sexes This game models the stereotypical dilemma between husband and wife. They want to be together (hopefully) but do not always like doing the
same things. This dilemma has been studied repeatedly (e.g., [13]) in the literature.
Frequently, it is assumed that playing one of the one-shot NE solutions repeatedly,
yielding payoffs of 4 to one player and 3 to the other, is acceptable behavior. However,
an alternate (and possibly more desirable) solution is for the agents to alternate (take
turns) receiving the high payoff (of 4).
Staghunt It has been argued that the staghunt models repeated social interactions more realistically than the prisoner’s dilemma [69]. While it appears that the
solution to the game is obvious (the solution (C, c) is best for both agents), fear of
defection by the associating agent can lead to the NE (D, d), which gives each agent
only a payoff of 2. This fear is increased if payoffs of 1 in this payoff matrix are
lowered considerably, which case we will study in subsequent chapters.
Tricky Game This game, presented in [8] is an interesting game theoretically,
although it is not likely to be seen in nature. In this game, mi = 1 for each agent.
The unique one-shot NE is for each agent to play randomly, resulting in an average
payoff of 1.5. However, this one-shot NE is clearly pareto dominated by the solution
(A, b) (among others), which is the solution suggested by Littman [53]). Agents can
offer and accept compromises (as well as issue threats) to ensure that this solution
(or some other closely related solution) is played.
Shapley’s Game This game (which is studied in, among other places, [33]) has
often been used to show that various learning algorithms do not converge. The game
has a unique one-shot NE in which all agents play randomly. This NE yields a payoff
of 13 to each agent. However, if the agents alternate between “winning” (receiving a
payoff of 1) and “losing” (receiving a payoff of 0), they each receive an average payoff
of 12 . This pareto efficient strategy (which can be an rNE) is ignored in the literature.
2.6

Knowledge and Information

We mentioned previously that artificial agents should be able to learn given the
knowledge afforded by their environments. When environments afford more information, agents should be able to use the extra information to learn more successfully
(i.e., learn faster and learn better solutions). All of the games we have mentioned
in this chapter can be played in environments that afford various amounts of knowledge to an agent. Below, we list the various categories of information (in order of
increasing sophistication) that may be available to an agent in these (and other)
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games. Knowledge of each category can be available to an agent in various degrees
(i.e., probabilistically).
• An agent’s own actions. Knowledge of the actions that one can take is a
basic requirement of agency. An agent must be able to determine what it can
do in order for it to make a choice.
• An agent’s own payoffs. We also consider being able to observe the payoffs
that one receives as a basic knowledge requirement for learning. However, information in this category may be available to an agent in various degrees. For
example, an agent may sometimes know many consequences of various actions
prior to acting in its environment, or it may need to learn these consequences
through experimentation.
• Existence of other agents. Knowledge of whether other agents are acting on
the same environment can dramatically increase an agents ability to learn.
• Associates’ actions. Knowledge of the actions that other agents in the environment take can make the learning problem much easier in many situations.
Information of this type may also be observable in varying degrees.
• Associates’ payoffs. Being able to observe the payoffs that associates receive
allows the interactions between agents to be much more complicated. For example, if an agent knows (to some degree) the payoffs that other agents receive,
it can make intelligent threats to induce those agents to act in different ways.
• Associates’ internals. Knowing (or being able to learn) the internal state
and processes of associates can be very useful to an agent. However, it is not
always practical, particularly if one’s associates are complex. Information such
as the learning processes employed by associates, learning rates, etc. fit into
this category.
Note that when an agent does not know the payoffs and actions of other agents,
offering and accepting beneficial compromises becomes increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, successful learners should learn to do so.
2.7

Discussion

The most influential approaches to multiagent learning to date have advocated
that learning agents should seek to learn to play best-response strategies. Typically,
this has been done by seeking to learn an equilibrium strategy based on the current
episode (i.e., a myopic best response). Nevertheless, it has been shown that these
(myopic) best-response approaches do not always produce adequate payoffs over time
in games between learning agents [54]. Examples of games in which (myopic) best
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response strategies demonstrate undesirable characteristics include social dilemmas,
such as the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, chicken, public goods games, etc. We advocate that learning algorithms must be developed that can learn to offer and accept
profitable compromises (when beneficial) in these games. Furthermore, agents should
learn to protect themselves from being exploited.
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Chapter 3
Learning Near Pareto Efficient Solutions with Minimal Knowledge Requirements Using Satisficing
3.1

Introduction

Many applications to which multiagent learning can be applied require agents to
cooperate with and adapt to each other on an ongoing basis. Thus, inherently, these
applications of multiagent learning involve repeated play. This suggests that in many
applications, the Nash equilibrium perspective should be replaced by a Nash bargaining perspective [59, 60], since learning a one-shot best-response (locally optimal)
solution is not always desirable when agents interact repeatedly. It is, therefore, important that multiagent learning algorithms be developed that learn bargaining-like
solutions. This entails that the algorithms learn to play pareto efficient or near pareto
efficient solutions high percentages of the time when it is feasible, and have a solid
fallback position when it is not. Such an approach also dictates that solutions be fair,
meaning (loosely) that all agents receive relatively high payoffs.
Many real-world applications also require agents to learn in non-stationary environments where only partial information about the world and/or other agents is
available. Thus, it is desirable for multiagent learning algorithms to learn effectively
when minimal information is available to the agent.
In this chapter, we discuss multiagent learning in repeated general-sum matrix
games with these two goals in mind: a) learning near pareto efficient solutions and
b) requiring minimal knowledge/information about the environment. Specifically, we
focus on learning near pareto efficient solutions when only knowledge of one’s own
actions and payoffs are available. Thus, we assume that an agent cannot observe the
actions and payoffs of other agents.
While many multiagent learning algorithms have been developed, one of the more
promising algorithms for learning pareto efficient solutions is a satisficing learning
algorithm developed by Karandikar et al. [46]. Karandikar et al. analyzed the algorithm in a set of two-agent repeated play matrix games and found that, in self play,
it converges to a pareto efficient (and cooperative) solution with probability close
to unity. This algorithm was modified slightly and analyzed in a multiagent social
dilemma (MASD) by Stimpson and Goodrich [72, 71, 70]. Again, they found that,
when certain conditions are met, the satisficing algorithm (in self play) converges to
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a pareto efficient solution with probability close to one in the MASD.
In this chapter, we analyze the algorithm presented by Stimpson and Goodrich
(which we call the S-Algorithm) in the context of general-sum matrix games. We
show that the S-Algorithm converges to a near pareto efficient solution (in self play)
provided that certain conditions are met. We show that these conditions can be met in
most repeated general-sum games (and all 2-agent general-sum games). Additionally,
we present an empirical study showing the behavior of the S-Algorithm (in self play) in
a variety of general-sum matrix games. In this study, we compare the performance of
the S-Algorithm with the performance of two other well-analyzed learning algorithms
(WoLF-PHC [9] and Q-learning [76]).
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide some background information. This includes a list of terms and definitions that we will use
throughout this chapter, as well as a discussion of related work. We will then review
previous work on aspiration-based satisficing learning in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4,
we show that the S-Algorithm learns (in self play) to play near pareto efficient solutions in most general-sum matrix games with arbitrarily high probability, provided
that certain initial conditions are met. We present an empirical study of the SAlgorithm in Section 3.5. In the last section, we summarize the chapter and provide
further commentary on the S-Algorithm.
3.2

Background

In this section, we give some background information relevant to this chapter.
First, we give terms and definitions that we will use throughout the chapter. We
follow this with a discussion of some related work.
3.2.1

Terms and Definitions

In this chapter, we use the same notation related to strategies and payoffs that
was introduced in the previous chapter. We now define additional terms and notation.
We begin by revisiting the notion of pareto efficiency.
Definition 3.1. (Pareto Dominated) A solution π is strictly pareto dominated if
there exists a joint action a ∈ A for which ri (a) > ri (π) for all i and weakly pareto
dominated if there exists a joint action a ∈ A for which ri (a) ≥ ri (π) for all i.
Definition 3.2. (Pareto Efficient) A solution π is weakly pareto efficient (PE) if it
is not strictly pareto dominated and strictly PE if it is not weakly pareto dominated.
Unless specified, the former (i.e. weakly PE) terminology is implied.
While pareto efficiency can be a goal of an agent who is involved in repeated play,
it is sometimes difficult and impractical to guarantee. We relax this goal slightly by
seeking near pareto efficiency.
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A
B
C

a
b
c
1, 4 1.3, 2.8
2, 2
3, 3 0.6, 0.4 2.3, 0.9
4.5, 1 0.2, 2 3.2, 0.3

Figure 3.1: Diagram (shown at right) of the regions P, Pε (with ε = 0.5), and Dε in
the payoff space R2 for the 3 × 3 matrix game (shown at left).

Definition 3.3. (ε-Pareto Dominated) A solution π is strictly ε-pareto dominated
if there exists a joint action a ∈ A for which ri (a) > ri (π) + ε for all i and weakly
ε-pareto dominated if there exists a joint action a ∈ A for which ri (a) ≥ ri (π) + ε for
all i.
Definition 3.4. (ε-Pareto Efficient) A solution π is weakly ε-pareto efficient (ε-PE)
if it is not strictly ε-pareto dominated and strictly ε-PE if it is not weakly ε-pareto
dominated. The former (i.e. weakly ε-PE) terminology is implied unless specified
otherwise.
We now give names to various regions of the reward space of n agents, some of
which are shown (graphically) in Figure 3.1 for an arbitrary 3×3 matrix game (shown
at left) with ε = 0.5. The ×’s depict the joint payoffs of the pure strategy solutions
of the game. Let Rn denote the real-valued reward space. Let D be the subset of Rn
that is weakly pareto dominated. Let P = Rn − D. That is, P is the subset of Rn that
is strictly PE. Also, let Dε be the subset of Rn that is strictly ε-pareto dominated.
Finally, let Pε = D − Dε .
The pareto boundary divides set D from set P in the payoff space Rn . If v ∈ D,
then v is said to be below the pareto boundary. If v ∈ P, v is said to be above
the pareto boundary. Likewise, the ε-pareto boundary divides set Dε from set Pε .
If v ∈ Dε or v ∈ Pε , then v is said to be below or above the ε-pareto boundary,
respectively.
Also, we say that the pure strategy solution a ∈ X, where X is some region of the
payoff space, if (r1 (a), . . . , rn (a)) ∈ X.
It is also important to understand the way we use terms associated with satisficing.
Let αit be agent i’s aspiration level at time t, and let αt = (α1t , . . . , αnt ) be the joint
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aspirations of the agents at time t. A solution π is satisficing to agent i if ri (π) ≥ αit .
Likewise, an agent is satisfied if the most recently played joint action was satisficing
to it. A solution π is mutually satisficing at time t if ri (π) ≥ αit for all i. Let Si (αi ) be
the set of pure strategy solutions that are satisficing to agent i given its aspiration level
αi . Then, we have the mutually satisficing set S(α) = S1 (α1 ) ∩ S2 (α2 ) ∩ · · · ∩ Sn (αn ).
3.2.2

Related Work

In this chapter, we discuss learning near pareto efficient solutions (in self play).
Few learning algorithms have had this as a goal in the context of general-sum games,
particularly when the actions and payoffs of other agents are not observable. We
refer the reader to Section 2.2.2 for a further discussion on learning pareto efficient
solutions in general-sum games.
Many algorithms have been developed which assume that the actions and payoffs
of other agents are not available. In particular, many no-regret algorithms have this
property (e.g., [31, 8, 43]), as well as WoLF-PHC [9], and standard (independentaction) Q-learners [76]. We note that each of these algorithms tends to play myopically
in repeated matrix games, particularly in games in which no one-shot NE is pareto
efficient.
This section discusses an aspiration-based satisficing learning algorithm. Satisficing, which is a term meaning good enough, has its roots in work by Simon on bounded
rationality [68]. An alternate form of satisficing (using dichotomous attributes) is presented by Stirling and associates [74, 73, 58, 38], which is based somewhat on Levi’s
work on suspending judgment [48, 49]. A combination of Q-learning and dichotomous
satisficing for single agent problems is manifest in Goodrich’s Satisficing Q-learning
algorithm [37].
3.3

Aspiration-based Satisficing Learning

In this section, we review two versions of the aspiration-based satisficing learning
algorithm. First, we review the work of Karandikar et al. [46]. Second, we review the
work of Stimpson and Goodrich [70, 72, 71].
3.3.1

Karandikar et al. (1998)

Karandikar et al. [46] studied the behavior of a satisficing algorithm in the set
of 2 × 2 matrix games depicted in Figure 3.2. The authors imposed the following
constraints on the values of the matrix: σ > δ > 0 and 0 ≤ θ 6= δ. When θ > σ the
game is a prisoner’s dilemma.1 Also, when θ = 0, the game is a pure coordination
game, where the joint actions (C, C) and (D, D) are both one-shot NEs.
1

Note that this does not constitute a prisoner’s dilemma as defined by Axelrod [2]. Axelrod
imposed the additional constraint that σ > θ2 .
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C
C σ, σ
D θ, 0

D
0, θ
δ, δ

Figure 3.2: 2 × 2 matrix game studied by Karandikar et al. The following constraints
on the values of the matrix where imposed: σ > δ > 0 and 0 ≤ θ 6= δ.

Repeat
(a) Select an action ati according to the following rule:
if (rit−1 < αit−1 ) then with probability 1 − p
ati 6= at−1
(switch actions)
i
otherwise
ati = at−1
i
(b) Receive reward rit and update aspiration level:
With probability η
αit+1 = g(αit )
Otherwise
αit+1 ← λαit + (1 − λ)rit

Algorithm 3.1: The satisficing algorithm for agent i as presented by Karandikar et al.

The Algorithm
The satisficing learning algorithm as presented by Karandikar et al. is given in
Algorithm 3.1. In short, an agent repeats its action of the previous episode whenever
it is satisfied. Otherwise, the agent is disappointed and it switches its action with
probability 1 − p (thus, it repeats the action of the previous episode with probability
p). The probability p is based on the degree of the agent’s disappointment, which is
given by αit − rit . The authors specify that p should be bounded away from 0, meaning
that an agent continues its same action with at least some probability p̃ > 0 (thus,
p ≥ p̃). The probability p is called the agent’s inertia.
After both agents select an action, the resulting reward rit is observed and the
aspiration level (αit ) is either perturbed according to the distribution g(αit )2 or moved
toward rit using the convex combination
αit+1 ← λαit + (1 − λ)rit

2

(3.1)

Karandikar et al. did not discuss the distribution g(αit ) in great detail other than specifying that
aspiration trembles could occur on either side of αit . Also, aspirations should remain in the region
of feasible payoffs. In the next chapter, we will analyze how this distribution affects the long-term
performance of the algorithm.
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While most learning algorithms found in the literature have focused on learning
the value of an action, Karandikar et al.’s algorithm focuses instead on learning an
appropriate aspiration level. We will show in Chapter 5 that these approaches are
indeed quite similar. However, the aspiration-based approach offers many important
insights into the multiagent learning problem that are not immediately obvious (nor
typically used) in action-based learning approaches.
Results
Karandikar et al. considered the situation in which two satisficing agents (with
identical learning rates) play the set of matrix games defined in Figure 3.2. The
behavior of these two agents can be described by a Markov process P η over the state
space, which can be identified as the set E ≡ A × Rn . A related process is the process
P, which describes the joint behavior of the agents in the absence of trembles. We
refer to P η as the trembled process and P as the untrembled process.
Let st = (at−1 , αt−1 ) denote the state of the process at time t3 . A pure strategy
state is a state in αit−1 = rit−1 (at−1 ). Thus, if the untrembled process P is in a pure
strategy state at time T , then st = st+1 for all t > T thereafter. Karandikar et
al. showed that, in the set of games depicted in Figure 3.2, P converges to some pure
strategy state regardless of the initial state s0 .
The authors also showed that the trembled process P η converges to a unique
invariant distribution, regardless of the initial state of the algorithm. Additionally,
they showed (and this is their main result) that the limit invariant distribution places
almost all of its weight on the (C, C) pure strategy state, provided that the learning
rate λ is sufficiently close to unity.
Intuition behind this result is depicted by Figure 3.3. Because of aspiration trembles (among other things), the joint aspirations will eventually move into the shaded
region of the payoff space, which is the region in which only the (C, C) solution is
mutually satisficing. Since agents repeat their actions when they are satisfied, the
longer that aspirations remain in this region, the more likely the agent is to enter
the (C, C) pure strategy state. Since λ controls how quickly aspirations change over
time, λ close to unity means that the agent will spend most of its time in the (C, C)
pure strategy state.
The argument (and corresponding proof) showing that λ controls the minimum
amount of time that joint aspirations will remain in a given region was also made by
Stimpson et al. (as we will see). Since we will also be using this result, we now review
it (in the form of a lemma). We note that since this lemma assumes the absence of
aspiration trembles, it is applicable only to the untrembled process P.
3

Note that st is determined by the joint action and joint aspirations of the previous episode since
agent i’s behavior is dependent on the comparison between rit−1 and αit−1 (see Algorithm 3.1).
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Figure 3.3: The payoff space of a particular prisoner’s dilemma game. Once aspirations enter the shaded region, only mutual cooperation is mutually satisficing.

Let T (λ, x) be the minimum number of episodes before a single agent’s aspirations
T (λ,x)+t
have deviated by x units (i.e., |αi
− αit | ≥ x) (given the learning rate λ).
Lemma 3.1. As λ → 1, T (λ, x) → ∞ for all x > 0.
Proof. It follows from the aspiration update rule given in Equation 3.1 that the maximum change in an agent’s aspiration level in one episode is given by
|αit+1 − αit | = (1 − λ)|rit − αit | ≤ (1 − λ)W

(3.2)

where W is the maximum difference between aspirations and payoffs, given by max(rimax −
αit , αit − rimin ), where rimax and rimin are the maximum and minimum payoffs that an
agent can receive on any given episode. Then it follows that


x
T (λ, x) =
(3.3)
(1 − λ)W
It is obvious from Equation (3.3) that T (λ, x) → ∞ as λ → 1.
In the infinitely repeated games in question, the (C, C) outcome is as much as
one can expect to receive (at least when limited to pure strategy outcomes) when
associating with another learner. This is because both agents can fallback to the
defection action (its minimax solution) if its associate tries to do better by defecting.
However, aspiration-based satisficing learning algorithms is the only class of learning
algorithms that we know of that learns mutual cooperation in self play of the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma when the actions and payoffs of other agents are unknown.
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Karanikar et al. noted that the ability of this algorithm to learn mutual cooperation in these games comes with a price. While many (action-based) learning algorithms seek to learn a best response when associating with static (non-learning)
agents, the satisficing learning algorithm does not. Indeed, the satisficing learning
algorithm typically does not learn a best response to a static mixed strategy (and in
some circumstances, a static pure strategy). The desirable features of the satisficing
learning algorithm (i.e., convergence to pareto efficient solutions in which all agents
benefit) arise from the joint behavior of the agents.
3.3.2

Stimpson et al. (2003)

Stimpson and Goodrich extended the satisficing learning algorithm to n-agent,
m-action matrix games, and analyzed the algorithm in a multiagent social dilemma
(MASD). We now review the resulting algorithm (which we call the S-Algorithm),
the MASD (as presented in [71]), and Stimpson et al.’s findings.
Algorithm
The S-Algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3.2. The algorithm is identical to the satisficing learning algorithm presented by Karandikar et al. except for three important
differences. First, the S-Algorithm requires (for success) that initial aspirations be
set high4 . Second, the S-Algorithm does not explicitly incorporate inertia (although
an element of inertia still remains since an action yielding a non-satisficing result will
be repeated with probability A1i ). This modification becomes necessary for extending
the algorithm to m-action games. Third, no aspiration trembles are employed by the
S-Algorithm.
To better understand the S-Algorithm, consider Figure 3.4, which shows the payoff
space of a 3 × 3 matrix game (shown with ε = 0.5). The payoffs to player 1 are
plotted as x-coordinates and the payoffs to player 2 are plotted as y-coordinates.
In the figure, ×’s indicate ε-PE solutions, +’s indicate non-ε-PE solutions, and the
circle (o) indicates the current joint aspirations of the agents. All solutions in the
region marked by the gray rectangle (the satisficing region) are mutually satisficing.
At the time shown in the figure, the only solution in the satisficing region is ε-PE.
Once the solution in the satisficing region is played, it will be played in every episode
thereafter. However, if it is not played by the agents, aspirations are likely to relax
until the satisficing region contains a (pure strategy) solution that is not ε-PE, which
would make convergence to a non-ε-PE solution possible. Thus, as in Karandikar’s
4

We note that setting initial aspirations appropriately requires that various values of the game
matrix are known. Even though the game matrix is unknown (and, even, unobservable), an agent
can observe its highest payoff (with high probability) during an exploration period prior to beginning
learning if associates also adequately explore during this time period. This value can be used to
initialize an agent’s aspiration level.
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1. Set initial aspirations (αi0 ) high
2. Repeat
(a) Select anaction ati according to the following criteria:
at−1
if (αit−1 ≤ rit−1 )
i
ati ←
rand(Ai ) otherwise
where rand(Ai ) denotes a random selection from the set Ai .
(b) Receive reward rit and update aspiration level:
αit+1 ← λαit + (1 − λ)rit

Algorithm 3.2: The S-Algorithm for agent i as presented by Stimpson and Goodrich.

Figure 3.4: The payoff space of a 3 × 3 matrix game.

version of the algorithm, slower learning rates (i.e., high λ) make convergence to ε-PE
solutions more likely.
A Multiagent Social Dilemma (MASD)
Stimpson and Goodrich analyzed the S-Algorithm in a multiagent social dilemma
(MASD) [71, 70]. In each episode of the MASD, each of the n agents is faced with the
decision of allocating M units of some discrete resource toward either its own goal or
the group goal (i.e., a common goal shared by the n agents). Let ati be the amount
contributed by agent i toward the group goal at time t (and thus agent i contributes
M − ati toward its own selfish goal). For each agent, there are M + 1 possible actions
(ati ∈ {0, 1, . . . , M }). Let each agent’s payoff be represented as a linear combination
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of the amount the group contributes to the group goal and the amount the agent
contributes to its own goal. Let kGi be agent i’s weighting of the group goal and let
kSi be agent i’s weighting of its own selfish goal. Then rit (at ) (agent i’s payoff at time
t when the joint action at is played) is given by
" n
#
X
(3.4)
rit (at ) = kGi
atj + kSi (M − ati )
j=1

If we suppose that only the relative (not absolute) utilities are important (and
assume that all agents use the same weights kG and kS ), the number of parameters
1
can be reduced by letting kG = nM
and kS = Mk , where k is some positive constant5 .
A resulting relative payoff of rit (at ) can be used, given by
h P
i
n
1
t
t
a
j=1 j − kai
n
t t
ri (a ) =
(3.5)
M (1 − k)
Figure 3.5 shows the payoff space of a two-agent MASD with k = 0.6, M = 3,
and n = 2. The solution marked with the o is the solution in which both agents
allocate all their resources to the group goal. The solution marked * is the solution
corresponding to the event in which each agent allocates all of its resources to its
own individual goal. The two solutions marked +’s correspond to the events in which
one agent gives all its resources to the group good, and the other contributes all its
resources to its own individual goal. These four specially marked solutions correspond
to the payoff space of a prisoner’s dilemma, and the convex hull of these four solutions
is equivalent to the convex hull of the MASD6 . The other solutions of this game are
marked with ×’s in the figure.
Results
Most of the work of Stimpson et al. focuses on the MASD. However, their initial
work [72] gives an empirical study of the (slightly modified) S-Algorithm in the set
of matrix games defined by Karandikar. The study analyzes how different learning
rates and initial parameter settings affect the performance of the S-Algorithm in these
games. Perhaps the most insightful of their findings is that the probability of mutual
cooperation is not only dependent on the learning rate λ, but it is also dependent on
how initial aspirations are set. They concluded that initial aspirations should be set
high.
Stimpson et al. also showed that Q-learners and basic belief-based agents do not
perform well in the MASD. They showed that the behavior of basic belief-based agents
The game is really only interesting when n1 < k < 1.
6
This insight shows that playing the classical iterated prisoner’s dilemma is essentially a MASD
(with n = 2) if the state of the agents is based on the previous M joint actions of the agents (when
such information is observable).
5
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Figure 3.5: The payoff space of a 4 × 4 MASD (k = 0.6, M = 3, n = 2).

is essentially random in this game. On the other hand, if initial aspirations are high
enough (i.e., above the pareto boundary) and if learning rates are slow enough, then
the S-Algorithm learns to play pareto efficient solutions with high probability in the
MASD (in self play). Additionally, if initial aspirations and learning rates are similar
among the agents, then the pareto efficient solution that is most likely to be played
is the Nash bargaining solution (the solution corresponding to the event in which all
agents allocate all of their resources to the group goal).
Central to multiagent learning theory is the idea of security, or bounded loss [60].
Such is the concept behind the minimax value, etc. In the MASD, Stimpson et
al. showed that the S-Algorithm also learns to play the minimax solution (defect, or
contribute all resources to the individual goal) with high probability (dependent on
λ) when associating with defecting agents. We note, however, that this result does
not apply to games in which the minimax solution is a mixed strategy.
3.4

The S-Algorithm in General-Sum Matrix Games (Theoretical Results)

The works of Karandikar et al. and Stimpson et al. show in two different (yet
related) contexts that aspiration-based satisficing learning results (in self play) in
the agents learning to play a pareto efficient solution (with high probability). These
results raise several questions. Does the S-Algorithm learn to play ε-pareto efficient
solutions in all general-sum matrix games? If so, what conditions bring about this
result? If not so, in what set of games does this result hold?
We answer these questions in this section. Before doing so, however, we analyze
the untrembled process P in greater detail.
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3.4.1

The Untrembled Process and Critical Events in General-Sum Games

Since the S-Algorithm has converged (learned) once it plays a mutually satisficing
solution, it is essential that we have an understanding of the probability that mutually
satisficing solutions will be played. That is, we must understand P r(a) for all a ∈
S(αt ), where P r(a) denotes the probability that the solution a will be played (given
1
the current state of the process P). When all agents act randomly, then P r(a) = |A|
for all a. However, the S-Algorithm dictates that an agent act randomly only when it
is not satisfied. Since it is common that at least one of the agents in the game will be
satisfied (albeit temporarily), P r(a) is unknown in an unknown general-sum matrix
game.
Fortunately, to show that the S-Algorithm can learn to play ε-PE solutions in
general-sum matrix games (with high probability), we need only guarantee for some
continuous subregion of the game’s payoff space that a) only ε-PE solutions are mutually satisficing and that b) for each τ (a constant) episodes in which joint aspirations
remain in this subregion, there is a positive probability that one such solution will
be played. If we can guarantee that joint aspirations will remain in this subregion
for T ≥ 1 episodes, Lemma 3.1 shows us that T can be made arbitrarily large. This,
in turn, means that the probability that the S-Algorithm will learn to play an ε-PE
solution can be arbitrarily large.
Recall that the untrembled process P is defined over the continuous state space
A × Rn . However, this state space be can partitioned into a finite7 set of contiguous
disjoint subregions by the observation that the probability that an action is selected
at any given moment t is solely dependent on the previous joint action at−1 and each
agent i’s satisficing set Si (αit−1 ). Thus, when considering only action probabilities,
the state st of P is given by st = (at−1 , S1 (α1t−1 ), · · · , Sn (αnt−1 )). Thus, W is called a
subregion8 of Rn if, for all i ∈ I, Si (αi ) is constant for all α ∈ W. In other words,
a subregion is a subset of Rn in which all of the agents’ satisficing sets are identical
for all joint aspirations vectors in the region. Figure 3.6 demonstrates how satisficing
sets partition Rn in this way for an arbitrary 2-agent game. Each rectangle in the
figure is a separate subregion of Rn .
From each joint aspiration vector α ∈ W (where W is a subregion of Rn ) the same
set of critical events can occur. A critical event is a joint action (of a subset of the
agents) that makes P r(a) become 0 for at least one a ∈ A for the remainder of the
time that joint aspirations remain in the current subregion. In other words, a critical
event is a joint action that reduces the number of solutions that will be played (for
some period of time).
More formally, consider the example timeline shown in Figure 3.7. In the timeline, three different events are labeled. At time t0 , the joint aspirations α enter the
7
8

Finite if we assume a finite number of actions for each agent.
Note the specific definition of the term subregion as it is used in this chapter.
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Figure 3.6: The payoff space Rn is partitioned into subregion in which all vectors in
each subregion have a constant satisficing set Si for all i.

Figure 3.7: Timeline of the events surrounding a critical event.

subregion W. At time t, the joint action at (J) is played, where J ⊆ I. At time tk ,
−
the joint aspirations leave the subregion W. Let TW
be the time interval (t0 , t] and
+
let TW the time interval (t, tk ] (as shown in the figure).
Definition 3.5. (Critical Event) at (J), where J ⊆ I, is a critical event if, for some
−
v ∈ A, there exists some ζ ∈ TW
such that P r(aζ = v) > 0 and P r(aτ = v) = 0 for
+
all τ ∈ TW
.
−
We say that a critical event excludes the solution v if there exists some ζ ∈ TW
+
such that P r(aζ = v) > 0 and P r(aτ = v) = 0 for all τ ∈ TW
. Thus, a critical
event is a joint action that excludes at least one solution v ∈ A. If a solution is not
excluded, then it is called a non-excluded solution. Also, we say that critical event k
excludes critical event d if critical event k makes it impossible for critical event d to
be played while aspirations remain in the current subregion.
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Figure 3.8: Timeline of the events surrounding two critical events in the same subregion.

Notice that the definition of a critical event does not discuss the effects of the
critical event after the joint aspirations leave the current subregion. However, the
effects of some critical events continue after joint aspirations have left the current
subregion. If the effects of a critical event are permanent (i.e., the critical event
makes it so that a solution will not be played for all τ > t), then the critical event is
said to be stable. Otherwise, the critical event is said to be unstable.
Multiple critical events can occur while joint aspirations remain in the same subregion, although no more than one critical event can occur on any given episode.
Consider the timeline shown in Figure 3.8. In the figure, a critical event first occurs
at time tc , meaning that at least one solution v ∈ A is excluded by the joint action taken at time tc until aspirations leave the current subregion. Note that in the
−
+
Figure 3.8, the time intervals Tc− and Tc+ have replaced TW
and TW
in Figure 3.7.
A second critical event occurs at time td . We say that the critical event at time td
refines the critical event at time tc since it excludes at least one additional solution
from being played for the remainder of the time that the joint aspirations remain in
W.
Three types of critical events occur with the S-Algorithm. They are selection
critical events, security critical events, and preclusion critical events. We describe
each type of critical event in the discussions that follow.
Selection Critical Events
Selection critical events are demonstrated by the game example shown in Figure 3.9. If the joint action (A, a) is played during the time in which joint aspirations
are in the shaded subregion shown in the figure, then both agents will become satisfied (since they both receive a payoff at least as great as their aspiration level). Thus,
they will play this joint action in each episode thereafter with probability 1, and the
other three joint actions will not be played thereafter. Observe that any subregion to
the left and down of the shaded subregion also contains this same critical event (but
they may also contain other possible critical events as well).
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A
B

a
b
(4, 4) (1, 3)
(3, 1) (2, 2)

Figure 3.9: Example situation in which a selection critical event can occur. The joint
action (A, a) is a selection critical event when joint aspirations are somewhere in the
shaded subregion.

Formally, a selection critical event is a mutually satisficing solution. If a selection
critical event is ε-PE, then the S-Algorithm has learned to play an ε-PE solution. On
the other hand, if a selection critical event is not ε-PE, the S-Algorithm has learned
to play a non-ε-PE solution. Note that all selection critical events are stable.
Security Critical Events
A second type of critical event, the security critical event, is illustrated by a second
example, which is depicted in Figure 3.10. In this game, if joint aspirations are in
the shaded subregion (or if the row player’s aspiration level is 3 or less), a security
critical event occurs when player 1 (the row player) plays A. Once player 1 plays A, it
will continue to do so from then on (and, thus, the joint actions (B, a) and (B, b) will
have zero probability of being played from then on), while player 2 will play randomly
until its aspiration level falls to 2 (or below). At this point, the joint aspiration vector
will be in the subregion just below the shaded subregion, and a second critical event
(a selection critical event) will eventually refine the first critical event when player 2
plays the action a.
The joint action (B, a) in Figure 3.10 is a selection critical event if it is played when
joint aspirations are in the shaded subregion. If this critical event is played before
the security critical event (in which player 1 plays A), then the security critical event
is excluded. Similarly, once the security critical event (in this case) is played, the
selection critical event (B, a) is excluded.
In the example just given, the security critical event in which player 1 plays A
is stable, meaning that even after the joint aspirations leave the subregion in which
the critical event occurred, the solutions (B, a) and (B, b) continue to be excluded.
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A
B

a
b
(3, 2) (3, 1)
(4, 3) (1, 4)

Figure 3.10: Situation in which a security critical event can occur. When joint aspirations are in the shaded subregion (or anytime player 1’s aspirations are 3 or less),
then a security critical event occurs when player 1 plays A.

A
B

a
b
(3.5, 2) (3, 1)
(4, 3) (1, 4)

Figure 3.11: Situation in which an unstable security critical event can occur.
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However, security critical events can be unstable as well. To see this, consider the
matrix game shown in Figure 3.11. This game is identical to the game shown in
Figure 3.10 except that player 1 receives a payoff of 3.5 rather than 3 when the joint
action (A, b) is played. In this game, the security critical event still occurs when
player 1 plays A when joint aspirations are in the shaded subregion. However, if
aspirations enter a subregion to the right of the shaded subregion (i.e., α1t > 3), then
player 1 will become dissatisfied if player 2 plays b. Thus, player 1 would again play
randomly, so the solutions (B, a) and (B, b) would no longer be excluded.
We are now ready to formally define security critical events.
Let ris (ai ) = mina−i ∈A−i ri (ai , a−i ) be the security of action ai to agent i. In
words, agent i will never receive a payoff lower than ris (ai ) when it plays action ai .
Thus, if the joint aspirations are in a subregion such that αit ≤ ris (ai ), then ai is a
security critical event since, once it is played, agent i will continue to play it until
joint aspirations leave the current subregion. This critical event excludes every entry
in the payoff matrix except for those entries corresponding to (ai , ·).
The definition just given does not consider the case in which a critical event (of
some kind) has already excluded some solutions. In such cases, agent i’s security for
taking action ai might differ from its original value. Let E t be the set of non-excluded
solutions at time t. Then, agent i’s security for taking action ai at time t is
ris (ai |E t ) =

min

a−i ∈A−i ,(ai ,a−i )∈E t

ri (ai , a−i )

(3.6)

Thus, ai is a critical event when ris (ai |E t ) ≥ αit . We continue to use the notation
ris (ai ) to denote the special case in which E t = A. Thus, ris (ai ) = ris (ai |A).
It is possible that any of an agent’s actions can be security critical events (under
certain conditions). However, when E t = A and initial aspirations are set high (as
called for by the S-Algorithm shown in Algorithm 3.2), the first possible security critical event that each agent can play is its minimax action. Let πiP = argmaxai ∈Ai ris (ai )
be agent i’s minimax action (over the pure strategy space), and let mPi be agent i’s
minimax value over the pure strategy space given by
mPi = max ris (ai ) = max min ri (ai , a−i )
ai ∈Ai

ai ∈Ai a−i ∈A−i

(3.7)

Thus, if agent i’s minimax action is not a security critical event in a given subregion,
then neither are any of its other actions.
We note that, in the case of a critical event, the minimax action and value for each
agent can change (in accordance to the security ris (ai |E t ) of each action ai ∈ Ai ). Thus,
more generally, let πiP (E t ) = argmaxai ∈Ai rit (ai |E t ) and let mPi (E t ) = ris (πiP |E t ). In
words, the minimax strategy and value (over the pure strategy space) are calculated by
considering only those solutions that are not currently excluded. Note that mPi (E t ) ≥
mPi .
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A
B
C

a
b
c
(0, 3) (3, 0.5) (3, 0)
(0.5, 3) (4, 4) (1.5, 3)
(3, 1.5) (3, 1)
(1, 3)

Figure 3.12: Situation in which a preclusion critical event can occur. In this case, if
joint aspirations are in the shaded subregion, then a cyclic critical event can occur
which makes it impossible for the joint action (B, b) to be played thereafter.

Preclusion Critical Events
The game shown in Figure 3.12 illustrates a preclusion critical event. When joint
aspirations are in the shaded subregion in this game, then all joint actions except
the joint action (B, b) are preclusion critical events since they make it impossible
for the joint action (B, b) to be played thereafter (while aspiration remain in the
shaded subregion). For example, if the joint action (C, a) is played, then player 1
will continue to play action C until player 2 plays action c, at which point player 2
will be satisfied (receiving a payoff of 3). Thus, player 2 will continue to play c until
player 1 plays action A. At this point, player 1 (who again receives a payoff of 3) will
be satisfied until player 2 plays action a, meaning that player 2 will be satisfied until
player 1 has played action C. This cycle will continue to repeat (at least while the
joint aspirations remain in the shaded subregion). At no time during the cycle can
the action (B, b) ever be played.
The defining property of preclusion critical events is that, after a preclusion critical
event, no agent is satisfied with all non-excluded solutions. This is not true of selection
and security critical events. However, as in the case of all critical events, after a
preclusion critical event, each non-excluded solution does satisfy at least one of the
agents (which is what causes the effective reduction in the size of the payoff matrix).
Let J be any subset of I in which |J| ≥ 2. The agents in J can induce/play a
prec
preclusion critical event if a) there exists a vector of thresholds T prec = (Tjprec , ..., Tj−1+|J|
)
prec
t
such that αj ≤ Tj for all j ∈ J and b) all non-excluded solutions (as a result of the
critical event being played) satisfy at least one agent j ∈ J (i.e., if the critical event
occurs at time t, then for all a ∈ E t+1 , rj (a) ≥ Tjprec for some j ∈ J). If these two
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c
d
C (1, 3) (3, 2)
D (4, 1) (4, 1)
Table 3.1: Game containing a refinable preclusion critical event.

conditions do not hold, then no preclusion critical event can occur.
Preclusion critical events are classified as either unrefinable or refinable. An unrefinable preclusion critical event (of which the game shown in Figure 3.12 is an example)
excludes all other critical events for the duration of the time that joint aspirations are
in the current subregion. Thus, all non-excluded solutions (as a result of the critical
event being played) satisfy at least one agent j ∈ J, but not all j ∈ J. As a result,
the play of the agents cycles.
As an example, consider, again, the game depicted in Figure 3.12. In this game,
the thresholds T1prec = 3 and T2prec = 3 delineate the regions of support for a preclusion
critical event. Thus, when αit ≤ 3 for i = 1, 2, then a preclusion critical event can
occur in which the solution (B, b) is excluded. Note that all non-excluded solutions
gives one of the agents (but not both) at least its threshold value.
As in security critical events, the threshold Tjprec can change as the set of nonexcluded solutions (E t ) changes. Thus, we denote the threshold as Tjprec (E t ) for the
general case.
A refinable preclusion critical event can be refined by a selection or security critical
event while aspirations remain in the current subregion. An example of a refinable
preclusion critical event is given by the matrix game shown in Table 3.1. In this game,
suppose that αt−1 = (3.5, 2.9), and that the joint action played at time t is (C, c).
In this case, player 2 (the column player) would be satisfied, whereas player 1 would
not be. Thus, player 2 would repeat the action c until player 1 played D, which is
a stable security critical event, resulting in player 1 playing D thereafter. Thus, the
preclusion critical event (C, c) excludes the solution (C, d).
Note that in this example, the preclusion critical event (C, c) is only a critical event
because of the security critical event that follows. But this is not true of all refinable
critical events. For example, if aspirations are in the subregion to the left of the
shaded subregion in the game shown in Figure 3.12, then the same preclusion critical
event that was discussed previously (in this game) is a refinable preclusion critical
event since the mutually satisficing solution (B, c) (which is a selection critical event)
can refine the preclusion critical event. Refinable preclusion critical events occur only
when a) there exists at least one solution that is mutually satisficing (i.e., S(α) 6= ∅)
or b) αit ≤ mPi (E t ) for some i.
Refinable preclusion critical events are governed by the same kind of thresholds
prec
Tj
as unrefinable preclusion critical events. For example, in the game shown in
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Table 3.1, T1prec = 4 (player 1’s minimax value) and T2prec = 3. This example illustrates
the fact that if Tjprec ≤ mPj for some j, then the preclusion critical event is refinable
by a security critical event. A preclusion critical event is also refinable by a selection
critical event if a non-excluded solution has a payoff that exceeds the threshold of
each agent.
Before proceeding, we present one more important property of preclusion critical
events. We give this property in the form of a lemma.
Lemma 3.2. A preclusion critical event cannot exclude a security critical event.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the defining characteristic of preclusion critical
events. That is, after a preclusion critical event, no agent is satisfied with all nonexcluded solutions. This means that each agent has a positive probability of becoming
dissatisfied (over a constant number of episodes), at which point it will act randomly.
Thus, all of its actions have a positive probability of being played (and, thus, they
cannot be excluded by a preclusion critical event).
We are almost ready to present our main results about the S-Algorithm. Before
doing so, however, we formalize restrictions on initial aspirations.
3.4.2

Assumptions about Initial Aspirations

The first step of the S-Algorithm (shown in Algorithm 3.2) specifies that initial
aspirations α0 should be set high. As this term is somewhat vague, we now make some
clarifications. Perhaps the simplest method for initializing aspiration levels to high
values would be for each player to observe through experimentation (before learning)
the various payoffs it could receive. After each agent completes its observation period,
it could then set its aspiration level (αi0 ) to the highest payoff it has seen (up to that
point).
While this methodology for choosing initial aspirations is practical (assuming the
length of the observation period for each agent is similar), it is overly restrictive.
Instead we impose two restrictions on initial aspirations. First, α0 ∈ P ∪ P 2ε , meaning
that initial aspirations will not be below the 2ε -pareto boundary. Second, since an
agent should not be content with payoffs below its minimax value (over the pure
strategy space) αi0 > mPi − 2ε for all i (where mPi is defined as in Equation 3.7). The
term 2ε is subtracted from mPi to ensure that initial joint aspirations can be in P 2ε ).
These two rules define the region P0 .
3.4.3

Main Theoretical Results

We are now ready to answer whether (or when) the S-Algorithm learns to play
ε-PE solutions with high probability in self play. We show that the S-Algorithm
does learn to play ε-PE solutions with high probability determined by λ in most
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general-sum matrix games 9 when certain conditions (which we define shortly) are
met.
Let R be the set of subregions of Rn defined by the satisficing sets of the agents.
Let RP ⊆ R be the set of subregions such that if W ∈ RP , then ∀α ∈ W, S(α) 6= ∅
and ∀a ∈ S(α), a ∈ Pε .10 In words, RP is the set of subregions in which only ε-PE
(pure strategy) solutions can possibly be mutually satisficing and at least one solution
is mutually satisficing.
Note that RP contains (at the least) all subregions that overlap (i.e., share space
with) Pε . Thus, we know that RP is not empty. In many games, RP contains other
subregions as well. For example, in the game staghunt shown in Figure 3.9, RP
contains three additional subregions: (x ∈ (1, 2], y ∈ (2, 3]), (x ∈ (2, 3], y ∈ (1, 2]),
and (x ∈ (2, 3], y ∈ (2, 3]).
However, it is not enough for RP to be non-empty. In order to show that that
the S-Algorithm will converge to ε-PE solutions with probability dependent on λ, we
must show that joint aspirations will enter at least one of the subregions W ∈ RP
in which no critical event (or sequence of critical events) can exclude all mutually
satisficing solutions. If this happens, we say that the conditions of pareto efficiency
have been met.
Let RN ⊆ RP be the set of subregions in which no critical event (or sequence
of critical events) can exclude all mutually satisficing (ε-PE) solutions. Further, for
simplicity, let RN consist only of those subregions of RP that share space with P 2ε .
We first show that when RN 6= ∅, then it is possible to learn ε-PE solutions with
high probability. We then give circumstances under which RN 6= ∅.
Theorem 3.1. If RN 6= ∅, then there exists a non-empty set of vectors V ∈ P0 such
that if α0 ∈ V, then the S-Algorithm learns (in self play) to play ε-PE solutions with
arbitrarily high probability dependent on λ.
Proof. To show that the S-Algorithm learns to play an ε-PE solution with high probability, we need only show that, with high probability, a mutually satisficing ε-PE
solution will be played once (since once one of these solutions is played, it will be
played from then on).
Let W be a subregion of RN . Let Ẃ be the interior of W. Then let V ≡ Ẃ ∩P 2ε .11
Note that V is non-empty since RN (which consists of subregions in RP that share
space with Pε ) is assumed non-empty (in the statement of the theorem).
9

The phrase most general-sum games does not entirely make sense, since there are an infinite
number of general-sum games. However, each matrix game specifies, for each agent, a preference
ordering over solutions, and there are a finite set of preference orderings over solutions (if we assume
|A| is finite). Thus, we use the phrase most general-sum games to indicate that most sets of preference
orderings specify situations in which the S-Algorithms learns to play pareto efficiency solutions with
probability dependent on λ when certain conditions are met. We note that all the games that have
been studied in the literature (that we are aware of) have such preference orderings.
10
Recall that S(α) is the mutually satisficing set for the joint aspirations α.
11
V can be (and usually is) larger than Ẃ ∩ P 2ε , but this suffices for the proof.
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Figure 3.13: Examples showing a subregion that is in RN in games with no preclusion
critical events.

If α0 ∈ V, joint aspirations must remain in W for a non-zero length of time (i.e.,
number of episodes), the length of which is dependent on λ. Let T (λ) denote this
minimum length of time. Since αt ∈ W (where t is one of the T (λ) episodes), there
exists at least one ε-PE solution that is mutually satisficing (S(αt ) 6= ∅). Thus,
there exists some positive probability p ∈ (0, 1] that some a ∈ S(αt ) will be played
during some constant number of episodes τ (since αt ∈ W ∈ RN ). This means that
the probability that some b ∈ S(αt ) will not be played over τ episodes is 1 − p,
so the probability that some b ∈ S(αt ) will not be played during T (λ) episodes is
T (λ)
q = (1 − p) τ . Since T (λ) → ∞ as λ → 1 (see Lemma 3.1), q → 0 as λ → 1.
This theorem shows that if RN is non-empty, then there exists initial joint aspirations for which the S-Algorithm will converge to an ε-PE solution with high
probability. However, we have not shown when RN is non-empty. In the theorems
that follow, we show that RN is guaranteed to be non-empty in most general-sum
games. However, there exists a small class of games in which RN appears to be
empty12 . We now give these results.
The first class of games that we consider is the large set of games that have no
preclusion critical events.
Theorem 3.2. RN 6= ∅ in games that have no preclusion critical events.
Proof. In these games, we must show that there exists a subregion such that neither a
selection critical event nor a security critical event can exclude all mutually satisficing
ε-PE solutions.
12

Again, since the number of general-sum matrix games in infinite, the number of games in this
small class of games is also infinite. But there are a finite set of preference orderings over solutions
(if we assume |A| is finite). Thus, we use the term small in this case to indicate that there is only
a small number of sets of preference orderings (for general-sum games) for which RN appears to be
empty.
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For selection critical events, we note that when initial joint aspirations are in a
subregion in RP , then only ε-PE selection critical events can occur. Thus, selection
critical events cannot exclude all mutually satisficing ε-PE solutions when aspirations
are in any subregion of RP . Thus, if only selection critical events can occur, then
RN ≡ RP , which is non-empty.
We must now show that a security critical event cannot exclude all mutually
satisficing ε-PE solutions in all subregions in RP . In this case, it is sufficient to only
consider each agent’s minimax action πiP as security critical events. This is because
an agent’s other actions can only be security critical events if its minimax action is
a security critical event (see Section 3.4.1). Thus, we need consider only the security
critical events πiP (for all i).
If (mP1 , · · · , mPn ) ∈ P 2ε ∪ P, then the joint action (π1m , · · · , πnm ) is 2ε -PE. Since no
security critical event can exclude the solution (π1m , · · · , πnm ) when α = (mP1 , · · · , mPn ),
the subregion containing the point (mP1 , · · · , mPn ) is in RP . A hypothetical situation
of this kind is shown in Figure 3.13(left). In this example, the shaded subregion is a
subregion in RP .
/ P 2ε ∪ P (see Figure 3.13(right)), then there must
In contrast, if (mP1 , · · · , mP2 ) ∈
be at least one P E solution b ∈ P such that ri (b) > mPi + 2ε for all i. Thus, b cannot
be excluded by a security critical event and so the subregion containing the point
(r1 (b), · · · , rn (b)) is in RP (as illustrated in the figure).
Thus, there exists a subregion in RP such that no selection or security critical
events can exclude all mutually satisficing (and ε-PE) solutions. Thus, RN 6= ∅, since
these games have no preclusion critical events.
Most general-sum games do not have preclusion critical events, particularly unrefinable ones. However, for a complete treatment of general-sum matrix games, we
must discuss games in which a preclusion critical event can occur for some set of joint
aspirations α. Games with preclusion critical events have the high-level characteristics depicted in Figure 3.14(left). In the figure (which is depicted for a two agent
game), the agents’ minimax actions and preclusive thresholds define the (shaded)
region in which no security or preclusion critical events can occur. This region is the
set of points p = (p1 , . . . , pn ) ∈ Rn such that pi > mPi for all i and, for all J in which
|J| ≥ 2, pj > Tjprec for some j ∈ J. If any solution a ∈ Pε is in this region, then RN is
non-empty, since the subregion containing the solution a is in RN (the darkly shaded
region in Figure 3.14(right)). We give this result in the form of a theorem.
Theorem 3.3. RN 6= ∅ in games in which there is a preclusion critical event if there
exists a solution a ∈ Pε such that ri (a) > mPi for all i and rj (a) > Tjprec for some
j ∈ J (for all possible sets J ⊆ I in which |J| ≥ 2).
Proof. Let W be the subregion containing the solution a. Since a ∈ Pε , then W ∈ RP .
Suppose that α0 ∈ W. Then, a selection critical event cannot exclude a unless it is
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Figure 3.14: (Left) High level characteristics of games with preclusion critical events.
(Right) When a solution a ∈ Pε is in the shaded region, then RN is non-empty, since
the darkly shaded subregion is in RN .

itself ε-PE. Also, a security critical event cannot exclude a since ri (a) > mPi for all
i. Lastly, a preclusion critical event (of any kind) cannot exclude a since αj > Tjprec
for some j ∈ J for all possible sets of J in which |J| ≥ 2. Thus, W ∈ RN , so RN is
non-empty.
Note that this result also holds when Tjprec < mPj (although this is not depicted
in Figure 3.14(left)).
When there is no solution in the shaded regions of Figure 3.14(left), then either
a preclusion or security critical event can occur in all subregions of RP . However,
we show that in all 2-agent general-sum matrix games, these critical events cannot
exclude all ε-PE mutually satisficing solutions for all possible initial joint aspiration
vectors. Thus, RN is not empty in any 2-agent matrix game.
Theorem 3.4. RN 6= ∅ in all 2-agent general-sum matrix games.
Proof. If the game has no preclusion critical events, then Theorem 3.2 suffices. Additionally, if the game has a solution that satisfies the stipulations given in Theorem 3.3,
then the proof of that theorem suffices. Hence, we need only consider games in which
there does not exist a solution that satisfies the stipulations given in Theorem 3.3
(the shaded region of Figure 3.14(left)), but that does contain a preclusion critical
event.
First, we consider unrefinable preclusion critical events. In these games, the points
prec
(T1 , mP2 ) and (mP1 , T2prec ) are both in Pε , otherwise the conditions stated in Theorem 3.3 would be satisfied. Additionally, we claim that there must be at least one
solution a ∈ A that weakly dominates the point (T1prec , mP2 ) (i.e., r1 (a) ≥ T1prec and
r2 (a) ≥ mP2 ) and at least one other solution b ∈ A that weakly dominates the point
(mP1 , T2prec ) (i.e., r1 (b) ≥ mP1 and r2 (b) ≥ T2prec ).
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Figure 3.15: The structure of a payoff matrix of 2-agent games with an unrefinable
(possibly) preclusion critical event. In the figure, Ti = Tiprec .

To see this, consider Figure 3.15, which gives the general structure of the payoff
matrix for all 2-player games of this kind13 . As in all 2-agent payoff matrices, the
rows in the figure (labeled a1 to a|A1 | ) give the actions available to the row player
and the columns (labeled b1 through b|A2 | ) give the actions available to the column
player. Thus, the joint action (a1 , b1 ) gives player 1 (the row player) a payoff less
than T1prec (prec is omitted for convenience) and it gives player 2 a payoff greater than
or equal to T2prec . Dots in the figure indicate other rows and columns not depicted in
the figure.
As in previous examples that we have given of unrefinable preclusion critical events
(see Figure 3.12), the solutions in the center of the payoff matrix are excluded (as
shown by the big × in Figure 3.15) by a preclusion critical event when αjt ≤ Tjprec for
all j ∈ J. Thus, once the critical event is played, the agents then cycle through the
solutions on the perimeter of the payoff matrix until another critical event occurs or
one of the agent’s aspiration levels exceeds its preclusive threshold. For example, if
the solution (a|A1 | , b1 ) is played, then player 1 will continue to play the action a|A1 |
until player 2 plays b|A2 | (since α1 < T1 ), at which point player 2 will play b|A2 | until
player 1 plays a1 (since α2 < T2 ), etc.
In any event, observe that the preclusion critical event does not exclude at least
one solution that weakly dominates the point (mP1 , T2prec ) (in the case of the figure,
when player 1 plays π1P and player 2 plays b1 or b|A2 | ). The same argument can be
made for the point (T1prec , mP2 ).
13

Figure 3.15 gives the general structure of the payoff matrix of these games. Rows and columns
can be shuffled. Additionally, more than two rows and two columns can be involved in the resulting
cycle (caused by the preclusion critical event).
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Thus, all solutions that weakly dominate these points are ε-PE solutions in 2player games (unless, again, the payoff matrix satisfies Theorem 3.3, which means that
the proof of that theorem suffices). Also, the subregions containing these solutions
are in RN , provided that no refinable preclusion critical event can exclude all of these
solutions. A refinable preclusion critical event cannot exclude all mutually satisficing
(ε-PE) solutions in these subregions since a) these subregions are in RP (thus, a
non-ε-PE selection critical event cannot refine a preclusion critical event) and b) the
only possible security critical events in these regions are the agents security actions
(mPi ) (or security critical events that yield nearly the same security to the agent),
which cannot exclude all mutually satisficing solutions for joint aspirations in these
subregions.
We note that setting initial aspirations in these subregions of RN may not be (and
probably is not) in the best interest of at least one of the agents, as other aspiration
levels could give it higher average payoffs. However, if aspirations are placed in these
subregions, the S-Algorithm will learn to player ε-PE solutions in self play with high
probability dependent on λ.
Unfortunately, it appears that the last theorem cannot be extended to (n > 2)agent matrix games, since a preclusion critical event (played by a different set of
agents) could theoretically exclude the solutions in the subregions defined in the
proof. Thus, RN can possibly be empty in some small class of games. Thus, in these
games we cannot guarantee that the S-Algorithm will converge with high probability
to ε-PE solutions.
On a positive note, it appears that these games (i.e., games in which we cannot
guarantee that RN is non-empty due to preclusion critical events) are very rare and
uninteresting14 , as we know of no game studied in the literature that possesses these
properties. The same can be said of any game with an unrefinable critical event (that
we know of).
Regardless of whether there is a set of initial joint aspirations that causes the SAlgorithm to learn to play ε-PE solutions with high probability, S-Algorithm agents
are protected by security critical events. Thus, an agent’s average payoffs are likely
bounded from below (in the limit) by the minimax value mPi . This is because the
agent is likely (if λ is close enough to unity) to play πiP (a security critical event)
before its aspirations drop far below mPi . This argument follows from Lemma 3.2,
which says that a preclusion critical event cannot exclude a security critical event.
Recall that Stimpson et al. showed this security property for the specific case of the
MASD [71].
In the next section, we will demonstrate the individual average payoffs obtained
by the S-Algorithm (in self play) in many theoretically important games. Before
14

Uninteresting in the sense that an agent is not likely to encounter such games in practical
situations.
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doing so, however, we (briefly) discuss convergence of the S-Algorithm (again, in self
play).
3.4.4

Convergence

Throughout this chapter, we have repeatedly discussed convergence. We now
formally define the term (as we use it) and discuss the convergence of the S-Algorithm
in general-sum games.
Definition 3.6. (Convergence) A learning process has converged if and only if πit =
πit+1 for all t > T , where T is some constant.
The question arises whether or not the S-Algorithm converges in self play in all
general-sum matrix games. While the S-Algorithm does converge with high probability when aspirations begin in a subregion of RN , it is not guaranteed to converge
when initial aspirations vectors are not in a subregion of RN . Thus, if RN is empty
or agents do not set their aspirations “appropriately,” then the S-Algorithm might
not converge (in self play).
While there are many examples of such games (especially many games with unrefinable preclusion critical events), we present just one (additional) example. This
game is shown in Figure 3.16. In this game, if joint aspirations are initialized above
the pareto boundary, then aspirations will remain above the pareto boundary (i.e.,
αt ∈ P for all t). Thus, no selection critical event can ever occur. In general, the joint
aspiration vector will remain close to (0.25, 0.25) (with high probability), which is a
point in P.
Observe, however, that if joint aspirations are chosen using the method suggested
in Theorem 3.1, then initial joint aspirations will be in the subregion containing the
point (0, 0). This means that any solution is mutually satisficing (as well as ε-PE).
Thus, the S-Algorithm will converge to an ε-PE solution with probability 1. However,
note that convergence to PE solutions does not entail effective learning (in all cases),
as, in this case, it requires that at least one of the agents receive an average payoff
of 0. In Chapter 5, we present a learning algorithm that is able to alternate between
“winning” and “losing” so that both agents receive an average payoff of 0.5 in this
game.
3.5

The S-Algorithm in General-Sum Matrix Games (Empirical Results)

In the previous section, we showed that the S-Algorithm converges to ε-PE solutions in self play (with high probability) when the conditions of pareto efficiency are
met. We showed that the conditions of pareto efficiency can be met in most generalsum matrix games. These conditions are easily identifiable when the complete payoff
matrix is known. However, in this chapter, we have assumed that the game matrix
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A
B

a
b
(0, 0) (0, 1)
(1, 0) (0, 0)

Figure 3.16: Example game in which the S-Algorithm does not converge.

is not known (and cannot even be constructed since the payoffs and actions of other
agents are unknown).
That being said, we note that the conditions of pareto efficiency are not difficult
to satisfy in most general-sum games if the agents takes a little time to estimate their
highest possible payoff (rimax ). More importantly, the matrix games that have been
studied extensively in the literature are in the class of games in which these conditions
are easily met.
In this section, we present an empirical study of the S-Algorithm in a variety
of theoretically important general-sum matrix games. In doing so, we compare the
S-Algorithm in self play to two other algorithms: WoLF-PHC [9] and Q-learning [76].
Both of these algorithms (like the S-Algorithm) operate under the assumption that
the actions and rewards of other agents (and, thus, the payoff matrix) are unknown.
Unless stated otherwise, the parameter settings for the three algorithms (abbreviated S-Algorithm, WoLF, and QL respectively) are given in Table 3.2. For the SAlgorithm, initial aspirations where randomly selected in the region P0 with ε = 015 .
Figures 3.17-3.25 show the performance of the algorithms in the prisoners dilemma,
MASD (k = 0.6, n = 3, M = 5), chicken, staghunt, Shapley’s game, tricky game [8],
battle of the sexes, and two other (unnamed) games. For each game, we show the average performance over time of the algorithms (over 50 trials) and a box and whisker
plot (generated by MATLAB) showing the final (average) payoff distributions. These
box and whisker plots show the median (line in middle of box), the median of the
upper and lower quartiles (top and bottom of box), and extremes of the data (top
and bottom of whiskers). Data points which fall outside of 1.5 multiplied by the
15

We acknowledge that the agents do not know how to set their aspirations so that α ∈ P0 when
the payoff matrix is unknown. However, in this empirical study, we assume that the agents do set
their aspirations as such. In the next chapter, we consider the case in which the agents perturb their
aspiration levels, which eliminates the need for this assumption.
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Name
S-Algorithm
WoLF-PHC
QL

Parameter Values
α0 ∈ P0 , λ = 0.99
λ = 1/(10 + 0.01κas ), γ = 0.95,
-greedy w/  = max(0.2 − 0.0006t, 0)
γ = 0, λ = 1/(10 + 0.01κas ),
-greedy w/  = 0.1

Table 3.2: Learners and their parameter values. κas is the number of times that action
a has been played in state s, λ is used for the learning rate to avoid confusion. QL
uses a stateless Q-update.

C
D

c
3, 3
5, 0

d
0, 5
1, 1

Figure 3.17: Results from 50 trials of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma.

interquartile range are considered outliers, and are plotted as *’s. Notches in the
boxes represent a robust estimate of the uncertainty about the medians for box-tobox comparison. Boxes whose notches do not overlap indicate that the medians of
the two groups differ at a 95% confidence level. Tighter distributions are generally
more desirable than distributions that vary widely.
The results as given in the figures are largely self explanatory. However, we
comment on various aspects of each.
3.5.1

Prisoner’s Dilemma

As has been shown by Karandikar et al. and Stimpson et al., the S-Algorithm
learns mutual cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma (see Figure 3.17). For the parameters (and initial aspirations) used, the S-Algorithm learned mutual cooperation in
all cases. Both WoLF-PHC and QL learn without exception (in the 50 trials) to always defect. We note that QL’s payoffs are slightly higher than the mutual defection
payoff since it plays randomly with probability 0.1.
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Figure 3.18: Results from 50 trials of a 3-agent, 6-action MASD (k=0.6). In this
game, mutual cooperation yields a payoff of 1 to each agent and mutual defection
produces a payoff of 0 to each agent.

3.5.2

MASD

We also tested the algorithms on a 3-agent, 6-action MASD (k=0.6) (see Figure 3.18). Both WoLF-PHC and QL learn to play selfishly (almost always completely
selfishly), while the S-Algorithm generally learns to play cooperatively. Note, however, that full cooperation does not always result. The large variation in the data is
due to changing selections of α0 . Again, we note that Stimpson et al. showed that
the S-Algorithm generally learns mutual cooperation when initial aspirations are high
and similar [70] (and λ is sufficiently high). Additionally, because of the large joint
action space of this game, a higher λ is needed to make mutual cooperation more
likely.
3.5.3

Chicken

Figure 3.19 shows the performance of the three algorithms in the game chicken.
While the S-Algorithm learns without fail to always cooperate, the other two algorithms learn to either cooperate while the other defects, defect while the other
cooperates, or to both cooperate. The result is that the average payoffs received by
the S-Algorithm are significantly higher than those received by the other algorithms.
3.5.4

Staghunt

The performance of the three algorithms in the game staghunt is shown in Figure 3.20. In this game, the S-Algorithm distances itself from WoLF-PHC and QL,
since its learns mutual cooperation (with one exception). WoLF-PHC and QL learn
the safer (yet less profitable) strategy of defection. We note that QL’s payoff is lower
than WoLF-PHC’s because of its continued exploration.
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3, 3
3.5, 2

d
2, 3.5
1, 1

Figure 3.19: Results from 50 trials of the matrix game chicken.
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D

c
4, 4
3, −5

d
−5, 3
2, 2

Figure 3.20: Results from 50 trials of the matrix game staghunt.

3.5.5

Shapley’s Game

The S-Algorithm does not perform well in Shapley’s game, as shown in Figure 3.21.
While WoLF-PHC and QL play strategies that yield average payoffs close to 0.5,16
the S-Algorithm receives (in self play) an average payoff of 31 . This is not because the
S-Algorithm does not play ε-PE solutions. Indeed, all payoffs in Shapley’s game are
ε-PE. Rather, the joint aspirations of the agents never fall below the pareto frontier
(in pure strategy space). Thus, the S-Algorithm’s behavior is essentially random
(the one-shot NE). This behavior arises because the S-Algorithm focuses only on the
current episode.
Note that if aspirations are set as described in Theorem 3.1, the S-Algorithm
would converge. However, one of the agents would necessarily receive a payoff of 0 on
each episode. In order for learning agents to perform effectively in Shapley’s game,
they must learn turn-taking strategies. The algorithm we present in Chapter 5 is able
to do this successfully.
16

Game theorists and others have repeatedly used Shapley’s game to show the failure of learning
algorithms to converge to an one-shot NE (see, for example, [33]). Interestingly, learning algorithms
(even those that focus only on the current episode) tend to perform better than they would if they
played the one-shot NE (see Figure 3.21 and [8]).
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A
B
C

a
0, 0
1, 0
0, 1

b
0, 1
0, 0
1, 0

c
1, 0
0, 1
0, 0

Figure 3.21: Results from 50 trials of Shapley’s game.

3.5.6

Tricky Game

In Tricky game the S-Algorithm, again, outperforms the other two algorithms
(see Figure 3.22), both as the row player and as the column player. In each of the
50 trials, the S-Algorithm learned the PE solution in which the row player receives
a payoff of 3 and the column player receives a payoff of 2. The learned behaviors of
both WoLF-PHC and QL vary more widely and typically yield a lower payoff to both
the row and column players. Note that WoLF-PHC plays somewhat cooperatively in
early rounds of the game. However, myopic best response approaches cannot sustain
cooperation in this game. Thus, it eventually learns (as designed) to play the one-shot
NE (which yields a payoff of 1.5 to each agent).
3.5.7

Battle of the Sexes

Results for the game Battle of the Sexes are shown in Figure 3.23. The performance of all the agents is essentially equivalent. Either the row player receives 4
and the column player 3, or vice versa. Both solutions are PE. Note that, again,
QL’s payoffs are slightly lower since it continues to act randomly with probability
0.1. Since the algorithms focus only on the current episode, they are unable to learn
an alternate (but fairer) PE solution in which the agents alternate between receiving
payoffs of 3 and 4.
3.5.8

Negative Result

In the previous games, the S-Algorithm learns to play PE solutions with high
probability for all initial aspiration vectors in P0 .17 We now present a game in which
many initial aspiration vectors (in P0 ) lead to the play of a stable security critical
17

Again, we note that even in Shapley’s game, the S-Algorithm learns to play PE solutions for all
initial aspiration vectors in P0 even though it does not always converge, as all solutions are weakly
PE. Additionally, its average payoffs are PE.
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a
0, 3
1, 0

b
3, 2
2, 1

Figure 3.22: Results from 50 trials of Tricky Game. The performance of the row
player is shown above and the performance of the column player is shown below.
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c
2, 2
3, 4

d
4, 3
1, 1

Figure 3.23: Results from 50 trials for a version of the matrix game Battle of the
Sexes.
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event that excludes all ε-PE solutions. The game is shown in Figure 3.24. This game
has two (pure strategy) PE solutions, both of which occur when player 1 (the row
player) plays B. However, if the row player’s aspiration level drops below 3.5, then a
stable security critical event occurs if the row player plays the action A.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 locates initial joint aspirations under which the SAlgorithm will converge (with high probability) to a ε-PE solution in this game.
Specifically, if α0 ≈ (4, 3), then the S-Algorithm will converge to the PE solution
(A, a) with high probability. However, the S-Algorithm is not guaranteed to learn
to learn to play an ε-PE solution with high probability for all α0 ∈ P0 , since joint
aspirations might not pass through a subregion in RN in this game.
The performance of the S-Algorithm (as well as that of WoLF-PHC and QL) in
this game is shown in Figure 3.24. Indeed, in most trials, the security critical event
does occur before a mutually satisficing, PE solution is played, resulting (eventually)
in convergence to the (A, a) solution. It is interesting to note that WoLF-PHC and
QL appear to be even more susceptible than the S-Algorithm to this event, as they
learn similar strategies (and never learn to play the PE solution). We note, that,
as shown in the proof, the S-Algorithm converges with high probability to the PE
solution when initial aspirations are initially set to (3.99, 2.99). This result is shown
in Figure 3.24 as S-Alg (Fixed).
In Figure 3.25, we modify this game so that the security critical event is unstable.
While this does not change the behavior of WoLF-PHC and QL, it does allow the
S-Algorithm to learn to play the PE solution with higher probability. In fact, the
S-Algorithm learns to play (B, b) (with high probability) for most initial aspiration
vectors in this game. However, when the row player has relatively low initial aspiration
levels compared to the column player, the security critical event excludes the PE
solution long enough for convergence to a non-PE solution to become possible.
3.6

Summary, Discussion, and Future Work

In this chapter, we reviewed the satisficing learning algorithms presented by
Karandikar et al. and Stimpson et al. We also analyzed the S-Algorithm (the algorithm presented by Stimpson) in general-sum matrix games. We showed that in
almost all general-sum matrix games (and all 2-agent matrix games), the S-Algorithm
learns (in self play) to play ε-PE solutions with high probability dependent on λ if
the conditions of pareto efficiency are satisfied (see Section 3.4.3). However, since
the payoffs and actions of other agents are not known (and the payoff matrix is not
known), guaranteeing that these conditions are satisfied is impossible. But these
conditions can be easily met when the game matrix is known.
Because it is difficult to determine how to set initial aspirations so that the conditions or pareto efficiency are satisfied in an arbitrary (unknown) game, we presented
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A
B

a
3.5, 2
1, 4

b
3.5, 1
4, 3

Figure 3.24: Results from 50 trials of the game shown at left. The performance of the
row player is shown above and the performance of the column player is shown below.

C
D

c
3.6, 2
1, 4

d
3.5, 1
4, 3

Figure 3.25: Results from 50 trials of the game shown at left. The performance of the
row player is shown above and the performance of the column player is shown below.
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an empirical study which demonstrates that these conditions are easily met in a number of well-studied games. In many of these games, all initial aspiration vectors in
the region P0 allow the conditions of pareto efficiency to be met. We also showed
that even when the conditions or pareto efficiency are not satisfied, the S-Algorithm
still performs as well (in self play) as two other well-studied (and typical) multiagent
learning algorithms.
We emphasize that these results are for self play only. Future work could include
analysis of the S-Algorithm when it associates with other kinds of learners. The SAlgorithm, however, does not promise to do well when associating with a large class
of learning agents, as the success of the learning algorithm is closely tied to the joint
behavior that emerges as a result of adherence to the satisficing principle [46].
The solutions the S-Algorithm learned in the large empirical study we presented
in Section 3.5 where relatively fair in the sense that the agents tended to split the high
payoffs (when possible). This result is closely tied to initial aspirations. Additionally,
the S-Algorithm tends to learn the (fair) solutions suggested by Littman [53] when
these solutions are pure strategies. When initial aspiration levels are similar between
the agents, we would expect learned strategies to distribute payoffs more evenly among
the agents then if they varied widely. Other factors also affect fairness, including
learning rates and fallback positions.18 Future work could include in-depth analysis
of how these issues affect fairness and convergence to ε-pareto efficiency.
The S-Algorithm’s fallback strategy (playing randomly when not satisfied) seems
to be a key to the algorithm (which we have not discussed widely in this chapter),
and deserves more study in future work. In games such as the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma, this fallback strategy induces other agents to cooperate since it essentially
becomes a stochastic tit-for-tat [2]. However, in other games, this fallback strategy
is not as effective. In addition to providing a method for issuing threats to defecting
agents [54], a fallback strategy is essential to coordinating cooperation in games of
conflicting interest. The S-Algorithm’s fallback strategy is effective since it searches
the reward space thoroughly. Future work should study alternate fallback strategies.
In this chapter, we focused on non-competitive general-sum games. This is largely
because the focus of the chapter was pareto efficiency. In competitive games, all
solutions are pareto efficient, and, thus, pareto efficiency is not a good metric of
success. The S-Algorithm is not a good choice for an algorithm in competitive games.
This is largely because the minimax solution (an agents security strategy) is a mixed
strategy in many of these games, so the S-Algorithm cannot learn to play it. However,
if the minimax strategy is a pure strategy, then the S-Algorithm can learn (and
does [71]) to play effectively (somewhat) in these games. In Chapter 5, we discuss how
an algorithm related to the S-Algorithm can incorporate security when the minimax
18

An agent’s fallback position is the value that it guarantees itself when it plays its fallback strategy.
A fallback strategy is the strategy that an agent plays when it is not satisfied.
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strategy is known.
We also note that, in this chapter, we assumed a deterministic payoff function. While many multiagent learning algorithms (for example, WoLF-PHC and
Q-learning) are designed to handle the situation in which payoffs are nondeterministic, the S-Algorithm is not. Again, in Chapter 5, we discuss an algorithm related to
the S-Algorithm that can learn effectively when payoffs are nondeterministic.
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Chapter 4
Satisficing Learning with Aspiration Trembles
4.1

Introduction

In the previous chapter we discussed the S-Algorithm (as presented by Stimpson
et al. [70, 71]) in general-sum matrix games. We showed that under certain conditions
(i.e., if the joint aspirations of the agents are guaranteed to remain in certain subregions for a positive number of episodes) the S-Algorithm learns with high probability
to play ε-PE solutions1 . Furthermore, we showed that in most general-sum matrix
games (and all 2-agent matrix games) there exists a non-empty set of initial joint
aspiration vectors such that these conditions are met.
Unfortunately, when the payoffs and actions of other agents in an arbitrary matrix game are unknown, the set of initial joint aspirations that satisfy the necessary
conditions (for convergence to ε-PE with high probability) are also unknown. In most
general-sum matrix games, this is not overly problematic since most high initial aspirations satisfy the conditions. However, in a small set of general-sum matrix games,
these conditions are not easily met.
To overcome this difficulty, we extend the S-Algorithm to include periodic perturbations in aspiration levels, which we will call aspiration trembles. We call the
new algorithm SAwT (S-Algorithm with Trembles). This extension is in line with
Karandikar’s original aspiration-based satisficing learning algorithm [46]. In this
chapter, we analyze aspiration trembles in repeated general-sum matrix games. In
particular, we show that an agent can learn to tremble its aspirations to improve its
payoffs. We show (empirically) that this learning process results in aspiration trembles that satisfy the conditions of pareto efficiency (if it is beneficial for the agents)
in many games.
In addition to studying how aspiration trembles affect the performance of SAwT
in stationary general-sum matrix games, we also consider the case in which payoff
matrices vary over time. Situations in which payoff matrices change over time include
learning in stochastic games, which we will discuss in Chapter 6. We sketch the
argument that if payoff matrices change slowly enough, then SAwT will play ε-PE
solutions high percentages of the time.
1

Recall (see Section 3.4.3) that we refer to the conditions that lead to convergence to ε-PE (with
high probability) as the conditions of pareto efficiency.
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As in the previous chapter, we assume that an agent does not know the payoffs and
actions of the other agents in the game. Thus, an agent does not know its own payoff
matrix. Additionally, unless stated otherwise, we assume that an agent associates
with a copy of itself (i.e., self play).
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section (Section 4.2), we
relate aspiration trembles to traditional exploration methods. We present an overview
of SAwT in Section 4.3, and analyze three naive implementations (i.e., methodologies
for trembling aspirations) of this algorithm. We show that, while these aspiration
trembles do remove the requirement (of the S-Algorithm) that initial aspirations
should be set high, they do not always satisfy the the conditions of pareto efficiency
(although they do in most games). In Section 4.4, we show how a simple learning
algorithm (such as Q-learning) can be used to learn how an agent should tremble
its aspirations to improve its payoffs. In Section 4.5, we sketch the argument that
appropriate implementations of SAwT continue to play ε-PE solutions even when the
payoff matrix changes over time (as long as it does not change too quickly). Finally,
we summarize and discuss these results in the last section.
4.2

Relating Aspiration Trembles to Traditional Exploration Methods

A main issue of standard reinforcement learning is the trade-off between exploration and exploitation [44]. While an agent must exploit the information that it has
learned, it must also continue to explore its environment to guarantee that it learns to
play optimally. In multiagent learning situations, this trade-off between exploration
and exploitation becomes even more delicate [28].
Most traditional reinforcement learning algorithms require that an agent never
cease exploring its environment. For example, Q-estimates in Q-learning [76] converge
to their true Q-values (in stationary environments) only if each state-action pair is
visited infinitely often. Thus, many implementations of the Q-learning algorithm force
the agent to act randomly with a small probability for the duration of the agent’s
existence.
However, despite the importance of exploration methods in reinforcement learning, simple probabilistic exploration remains the state-of-the art [75]. Most of these
methods fit into the category of -greedy methods, in which an agent explores with
some probability, and exploits otherwise. Various implementations of -greedy exploration exist, including Boltzmann exploration, etc.
In contrast to traditional learning methods, the S-Algorithm turns exploration on
and off depending on whether the agent is satisfied or not. Thus, in self play, once all
agents are satisfied (i.e., at a satisficing equilibrium [74]), no more exploration takes
place. It is because the S-Algorithm ceases to explore that it can only guarantee
success with high probability. On the flip side, one can argue that the S-Algorithm
is successful at learning ε-PE solutions (in self play) because it stops exploring.
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The S-Algorithm can be extended to explore its environment in two ways. The
first way is to allow the agent to periodically act randomly (i.e., an -greedy-like
policy). We call this method action exploration. Action exploration induces a small
perturbation in an agent’s aspirations2 when the random action yields a different
payoff than the agent has been receiving (when it is satisfied). These small trembles
in aspirations can cause additional exploration as changes in aspirations can result in
the agent being satisfied with different outcomes.
The second way in which the S-Algorithm can be extended to more thoroughly
explore its environment is to use aspiration trembles. That is, an agent periodically
trembles its aspirations according to some distribution g(αit ). This is the method
used by Karandikar et al. [46]. When the distribution g(αit ) is tightly centered around
αit , then this method is essentially identical to action exploration. However, action
exploration is a subset of aspiration trembles (in the case of the S-Algorithm) since
g(αit ) can also be designed to cause large changes in aspirations.
Both small and large aspiration trembles appear to offer different advantages and
disadvantages. In the next section, we discuss these differences and present several
case studies showing how small and large aspiration trembles affect the performance
of aspiration-based satisficing learning agents.
4.3

The S-Algorithm with Trembles

In this section, we present a basic overview of the S-Algorithm with Trembles
(SAwT). Additionally, we present several naive implementations of SAwT, and show
via several case studies that they eliminate the need to initialize aspirations to high
levels. However, while these naive implementations of SAwT do learn to play ε-PE
solutions in most games, these naive implementations of aspiration trembles are not
guaranteed to satisfy the conditions of pareto efficiency (discussed in the previous
chapter).
4.3.1

Basic Overview

SAwT, as is outlined in Algorithm 4.1, is identical to the S-Algorithm (see Algorithm 3.2) except that a) it does not restrict initial aspirations and b) it trembles
its aspirations with probability η (according to the distribution g(αit )) if certain constraints are met. These constraints can vary from implementation to implementation.
We offer some reasonable constraints in Section 4.3.1.
Observe that SAwT still differs from Karandikar et al.’s original aspiration-based
satisficing algorithm in two ways. First, SAwT (like the S-Algorithm) does not incorporate inertia. Second, Karandikar allows the agents to tremble their aspirations
2

The magnitude of aspiration perturbations (per episode) using action exploration is bounded by
λW , where W is the maximum difference between aspirations and payoffs, given by W = max(rimax −
αit , αit −rimin ), where rimax and rimin are the maximum and minimum payoffs in agent i’s payoff matrix.
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Repeat
(a) Select anaction ati according to the following criteria:
at−1
if (αit−1 ≤ rit−1 )
i
ati ←
rand(Ai ) otherwise
where rand(Ai ) denotes a random selection from the set Ai .
(b) Receive reward rit and update aspiration level:
if constraints met, then w/ prob η
αit+1 = g(αit )
else
αit+1 ← λαit + (1 − λ)rit

Algorithm 4.1: The S-Algorithm with Trembles (SAwT) for agent i.

at any time, whereas SAwT places constraints on when an agent can tremble. These
differences are necessary if we are to apply this form of learning to general-sum matrix
games (rather than just the small class of games Karandikar et al. considered).
Below we discuss various methods for deciding when (i.e., what are the constraints)
and how (i.e., what form should g(αit ) take) an agent should tremble its aspirations.
Constraints on Aspiration Trembles
An infinitely repeated matrix game played by SAwT agents is an infinite sequence
of epochs. An epoch is a set of consecutive episodes beginning and ending with an
aspiration tremble by any of the agents in the game. The behavior of the agents in
each episode can be divided into two phases, or time periods. We refer to the first
time period as the relaxation search. During this phase, each agent searches for a
sustainable satisficing outcome as it relaxes its aspirations toward its average payoffs3 .
The relaxation search commences when one of the agents trembles its aspirations and
concludes (for each agent) when the agent’s strategy converges4 . The convergence
period follows the relaxation search and ends (as does the epoch) when one of the
agents once again trembles its aspirations. Note that it is possible for an epoch to
not have a convergence period if the agents do not converge before one of the agents
trembles its aspirations. However, this change in epochs may not be discernible to
the agents that do not tremble.
P
1
Agent i’s average payoffs during the relaxation search can be approximated by |A|
a∈A ri (a)
(though this estimate is not completely accurate).
4
Note that we have altered the definition of convergence from the previous chapter. In this
chapter, we say that an agent has converged if its strategy will remain unchanged until the end of
the current epoch.
3
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Since the primary purpose of aspiration trembles is to find a better solution than
the one currently being played, we contend that an agent should not tremble its aspirations during the relaxation search unless it has cause to believe that the relaxation
search will not end, or that it will not end satisfactorily. Thus, all aspiration trembles
should occur during the convergence period of an epoch unless, again, an agent has
reason to believe that the epoch will not have a convergence period or, if it does, the
convergence period will not be profitable.
This means that a SAwT agent must determine two things. First, an agent must
be able to determine when the relaxation phase of an epoch has concluded (i.e., play
has converged). Second, prior to the convergence of the relaxation search, it must
identify whether or not play is likely to converge to a profitable (for it) solution.
SAwT can conclude with some (hopefully high) probability that the relaxation
search concluded at time T if two conditions have held for all t ∈ [T, T + T c ), where
T c is a positive constant. The first condition is that the agent has been satisfied for
all t ∈ [T, T + T c ). The second condition is that rit = riT for all t ∈ [T, T + T c )5 . We
note that T c controls how certain an agent is that play has actually converged. If T c
is too small, then an agent may conclude prematurely that play has converged.
To summarize, SAwT concludes that the relaxation search for a given epoch has
concluded at time T if
∀t ∈ [T, T + T c ), rit ≥ αit and rit = riT

(4.1)

We now turn to the issue of determining whether or not play is likely to converge to
a profitable solution (in a given epoch). Relaxation searches that result in profitable
payoffs during the convergence period are usually shorter than those that do not.
This is because aspirations tend to move toward average payoffs during the relaxation
search. Thus, the longer the relaxation search, the more likely (in general) an agent is
to be content with average payoffs. Additionally, a long relaxation search may be the
result of a preclusion critical event that prohibits convergence (to profitable solutions).
For these reasons, an agent should consider trembling if the relaxation search has not
concluded in a reasonable number of episodes (which we denote T r (λ)). Note that
T r (λ) is dependent on λ since aspirations change more slowly for high values of λ
than for smaller values.
We now discuss how to determine T r (λ). Let T0 be the time at which the agent
believes the current epoch began. Assuming that play has not converged, agent i’s
aspiration level at time t is (from the aspiration updated equation) approximately
αit ≈ λt−T0 αiT0 + (1 − λt−T0 )r̄i

(4.2)

5
In the event of an unstable security critical event, a SAwT agent’s strategy may have converged
even though an action continues to yield different (yet satisficing) payoffs. However, we do not
concern ourselves with this situation since making this assumption does not hinder the performance
of the agent. Note also that this observation assumes a deterministic payoff function (which the
S-Algorithm also assumes).
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where r̄i is agent i’s average payoff. Thus, λt−T0 approximates the distance the current
aspirations are between αiT0 and r̄i . Thus, the longer the relaxation search lasts (i.e.,
the bigger t − T0 gets), the closer agent i’s average aspirations will be to its average
payoff r̄i and the less its aspirations will be like αiT0 .
Let θ ∈ (0, 1) be a threshold on how far (i.e., percentage) that an agent will allow
its aspirations to change before it determines that the relaxation search is not likely
to end profitably. Then, the number of episodes that a relaxation search should last
before an agent considers trembling is given by solving for T r (λ) in the equation
r
λT (λ) = θ, which yields
T r (λ) =

log θ
log λ

(4.3)

Thus, when t − T0 > T r (λ), an agent should consider trembling its aspirations. Note
that the closer θ is to 0, the more likely the relaxation search will not converge to a
profitable solution (if at all), since aspirations will get closer to average payoffs.
When probabilistic methods for determining aspiration trembles are used, typically only one agent will tremble at a given time. However, in most cases, this is all
that is necessary to trigger a relaxation search, as all agents can become dissatisfied
when just one agent changes its aspiration level (assuming the agents are satisfied
prior to the tremble). If aspirations are trembled to a large degree (in the upward
direction), then the trembling agent (i.e., the agent that trembles) will have an advantage in many games over the other agents since it will be more selective (i.e.,
satisfied with less outcomes) than the other agents. Knowing this, all agents have an
incentive (in many games) to tremble their aspirations higher and more frequently
than necessary,6 which will result in lower average payoffs to all the agents.
One way of circumventing this problem is for all agents to tremble their aspirations
at the same time (approximately). SAwT agents can do this without explicitly communicating if trembles occur during the convergence period. If an aspiration tremble
occurs in the convergence period, then all the other agents’ payoffs will usually change
suddenly, at which point each agent should tremble its aspirations.
We call such aspiration trembles coordinated trembles. Coordinated trembles can
be viewed as trigger strategies7 which can be used to create profitable rNEs, and are
the basis for the proof of the folk theorem [35].
The Tremble Distribution g(αit )
Karandikar et al. [46] allowed aspirations to be trembled to any real number in
a compact interval Λ, where Λ contained all feasible payoffs. This keeps aspirations
6

We note that agents can obtain similar effects by lowering their learning rates (i.e., increasing

λ).
7
A trigger strategy is a strategy that switches suddenly (usually with the intent to punish another
agent) when another agent does not play as expected.

70

from wandering too far from the payoffs of the game. While maintaining this restriction, we desire to understand how several issues related to aspiration trembles affect
the performance of SAwT. These issues include coordinated verses non-coordinated
trembles as well as the magnitude of trembles (i.e., large trembles verses small trembles).
Both small and large trembles appear to offer different advantages. Specifically,
small trembles will generally result in shorter relaxation searches. This seems to
be desirable since the agents’ average payoffs received during the relaxation search
are usually lower than those received during the convergence period. On the flip
side, large trembles in the upward direction usually give an agent a better chance of
receiving a high payoff when strategies converge.
While Karandikar et al. allowed aspiration trembles in either direction (up or
down), we consider only trembles in the upward direction in this section. This restriction seems reasonable if agents only tremble when satisfied, since downward trembles will have no affect on the immediate behavior of the agents [37]. However, we
note that downward trembles may be desirable when agents coordinate trembles. We
consider the possibility of downward trembles in the next section.
4.3.2

Case Studies

Based on the previous discussions, we designed three naive implementations of
SAwT. We call these implementations SAwST (S-Algorithm with Small Trembles),
SAwLT (S-Algorithm with Large Trembles), and SAwCT (S-Algorithm with Coordinated
Trembles). After presenting the details of the implementations, we will compare them
in several matrix games.
Since the algorithms differ only in their specifications of step (b) of Algorithm 4.1,
we only present each algorithm’s specific implementation of this step.
SAwST. SAwST is given in Algorithm 4.2. In SAwST, an agent perturbs its
current aspirations with probability η if it a) determines that the relaxation search
has completed (the first condition of the if statement) or if it b) believes that the
relaxation search will not result in convergence to a profitable solution (the second
condition of the if statement). The perturbation ξ is a real number randomly selected
from the interval [0, 0.00001].
SAwLT. SAwLT is shown in Algorithm 4.3. In SAwLT, an agent trembles its
aspirations under the same conditions as in SAwST. The difference is that SAwLT
trembles its aspiration level to the highest payoff it has seen up to that point (denoted
by rimax ) plus, a small positive margin .
SAwCT. SAwCT, shown in Algorithm 4.4, is identical to SAwLT except that it
also trembles (with probability 1) when it believes that another agent has trembled
(i.e., it uses coordinated trembles). SAwCT determines that another agent has trembled its aspirations if rit 6= rit−1 and rit−1 = rij , for all j ∈ [t − T c , t − 1) (i.e., the else
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(b) Receive reward rit and update aspiration level:

if ∀υ ∈ (t − T c , t], riυ ≥ αiυ and riυ = rit or (t − T0 > T r (λ)) then w/ prob η
αit+1 = αit + ξ
else
αit+1 ← λαit + (1 − λ)rit

Algorithm 4.2: Aspiration update rule for the S-Algorithm with Small Trembles
(SAwST) for agent i. ξ is randomly selected from the interval [0, 0.00001]. T c is
a constant defined in the arguments surrounding Equation (4.1), T0 is the time at
which an agent believes the current epoch began, and T r (λ) is given by Equation (4.3).
(b) Receive reward rit and update aspiration level:

if ∀υ ∈ (t − T c , t], riυ ≥ αiυ and riυ = rit or (t − T0 > T r (λ)) then w/ prob η
αit+1 = rimax + 
else
αit+1 ← λαit + (1 − λ)rit

Algorithm 4.3: Aspiration update rule for the S-Algorithm with Large Trembles
(SAwLT) for agent i.  is a small positive constant. T c is a constant defined in
the arguments surrounding Equation (4.1), T0 is the time at which an agent believes
the current epoch began, and T r (λ) is given by Equation (4.3).

if statement of Algorithm 4.4).
For each implementation, the tremble rate η was initially set to 0.01 and then
decreased slowly over time using
τ +200
η = 0.01( 200 )

(4.4)

where τ is the current epoch (estimated by the number of times the agent has trembled
its own aspirations).
Each agent’s initial aspiration level was randomly selected from the set of reals in
the interval [5, −5]. Also, unless specified otherwise, λ = 0.99, θ = 0.1, and T c = 20.
We compare these three implementations in five matrix games. These games are
chicken, staghunt, MASD (k = 0.6, n = 3, M = 5), and two other matrix games that
have stable security and preclusion critical events. For each game we show (as in the
previous chapter) the average payoffs of the agents over time (average of 50 trials) as
well as a box and whiskers plot of the average payoffs of the agents in the last 0.1%
of the episodes.
72

(b) Receive reward rit and update aspiration level:

if ∀υ ∈ (t − T c , t], riυ ≥ αiυ and riυ = rit or (t − T0 > T r (λ)) then w/ prob η
αit+1 = rimax + 
else if rit 6= rit−1 and rit−1 = rij , ∀j ∈ [t − T c , t − 1)
αit+1 = rimax + 
else
αit+1 ← λαit + (1 − λ)rit

Algorithm 4.4: Aspiration update rule for the S-Algorithm with Coordinated Trembles (SAwCT) for agent i. T c is a constant defined in the arguments surrounding
Equation (4.1), T0 is the time at which an agent believes the current epoch began,
and T r (λ) is given by Equation (4.3).

C
D

c
3, 3
3.5, 2

d
2, 3.5
1, 1

Figure 4.1: Results from 50 trials of the matrix game chicken.

Chicken
Results for the game chicken are shown in Figure 4.1. Each of the three SAwT
implementations learn to play the PE solution (C, c) in this game, yielding a payoff of
3 to each agent. Notice that the average reward also converges to 3 despite the cost
incurred by relaxation searches, even for large aspiration trembles. This is because
the probability of aspiration trembles (η) decreases over time.
Staghunt
As in the matrix game chicken, the three SAwT agents also learn to play cooperatively in staghunt (see Figure 4.2). However, it takes much longer for SAwST
(small trembles) to converge to mutual cooperation. This is because small aspiration
trembles make it less probable for both agents to become dissatisfied with mutual
defection (i.e., (D, d)) at the same time (which is required for the agents to overcome
the security critical event of playing D and d). Thus, it takes longer for them to learn
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C
D

c
4, 4
3, −5

d
−5, 3
2, 2

Figure 4.2: Results from 50 trials of the matrix game staghunt.

Figure 4.3: Results from 50 trials of a 3-agent, 6-action MASD (k=0.6). The results
are shown for λ = 0.999.

to play the more profitable solution (C, c).
MASD
The performance of the agents in a 3 × 6 MASD (k = 0.6) is shown in Figure 4.3.
Results are shown for a slower learning rate (λ = 0.999). In this game, small aspiration trembles (SAwST) are just as effective as large coordinated trembles (SAwCT).
However, large non-coordinated trembles result in lower average performance. This
is not because SAwLT does not learn to play PE solutions. Rather, it is a result of
the agent learning PE solutions with lower average payoffs, as one of the agents (the
trembling agent) typically receives a higher payoff than the non-trembling agents.
This result is in line with Stimpson et al.’s observation that aspirations should be
similar in the MASD.
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A
B

a
3.5, 2
1, 4

b
3.5, 1
4, 3

Figure 4.4: Results from 50 trials of the game shown at left. The performance of the
row player is shown above and the performance of the column player is shown below.
SAwT-Fixed is a SAwT agent that always trembles (using coordinated trembles) to
the point (3.99, 2.99).

A Game with a Stable Security Critical Event
Figure 4.4 (left) shows a matrix game with a stable security critical event (when
player 1 plays A) when player 1’s aspiration level is less than or equal to 3.5. The SAlgorithm (as we saw in the previous chapter; see Figure 3.24) converges to the pareto
dominated solution (A, a) in this game for most initial aspiration vectors. However, if
α0 ≈ (4, 3), then the S-Algorithm converges with high probability to the PE solution
(B, b), resulting in a higher payoff to both agents.
Figure 4.4 (right) shows that naive implementations of SAwT still converge to
the pareto dominated solution (A, a) much of the time, particularly in the case of
SAwST (small trembles). However, large aspiration trembles do increase the average
performance of the agents (slightly). Figure 4.4 (right) also shows the performance
of SAwT-Fixed, which is identical to SAwCT except that the agents always tremble
their aspirations to the point (3.99, 2.99). Such trembles result in convergence to the
PE solution (B, b).
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B
C

a
0, 3
0.5, 3
3, 1.5

b
3, 0.5
3.3, 3.3
3, 1

c
3, 0
1.5, 3
1, 3

Figure 4.5: Results from 50 trials of the game shown at left.

A Game with a Preclusion Critical Event
We now analyze SAwT in a game with a preclusion critical event. A similar
version of this game was discussed in the previous chapter (see Figure 3.12). Once
again, SAwST is outperformed by the algorithms that use larger trembles. However,
there appears to be little difference between SAwCT and SAwLT. This is because any
aspiration tremble to a region in which one of the agents has a payoff greater than 3
satisfies the conditions of pareto efficiency.
4.3.3

Discussion

In each of the games discussed in this section, each implementation of SAwT
performs (after learning) as well or better than the S-Algorithm (with the exception
of SAwST in the game shown in Figure 4.5). Thus, aspiration trembles (particularly
large ones) eliminate the need for the satisficing learners to set their initial aspiration
levels to high values.
In several of the games we analyzed in this section, large aspiration trembles
tend to lead to better overall performance than do small aspiration trembles (see
Figures 4.4 and 4.5). There are several reasons for this. First, in many games, large
aspiration trembles allow the agents to tremble their aspirations to locations in the
payoff space that satisfy the conditions of pareto efficiency discussed in the previous
chapter. Small aspiration trembles do not do as good of a job of overcoming critical
events that exclude mutually satisficing ε-PE solutions. Second, although smaller
aspiration trembles usually result in shorter relaxation searches, this advantage is
negated as the probability of aspiration trembles becomes infrequent (i.e., as η → 0).
In most games we studied in this section, coordinating trembles does not increase
the average payoffs of the agents. However, in the case of large aspiration trembles,
coordinating trembles does have a significant impact on the performance of the agents
in the MASD. This is because non-trembling agents eventually become satisfied with
lower payoffs when one of the agents becomes more selective (due to a large aspiration
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tremble). This results in lower average payoffs to the agents.
Unfortunately, naive aspiration trembles (at least those we presented) do not
satisfy the conditions of pareto efficiency in all games (see, for example, Figure 4.4).
As a result, the agents receive lower average payoffs (at least in these games) than
they otherwise might. In the next section, we show how agents can use a simple
learning algorithm to learn how to tremble their aspirations so as to improve their
average payoffs. We show (empirically) that this algorithm allows agents to learn
to tremble aspirations so that they satisfy the conditions of pareto efficiency (when
doing so is profitable).
4.4

Using Trembles to Learn Initial Aspirations

In the previous section, we considered trembling aspirations to the highest observed payoff or perturbing aspirations slightly in the upward direction. In this
section, we consider trembling aspirations to a set of fixed locations in the payoff
space. Trembling aspirations in this way allows an agent to learn how specific initial
aspiration levels (of a given epoch) affect future payoffs.
4.4.1

Background and Notation

At the beginning of an epoch, each agent trembles its aspiration level to one
of Zi + 1 values, where Zi is some positive integer. Let Ci denote agent i’s set of
tremble values (aspiration levels to which agent i considers trembling its aspirations).
= rimax + 2ε where rimax
Agent i’s maximum tremble value (denoted cZi i ∈ Ci ) is cmax
i
is agent i’s highest observed payoff. Its minimum tremble value (denoted c0i ∈ Ci
= mPi − 2ε , where mPi (as in the previous chapter; see Equation (3.7)) is its
is cmin
i
minimax value (over the pure strategy space) given by
mPi = max min ri (ai , a−i )
ai ∈Ai a−i ∈A−i

(4.5)

Note that mPi is unknown to agent i since it does not know its payoff matrix. However,
agent i can calculate an upper bound of mPi (which must converge to the true value
over time if all the agents sometimes act randomly) using observations of the minimum
payoff produced by each of its actions.
Let ∆i be the distance between each tremble value, given by
∆i =

cmax
− cmin
rmax − mPi + ε
i
i
= i
Zi
Z

Then, each tremble value cki ∈ Ci of agent i is given be
ε
cki = mPi − + k∆i
2

(4.6)

(4.7)

We consider the case in which agents coordinate aspiration trembles (as in SAwCT;
see Algorithm 4.4). Using this method, the initial joint aspirations of each epoch are
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Figure 4.6: Joint tremble values (marked with o’s) for an arbitrary 2-agent matrix
game for Z = 3, ε = 0.3, mP1 = 2.5, mP2 = 2.3, r1max = 3.5, r2max = 4.

in the region P0 (the region of possible initial aspiration vectors defined in the previous chapter). Let C = C1 × · · · × Cn be the set of joint tremble values8 . Figure 4.6
shows the set of joint tremble values for an arbitrary 2-agent matrix game. The o’s in
the figure mark the joint tremble values of the agents when Zi = 3 (for both agents).
A SAwT agent should learn to tremble its aspirations to maximize its own convergence payoffs. In most games, joint tremble values that satisfy the conditions of
pareto efficiency (if the agents tremble their aspirations to this point) are most likely
to satisfy this requirement. Thus, the question arises of how large Zi should be (for
each agent i) to guarantee that at least one joint tremble value will satisfy the conditions of pareto efficiency. If one such joint tremble value exists, then the agents can
learn to tremble their aspirations to this point in order to maximize their convergence
payoffs.
In most games, Zi need not be large as most joint tremble values in P0 satisfy
the conditions of pareto efficiency. In others, Zi must be chosen more judiciously. In
others still, it appears that there is no possible joint tremble value that satisfies the
conditions of pareto efficiency (see the previous chapter). We now present a claim
that places a bound on how high Zi must be to guarantee that at least one joint
tremble value will satisfy the conditions of pareto efficiency in most games.
cmax −cmin

Claim 4.1. If Zi ≥ 1 + i ε i for each agent i, then at least one c ∈ C satisfies
the conditions of pareto efficiency if the game being played has one of the following
characteristics:
(a) The game has no preclusion critical events.
(b) The game is a 2-agent game.
8

Note that C is only approximately the set of initial joint aspirations of each epoch since the
agents do not all tremble on the same episode when trembles are coordinated.
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(c) ∃a ∈ Pε such that ∀i ri (a) > mPi and ∀J ⊆ I (|J| ≥ 2), ∃j ∈ J rj (a) > Tjprec + ε.
cZ −c0

In each of these cases (Cases (a)–(c)), if Zi = 1 + i ε i for each agent i, then a
joint tremble value must be in a subregion defined in the proofs of the theorems of
the previous chapter. The subregion for Case (a) is given in the proof of Theorem 3.2,
the subregion for Case (b) is given in the proof of Theorem 3.3, and the subregion
for Case (c) is given in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
4.4.2

Learning Tremble Actions

Each agent i seeks to learn which of its tremble values gives it the highest average
payoff once play converges (if it does, indeed, converge). We call this payoff the
convergence payoff. Formally, let ci (τ ) denote agent i’s selected tremble value in the
τ th epoch and let c(τ ) = (c1 (τ ), · · · , cn (τ )) be the joint tremble value (of the n agents)
in the τ th epoch. The joint tremble value c(τ ) determines the convergence payoffs
that the agents will likely receive in epoch τ . We denote this payoff uτi for agent i.
Tτ
τ
For practical purposes, let uτi = αi end , where Tend
is the last episode of epoch τ .
τ
The convergence payoff ui is a sample taken from a distribution over the real
numbers. Let this distribution be denoted Ui (c(τ )). Then, the tuple (I, C, U) (where
U = {U1 , · · · , Un } and I, as before, is the set of n agents playing the game) is a matrix
game, which we will call the tremble matrix game.
In contrast to the matrix games we have studied so far, tremble matrix games have
nondeterministic payoff functions. Because of this, the S-Algorithm is not a good
choice for learning this game. Thus, we must select an alternate learning algorithm.
Fortunately, empirical evidence strongly suggests that the tremble matrix games does
not take on the form of all general-sum matrix games, as (it appears) each agent
has a tremble value (or set of tremble values) that dominates the other tremble
values (i.e., regardless of how the other agents choose to tremble their aspirations).
Additionally, it does not appear that off-dominant solutions can lead to higher payoffs
than dominant solutions (such as cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma). Thus, a
simple single-agent learning algorithm appears to be sufficient to learn in these games.
In this chapter, we explore the effectiveness of a stateless Q-learning [76] agent to
learn the tremble matrix game. We now describe our implementation (which we call
SAwT-Q).
Updating Q-values
SAwT-Q keeps track of two different Q-estimates for each tremble value ci ∈
Ci : Qτi (ci |down) and Qτi (ci |up). Qτi (ci |down) is the estimate of the agent’s average
convergence payoff (at epoch τ ) when it trembles its aspirations downward to the
tremble value ci , while Qτi (ci |up) is the estimate of the agent’s average convergence
payoff when it trembles its aspirations upward to the tremble value ci .
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At the end of each epoch, one Q-update is made. Let T0 be the time at which the
current epoch began. Then, if αiT0 ≥ ci (τ ) (i.e., the agent trembled downward), then
Qτi (ci |down) is updated using
Qτi +1 (ci (τ )|down) = (1 − ρ)Qτi (ci (τ )|down) + ρuτi

(4.8)

Otherwise, Qτi (ci |up) is updated using
Qτi +1 (ci (τ )|up) = (1 − ρ)Qτi (ci (τ )|up) + ρuτi

(4.9)

where ρ is the learning rate. For all results presented in this chapter, we used ρ =
max(0.01, κ(ci1(τ )) ), where κ(ci (τ )) is the number of times that the agent has trembled
its aspirations to the tremble value ci (τ ).9
Selecting Actions
We use an -greedy policy. That is, on epoch τ , the tremble value with the highest
Q-estimate is selected with probability 1 − . Otherwise (i.e., with probability ), the
tremble value is selected randomly. More formally,

maxci ∈Ci Qτi (ci ) with probability 1 − 
τ
(4.10)
ci ←
rand(Ci )
with probability 
where rand(Ci ) is a random selection from the set Ci and Qτi (ci ) is given by
 τ
Qi (ci |down) if αit ≥ ci
τ
Qi (ci ) =
if αit < ci
Qτi (ci |up)

(4.11)

When the agent acts according to its Q-estimates, then ηi is decreased over time
using


ηi = 0.01

τ
1.0+ 200Z



i

(4.12)

where τ is the current epoch. However, when an agent explores its environment,
lower tremble payoffs often result. To avoid receiving these payoffs for too long, we
set η = 0.01 in these epochs (when the tremble value is chosen randomly). This way,
SAwT gets the best of both worlds: it is able to explore its environment (as it is
still able to observe its convergence payoff), but it is also able to exploit what it has
learned for longer periods of time than when it explores.
As before, unless stated otherwise, λ = 0.99, θ = 0.1 (for Equation (4.3)), and
c
T = 20 (see Equation (4.1)). Also, Zi = 6 for all i and  = ηi (as given in Equation (4.12)).
The resulting algorithm (SAwT-Q) is a blend of the SAwT and Q-learning. SAwT
(in its original unmodified form) is used to learn to play satisficing equilibrium [74]
(or mutually satisficing solutions). Q-learning is used to learn how an agent can
maximize the effect of trembling (by learning how tremble values affect the long-term
performance of the agent).
9

We distinguish between up and down trembles when computing κ(ci (τ )).

80

C
D

c
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3.5, 2
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2, 3.5
1, 1

Figure 4.7: Results from 50 trials of the matrix game chicken.

4.4.3

Results

We now present a case study showing (empirically) how SAwT-Q performs in a
number of games. We compare the performance of SAwT-Q with two other agents
in each game. First, we compare SAwT-Q’s performance to SAwRT, an SAwT agent
that randomly selects a tremble value from the set Ci . Second, we compare SAwT-Q’s
performance to an agent that deterministically trembles its aspirations to locations
that produce high convergence payoffs (SAwCT in most games). Both of these agents
are designed to tremble their aspirations with the same frequency as SAwT-Q (i.e.,
they tremble their aspirations with probability ηi as given in Equation (4.12)).
Chicken
All initial aspiration vectors in P0 lead to convergence to an ε-PE solution in the
matrix game chicken. However, we show the performance of SAwT-Q in this game
to show that it learns to tremble its aspirations so that it converges to the mutually
satisficing solution (C, c), which is the highest average payoff an agent can expect
to receive in self play. Figure 4.7 shows that the performance of SAwT-Q is nearly
identical to that of SAwCT. Notice, however, that SAwRT plays cooperatively (and
does so very quickly) in this game (in most cases) despite the fact that it trembles its
aspirations randomly. This is because most aspiration trembles to the tremble values
in Ci tend to be in the downward direction. Since such trembles often have no affect
on the behavior of SAwT agents (since the agents remain satisfied), SAwRT does not
have as many aspiration relaxation searches (which can be costly). Thus, its average
performance is higher than that of SAwT-Q and SAwCT until η becomes small.
MASD
The results for the 3×6 MASD (shown in Figure 4.8) are uneventful, yet interesting
nonetheless. First, notice that the eventual performance of all the agents is nearly
identical. However, SAwRT outperforms the other two agents initially. Again, this is
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Figure 4.8: Results from 50 trials of a 3-agent, 6-action MASD (k=0.6). For these
results λ = 0.995.

due to aspiration trembles in the downward direction which do not result in behavior
changes in the agents. Notice also that the performance of SAwT-Q is identical to
that of SAwCT, since SAwT-Q agents learn to tremble using the tremble value cmax
i
(in most instances).
A Game with a Stable Security Critical Event
In the previous two examples, learning how to tremble aspirations does not appear
to increase the performance of the agents to a significant degree. However, SAwT-Q
often outperforms naive implementations of SAwT in games in which the conditions
of pareto efficiency are not easily satisfied. To see this, consider Figure 4.9, which
shows a game with a stable security critical event. Recall from the previous section
that naive implementations of SAwT do not tremble their aspirations to satisfy the
conditions of pareto efficiency (see Figure 4.4) in this game. As a result, they learn
to play pareto-dominated solutions, which results in inferior average payoffs to the
agents (in this game). However, SAwT-Q does learn to tremble its aspirations to
satisfy these conditions. Thus, it learns to play the PE solution (B, b) in this game.
As SAwT-Q learns, its performance becomes similar to that of SAwT-Fixed, which
always trembles its aspirations to the value (3.99, 2.99). Notice that random aspiration
trembles to the tremble values in Ci do not produce this result.
A Game with a Preclusion Critical Event
Figure 4.10 shows a 3 × 3 matrix game with a preclusion critical event when the
aspiration levels of both agents are 3 or less. In this game, SAwT-Q learns to tremble
its aspirations so that it avoids this preclusion critical event as well as maximize its
payoffs. It learns to tremble its aspirations as does SAwCT. Thus, its performance
becomes similar to that of SAwCT. Notice, again, that random trembles do not
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a
3.5, 2
1, 4

b
3.5, 1
4, 3

Figure 4.9: Results from 50 trials of the game shown at left. The performance of
the row player is shown above and the performance of the column player is shown
below. The SAwT implementation SAwT-Fixed is an agent that always trembles to
the point (3.99, 2.99).
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b
3, 0.5
3.3, 3.3
3, 1

c
3, 0
1.5, 3
1, 3

Figure 4.10: Results from 50 trials of the game shown at left. A learning rate of
λ = 0.995 was used.

produce these same performance levels. However, SAwRT’s performance is not bad
in this game since, again, many of its trembles are in the downward direction when
its aspiration levels are high.
4.5

SAwT in Changing Environments

In both this chapter and the previous chapter, we have assumed a stationary
payoff matrix. However, in many situations (such as multi-state stochastic games,
which we discuss in Chapter 6), the payoff matrix is non-stationary.
The S-Algorithm is not likely to perform well in games with a non-stationary
payoff matrix. One of the main reasons that it will not perform well is that it uses a
relaxation search (starting at a high value) to find a profitable solution that all agents
can agree on (are satisfied with). However, the relaxation search considers only the
current payoffs. Thus, once payoffs change (particularly in the upward direction),
aspirations will no longer be high (with respect to the payoffs of the game). Thus, any
subsequent relaxation searches (initiated by the agents becoming dissatisfied because
of changing payoffs) have no guarantees of converging to a profitable strategy with
high probability.
However, (large) aspiration trembles allow a satisficing agent to begin relaxation
searches at high values at the beginning of most epochs. Thus, SAwT will continue to
learn to play ε-PE solutions as long as the payoff matrix does not change too quickly.
The speed at which the payoff matrix can change to maintain this result is dependent
on the parameters λ (which controls the length of the relaxation search) and η. As
λ gets bigger and as η gets smaller, the environment must necessarily change slower
if SAwT is to play ε-PE solutions most of the time. Note, however, that decreasing
λ and increasing η results in the agent playing ε-PE solutions less frequently when
the payoff matrix is stationary since a lower λ means less likely convergence to ε-PE
solutions and a higher η means a shorter convergence period. Thus, simply decreasing
λ or increasing η to adapt to a changing payoff matrix will not typically lead to better
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performance
We note that the ability to adapt to changing payoff matrices is not a common
attribute of multiagent learning algorithms (to date), although there are some exceptions (see, for example, [15]). Algorithms that depend on learned models (particularly
those that are learned slowly) have a difficult time adapting to changing payoffs. Often these algorithms can never overcome the biases created by prior learning. One
example of this is fictitious play [33] which learns different strategies depending on
the agent’s prior beliefs about their associates. When a payoff matrix changes over
time, strategies learned under prior matrix configurations can result in permanent
biases, which can result in undesirable behavior.
With the exception of the models of rimax and mPi (modeling which could be
easily implemented for changing payoff matrices), naive implementations of SAwT
do not use models to govern behavior. Thus, a slowly changing payoff matrix does
not alter how it learns, as SAwT essentially restarts the learning process anew each
time it trembles its aspirations (particularly in the case of large aspiration trembles).
We note, however, that SAwT-Q learns a model that is not likely to adapt quickly
enough to changing payoff matrices, especially when η decreases over time.
While SAwT promises to be effective under some changing conditions, it is limited
by its minimal knowledge assumptions. We show in Chapter 6 how an algorithm similar to SAwT (presented in Chapter 5) can be extended to perform well in stochastic
games. This algorithm requires knowledge of the actions of the other agents in the
game so that an agent can observe its own payoff matrix.
4.6

Summary, Discussion, and Future Work

In this chapter, we extended the S-Algorithm to include aspiration trembles. The
resulting algorithm SAwT has a number of desirable properties. First, SAwT removes
the restriction that initial aspirations be made high. Second, SAwT agents can learn
to tremble aspirations so that the resulting joint aspirations satisfy the conditions of
pareto efficiency in many games. This results in higher average payoffs to the agents
(see, for example, Figures 4.9 and 4.10).
Also, SAwT shows promise for continuing to play ε-PE solutions even in games in
which the payoff matrix changes slowly over time. This result lays the foundation for
learning restarts, which are used by a similar algorithm that we present in Chapters
5 and 6.
Future work could include a more in-depth analysis of tremble matrix games. In
this chapter, we assumed that single agent Q-learners can learn this game effectively.
In the games we analyzed, this algorithm performed effectively. However, it is possible
that Q-learning will not be able to learn the tremble matrix game effectively in some
games.
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Chapter 5
Learning to Compete, Compromise, and Cooperate in Repeated General-Sum Matrix Games Using Reinforcement Learning
5.1

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we assumed that an agent did not know the actions and
payoffs of other agents in the environment. While this is a reasonable knowledge
restriction for many important domains, many other domains allow an agent to view
the actions taken by other agents in the environment. Thus, in this chapter, we
assume that an agent can view the actions of all agents in the environment and its
own payoffs, but not the payoff of other agents. Thus, agent i knows Ri , but not Rj ,
for all j 6= i.
Even with knowledge of the actions of the other agents, learning successfully
in repeated general-sum matrix games is a difficult problem. To see this, consider
Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1(a) shows R1 , the payoff matrix for the row player. This payoff
matrix, however, does little to tell the row agent how to play since R1 does nothing
to indicate the kind of game the agent is playing. For example, Figure 5.1(b)–(d)
give examples of three different kinds of games which the agent could be playing; (b)
shows a competitive game, (c) shows a fully cooperative game, and (d) shows a game
of conflicting interest.
Although knowing one’s own payoff matrix does not indicate the kind of game

a
b

a b
1 -2
-3 4
(a)

a
b
a 1, -1 -2, 2
b -3, 3 4, -4

a
b

(b)

a
b
1, 1 -2, -2
-3, -3 4, 4
(c)

a
b
a 1, 4 -2, -3
b -3, -2 4, 1
(d)

Figure 5.1: Example showing how knowledge of one’s own payoff matrix Ri does not
indicate the kind of game an agent is playing. (a) Shows player 1’s payoff matrix R1 ,
and (b)–(d) show three possible games the agent could be playing (given this payoff
matrix).
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an agent is playing, knowing the actions of other agents does provide valuable information. First, when an agent knows its own payoff matrix Ri , it can calculate its
minimax value over the mixed strategy space1 . The minimax value can serve as a
lower bound on the average payoff that an agent should expect to receive. Second, the
agents can use the previous ω joint actions as a signal that can be used to coordinate
profitable compromises. Third, knowing the payoff matrix allows an agent to learn
successfully in stochastic environments.
The first and second advantages just listed provide the foundation for (at least)
two desirable properties of learning agents. First, an agent should never learn to play a
strategy that produces expected payoffs lower than its minimax value. This property
is particularly relevant in competitive games. Second, an agent should learn to make
and accept compromises that increase its average payoffs. Thus, in cooperative games
and in games of conflicting interest, an agent should learn to influence its associates
so that its own payoffs are significantly greater than its minimax value. Though these
two properties are simple and fundamental, no learning algorithm in the literature is
known to possess them both (simultaneously) in general-sum games without knowing
the payoffs of other agents (until preliminary results of this chapter appeared in [20]).
In this chapter, we present a reinforcement learning algorithm (called M-Qubed)
that provably satisfies the first property in all general-sum matrix games (regardless
of the associate) and empirically displays (in self play) the second property in a wide
range of general-sum games.
5.2

Related Work

In this chapter, we present minimum criteria (in the form of two properties) that
multiagent learning algorithms should satisfy (at the least) in repeated general-sum
matrix games. Other minimum criteria have been suggested in the literature. One
such set of criterion, given by Bowling and Veloso in [9], is that an agent’s strategy
should a) necessarily converge and b) converge to a best-response when associates’
strategies converge. Bowling and Veloso presented an algorithm that provably satisfies
this criteria in repeated 2 × 2 matrix games [9]. Conitzer and Sandholm gave an
algorithm in [18] that provably satisfies this criteria in all repeated general-sum matrix
games.
Another criterion used for evaluating multiagent learning algorithms is no-regret,
or universal consistency [31, 33, 8]. If one of the experts used by a no-regret algorithm
is the agent’s minimax strategy, then no-regret learning guarantees that an agent will
not learn to play a strategy that yields an average payoff below its minimax value.
As we mentioned in Chapter 2, no-regret algorithms do not consider how an agent’s
1

Note that in the previous chapter we used the minimax value mP
i calculated over the pure
strategy space. The minimax value over the mixed strategy space (mi ) provides the agent with
much more security in many games.
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actions affect the future actions of associates. As a result, algorithms designed to
meet this criteria learn myopic strategies in many theoretically important repeated
games.
Yet another set of criterion for multiagent learning algorithms is given by Powers
and Shoham [63, 62]2 . In these works, they propose three criteria that are similar in
nature to the two criteria we advocate in this chapter (as well as in [20]). Powers et
al.’s criteria are more specific (and less general) but tighter then the criteria presented
herein.
The reinforcement learning algorithm we present in this chapter is an independent
action learner [16], but it uses the previous joint actions of the agents as state. This
idea was first used in Q-learning by Sandholm and Crites [66]. Additionally, it has
been advocated by Moody [57] and used effectively in [20, 6] (among other places).
This work relies heavily on work done in reinforcement learning, which we reviewed
briefly in Chapter 2. Thorough reviews of reinforcement learning can be found in [44,
75].
5.3

Terminology

In this section, we give some definitions and notation that we use in this chapter.
We note that the terminology and notation presented in the section differs in some
significant points from the terminology and notation used in the previous chapters.
Let S denote the set of states in the game and let Ai denote the set of actions that
agent/player i may select in each state s ∈ S. Let at = (at1 , at2 , . . . , atn ), where ati ∈ Ai ,
be the joint action taken by the n agents on episode t, and let A = A1 × · · · × An be
the set of possible joint actions.
A strategy (or policy) for agent i is a probability distribution πi (·) over its action
set Ai . Let πi (S) denote a strategy over all states s ∈ S and let πi (s) (or πi ) denote
a strategy in a single state s. A strategy may be a pure strategy (the agent selects
an action deterministically) or a mixed strategy (otherwise). A joint strategy played
by n agents is denoted by π = (π1 , . . . , πn ). Also, let a−i and π −i refer to the joint
action and strategy of all agents except agent i.
Central to game theory is the matrix game, which is defined by a set of matrices
R = {R1 , . . . , Rn }. Let Ri (a) be player i’s payoff distribution when the joint action
a ∈ A is played, and let µi (a) be the expected payoff to player i when the joint action
a is played (i.e., µi (a) = E[Ri (a)], E[·] denotes an expected value). Also, let µi (π) be
the expected payoff to player i, when the joint strategy π is played, and let µi (πi , π −i )
be the expected payoff to player i when it plays πi and when the the other agents
play the joint strategy π −i . Let µmax
= maxa∈A µi (a) and µmin
= mina∈A µi (a)
i
i
2

In [62], Powers and Shoham give a slightly more in-depth review of past standards (i.e., minimum
criteria) for multiagent learning that have been used in the literature. Our discussion of past
minimum criteria follows their review closely.
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Each matrix game has certain game theoretic values. The minimax value for agent
i (denoted mi ) is
mi = max min µi (πi , a−i )
πi

a−i

(5.1)

The minimax strategy for agent i (denoted πim ) is
πim = argmax min µi (πi , a−i )
πi

a−i

(5.2)

A one-shot NE is a joint strategy π such that no agent can unilaterally change its
strategy without lowering its expected payoff in the current episode. Nash [60] showed
that every n-player matrix game has at least one one-shot NE. An NE of the repeated
game (rNE) is a joint strategy π(S) over all states s ∈ S, such that no agent can
unilaterally change its strategy in any (reachable) state s ∈ S without lowering its
expected average payoff over time. Every one-shot NE is an rNE.
We assume that an agent can observe its own payoffs as well as the actions taken
by all agents. Thus, an agent can observe its own payoff matrix Ri . This being the
case, we assume in this chapter that a) an agent knows its payoff matrix Ri (or at
least µi (a) for all a ∈ A) prior to the beginning of play (and, therefore, can calculate
its minimax value mi and minimax strategy πim using linear programming) and b)
Ri (a) is stationary for all a ∈ A.
5.4

Minimum Criteria

As we mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, the folk theorem [35]
implies that, in many games, there exist rNEs that yield higher payoffs to all agents
than do one-shot NEs. Thus, the one-shot NE should not be chosen as the goal
of learning agents. Rather, in repeated games between successful learning agents, a
successful agent should learn to play profitable rNEs. However, it is not clear which
rNE an agent should learn to play. Additionally, in games between learning agents,
it is difficult for a learner to determine if it is playing its portion of an rNE. Because
of this, we seek to design an agent that learns to play strategies that yield average
payoffs that correspond to an rNE, preferably an rNE with a high payoff. Thus, a
learner should possess (at the least) the following two properties.
Property 5.1. (Security Property) An agent should not learn to play strategies that
produce average expected payoffs below its minimax value mi .
An agent can easily satisfy this property by playing πim (the minimax strategy)
regardless of what its associates do. However, such a strategy may be “irrational,”
since mi (the minimax value) may be much lower than the payoffs that an agent
can realistically expect. On the other hand, mi is the highest expected payoff that
any agent can guarantee itself without some form of cooperation or compromise from
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its associate(s). Thus, a successful agent must learn (if possible) to influence its
associate(s) to be cooperative. This brings us to the second property, which we
define next (after introducing the necessary terminology).
Let Ωti (π t−i (S)) = {πi (S) : µi (πi (S), π t−i (S)) > mi } and let ∆−i (S) = {π −i (S) :
Ωi (π −i (S)) 6= ∅}. That is, Ωti (π t−i (S)) is the set of all strategies for agent i (at
time t) that will give it an expected payoff greater than its minimax value given
the other agents’ strategies π t−i (S); and ∆−i (S) is the set of the agent’s associates’
strategies for which Ωti is not empty. Also, let ϕTi = (a0i , a1i , . . . aTi ) be an action
sequence through time T for agent i, where ati is agent i’s action at time t. Let
Φi = {ϕTi : ∀t ≥ T , π t−i (S) ∈ ∆−i (S) if, ∀τ ∈ [T, t), πiτ (S) ∈ Ωτi (π τ−i (S))}. That is,
Φi is the set of action sequences that agent i may take that lead to it receiving an
expected payoff greater than its minimax value from time T onward (provided that
it continues to play appropriately).
Property 5.2. (Compromise/Cooperate Property) This property has two parts: influence and compromise.
• Influence. If Φi 6= ∅, then an agent should play ϕi ∈ Φi prior to time T and
πit (S) ∈ Ωti (π t−i (S)) thereafter.
• Compromise. An agent can be influenced in non-competitive games (see Section 2.5).
We refer to this property as the compromise/cooperate (C/C) property because an
agent must offer and accept compromises to possess it. In words, influence says that
if an agent can influence its associate(s) to play cooperatively, it will. Compromise
says that an agent can be induced to cooperate/compromise.
It has been shown in [27] that an agent without omniscience cannot possess the
C/C property when associating with all associates. However, a successful learning
algorithm should possess this property when associating with a large class of agents.
In this chapter, we focus on the C/C property in self play only.
Note that the definition of the C/C property means that an algorithm satisfies
this property when µi (πi (S), π −i (S)) = mi + , where  > 0. This is hardly useful
since  is allowed to be very small, but defining a threshold greater than mi is difficult
for the general case. Ideally, we argue that when intelligent learning agents associate
in repeated games, the learned joint strategies should be pareto efficient. However,
a self-interested agent is not concerned with the payoffs of others (unless the payoffs
of others affect its own future payoffs). Thus, an algorithm could possibly satisfy the
C/C property without learning to play a pareto efficient solution.
To remedy this dilemma, we advocate that the C/C property can be satisfied to
various degrees. For example, suppose in a given game, that both agent A and agent
B satisfy the C/C property in self play. We say that agent A more fully satisfies the
C/C property in this game (in self play) than does agent B if µA (πA (S), π −A (S)) >
µB (πB (S), π −B (S)).
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Learning Algorithm
Security Property C/C Property (Self Play)
Q-Learning
No
No
Fictitious Play [33]
No
No
minimaxQ [51]
Yes
No
NashQ [41]
No
No
FFQ [52]
Yes
Only in cooperative games
WoLF-PHC [9]
No
No
Satisficing Learning [71, 24] No
In most noncompetitive games
GIGA-WoLF [8]
Yes
No
Table 5.1: Property characteristics of typical learners in repeated general-sum games.
Note that there are many algorithms that have been studied in the context of learning
to cooperate in small classes of games. We do not list them here to emphasize the
focus on general-sum games as a whole.

While these two properties should be considered simple and basic to the multiagent learning problem, until preliminary results of this chapter appeared in [20],
no known learning algorithm in the literature was known to possess both of these
properties simultaneously in repeated general-sum matrix games (even in self play)
without having full knowledge of the complete game matrix R3 . Table 5.1 gives a
short representative list of algorithms in the literature and indicates which of the two
properties that they possess.
5.5

The M-Qubed Algorithm

In this section, we describe a learning algorithm that (provably) satisfies the security property and appears (empirically) to possess the C/C property in self play. We
call this algorithm M-Qubed (Max or Minimax Q-learning = M 3 -Q = M-Qubed).
Like Q-learning [76], M-Qubed estimates the value of a state-action pair and
selects a strategy using this estimate. We now describe the algorithm.
5.5.1

Q-update

In Q-learning, the quality of a state-action pair Q(s, ai ) is estimated by iteratively
updating Q-values using the following equation:

t
t
t
t
t 0
Qt+1
(s,
a
)
=
(1
−
α
)Q
(s,
a
)
+
α
r
+
γ
V
(s
)
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
3

(5.3)

Powers and Shoham (in [62]) state a similar set of properties and give an algorithm that possesses
these properties when associating with a certain class of agents. However, their algorithm requires
complete knowledge of R.
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where s is the current state, ai is the action taken at time t, rit is the reward receive
at time t, and Vit (s0 ) is the estimated value of the next state s0 , given by
Vit (s0 ) = max Qti (s0 , bi )
bi

(5.4)

Watkins showed that the estimate Qti (s, ai ) approaches the true Q-values as t → ∞
in stationary environments provided that each state-action pair is taken infinitely
often and the learning rate αi is decreased appropriately [76]. However, since matrix games between learning agents effectually produce non-stationary environments,
various algorithms have been proposed to make Q-learning appropriate for these situations. These approaches involve a) estimating the value of a state-joint action pair
(rather than a state-action pair) and b) estimating the value of the next state Vit (s0 )
with a game theoretic value (e.g., [51, 41, 52, 39]).
We note that while matrix games do not have state, agents can benefit from using
the previous w joint actions taken by the agents as state (see [66]), provided that
the actions of all agents can be observed (which we assume). Let H(ωi ) be the set
of all histories of joint actions of length ωi . Then, in matrix games, S = H(ωi ) and
s = ht (ωi ) ∈ H(ωi ), where ht (ωi ) = (at−ωi , · · · , at−1 ).
An additional observation about Q-updates in matrix games in which the payoff
matrix is stationary is that the expected reward µi (at ) can be used in place of the
reward rit . This is because rit is a sample taken from the distribution Ri (at ). While
this substitution really does nothing in theory, it does in practice provide added
stability (and can increase the speed of learning) when Ri (a) has high variance.
These observations can be used to transform Equation (5.3) to


t
t
t
t
t
t t+1
Qt+1
(h
(ω
),
a
)
=
(1
−
α
)Q
(h
(ω
),
a
)
+
α
µ
(a
)
+
γ
V
(h
(ω
))
i
i
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i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
M-Qubed estimates the value of the next state Vit (ht+1 (ωi )) using
X
Vit (ht+1 (ωi )) =
πit (ht+1 (ωi ), bi )Qti (ht+1 (ωi ), bi )

(5.5)

(5.6)

bi

where πit (ht+1 (ωi ), bi ) is the probability that the agent believes it will play action bi
in state ht+1 (ωi ).4 Note that M-Qubed’s estimated value of the next state given in
Equation (5.6) is equivalent to the one used in Q-learning (see Equation (5.4)) if
πit (ht+1 (ωi )) = argmaxbi Qti (ht+1 (ωi ), bi ).
5.5.2

Selecting a Strategy

A Q-learner always (unless exploring) takes the action corresponding to its highest Q-value in the current state. However, in repeated matrix games, an agent’s best
4

Equation (5.6) makes M-Qubed’s Q-update similar to the on-policy learning method called
Sarsa [75].
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strategy might not be a pure strategy. The trick is to know when to play a pure
strategy and when to play a mixed strategy. We advocate that agents should act
predictably (pure strategies) in games of compromise and cooperation, but unpredictably (mixed strategies) in competitive games (if πim is a mixed strategy). Since it
is frequently unknown a priori whether a game is competitive or whether associates
will be inclined to cooperate, a successful learning algorithm must determine whether
to act predictably or unpredictably.
In this subsection, we state two strategy rules for determining whether M-Qubed
should play predictably or unpredictably. Since each strategy rule is advantageous
for a different set of circumstances, we present a third strategy rule that mixes the
two rules in a desirable fashion.
In the first strategy rule, M-Qubed determines whether it should play predictably
or unpredictably by comparing its highest Q-value in the current state (which is
given by maxai Qti (ht (ωi ), ai )) with the discounted sum of mi (which is given by
P∞ t
mi
mi
t t
t=0 γi mi = 1−γi ). When maxai Qi (h (ωi ), ai ) > 1−γi , M-Qubed plays predictably.
Otherwise, it plays the minimax strategy πim . Thus, M-Qubed’s strategy in state
ht (ωi ) is
(
mi
argmaxai Qti (ht (ωi ), ai ) if maxai Qti (ht (ωi ), ai ) > 1−γ
i
πi∗ (ht (ωi )) ←
(5.7)
otherwise
πim
We call this strategy rule Strategy Rule 1. Unfortunately, an agent may be exploited
when using this strategy rule since its Q-values might not reflect its actual payoffs
when the environment is made non-stationary by the changing strategies of associates.
A second strategy rule (called Strategy Rule 2) for determining whether to play preP
dictably or unpredictably is to compare the agent’s average payoff µti = 1t tj=1 µi (aj )
with mi . This gives
(
µt
mi
argmaxai Qti (ht ωi , ai ) if 1−γi i > 1−γ
∗ t
i
(5.8)
πi (h (ωi )) ←
πim
otherwise
While safe, µti reacts too slowly. Thus, an agent using this strategy rule might a) continue to play πim when a more profitable strategy can be learned otherwise or b) be
slow to play πim when it is being temporarily exploited.
Strategy Rule 1 allows an agent to explore possible improvements (C/C), while
Strategy Rule 2 provides an agent with security. A balance may be obtained by
learning which of the two techniques is more successful. Let βit be the probability
that M-Qubed uses Strategy Rule 2 at time t, and let 1 − βit be the probability that
it uses Strategy Rule 1. Thus,

Strategy Rule 2 with probability βt
∗ t
πi (h (ωi )) ←
(5.9)
Strategy Rule 1 with probability 1 − βt
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Figure 5.2: M-Qubed sets in is Q-values high initially (left) and randomizes its strategy with a small probability (ηi ) when it has not visited the state containing the
highest global Q-value recently (right).

We call this strategy rule Strategy Rule 3.
βit is determined using the intermediate variable β́it . Initially, M-Qubed optimistically sets β́i0 = 0, then updates it using
(
β́it + λ(rit − mi ) Strategy Rule 2
(5.10)
β́it+1 ←
β́it − λ(rit − mi ) Strategy Rule 1
where λ is some constant. In words, β́it determines which rule is more successful by
increasing (toward Strategy Rule 2) if Strategy Rule 2 yields payoffs greater than mi
or if Strategy Rule 1 yields payoffs lower than mi , and decreasing (toward Strategy
Rule 1) otherwise. βit is β́it constrained to the interval [0, 1], or
βit = min(1, max(0, β́it ))
5.5.3

(5.11)

Adding Exploration

Q-learners typically explore their environment using ε-greedy or Boltzmann exploration. In repeated matrix games, an alternate exploration method is to set initial
value estimates optimistically (as suggested in [72]) and let the learning process dictate exploration. M-Qubed does this by initializing each Q-value to its highest posµmax
i
sible expected discounted reward, 1−γ
(see Figure 5.2(left)). In this way, an agent
i
uses a relaxation search to find a strategy that yields an expected discounted reward
at least as high as its highest Q-value.
M-Qubed also randomizes its strategy with some small probability ηi if it perceives
that its current strategy πi∗ keeps it in a local maximum. For example, consider the
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Name

Type

M-Qubed M-Qubed
QL

Q-learner

rQL

Q-learner

WoLF

WoLF-PHC

Parameter details
0.005(µmax −µmin
)
i

i
αi = 0.1, γi = 0.95, ωi = 1, ε =
1−γi

0.01αi
20000
, λ = µmax
ηi = 0.04 20000+t
−µmin
i
i
ai
αi = 1/(10 + 0.01κs ), γi = 0.95,
ε-greedy w/ ε = max(0.2 − 0.0006t, 0)
αi = 1/(10 + 0.01κas i ), γi = 0.95,
ε-greedy w/ ε = 0.1
Same as QL, but with
δw = 1/(10.0 + κas i ), δl = 4δw

Table 5.2: Learners and their parameter values. κas i is the number of times that action
ai has been played in state s.

hypothetical Q-values shown in Figure 5.2(right). In the figure, the highest global Qvalue is in state s∗ . However, only the rightmost states have been visited “recently,”
none of which have Q-values as high as does s∗ . Thus, M-Qubed randomizes its
strategy with probability ηi in hopes of entering state s∗5 .
M-Qubed guesses that its current strategy keeps it in Q
a local maximum if none
of the states which it has visited in the previous w = ( i |Ai |)ωi (the number of
states in the game) episodes of the game have Q-values close to the highest Qt−1
=
= maxai ∈Ai Qti (s∗ , ai ) and let Ht−w
value in state s∗ . More formally, let Qmax
i
t−w
t−1
{h (ωi ), · · · , h (ωi )}. Then, M-Qubed’s current strategy keeps it in a local maxit
t−1
mum if Qmax
> maxh∈Ht−w
i
,ai ∈Ai Qi (h, ai ) + ε, where ε is some small positive constant.
Thus,
(
πit (ht (ωi ), ai )

←

πi∗ (ht (ωi ), ai ),

if Qmax
≤ maxh∈H t−1 ,ai ∈Ai Qti (h, ai ) + ε
i
t−w

(1 − ηi )πi∗ (ht (ωi ), ai ) + ηi |A1i | , otherwise

(5.12)

where πi∗ (ht (ωi ), ai ) is obtained from Equation (5.9) (unless stated otherwise). ηi is
slowly decayed to 0 as t → ∞.
Because M-Qubed can cease to explore, it can learn strategies that are not as
desirable as it otherwise might have learned. However, we will show in the next
section that continuing to explore in repeated games can be more costly than ceasing
exploration.
5.6

Results

In this section, we prove that M-Qubed (summarized in Algorithm 5.1) satisfies
the security property and show that it displays the C/C property in a wide range
of games (in self play). Unless stated otherwise, the algorithms use the parameter
values shown in Table 5.2.
Note, again, that s∗ is simply the previous ωi joint actions taken by the agents prior to the
current time t. We use the term s∗ , rather than ht (ωi )∗ for notational simplicity.
5
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1) αi , ηi ∈ [0, 1], β́i = βi = 0.
2) Initialize πit (ht (ωi ), ai ) ←

1
,
|Ai |

Q(ht (ωi ), ai ) ←

µmax
i
1−γi

3) t ← 1
4) Repeat,
a) Take action ai according to πit (ht (ωi ))
b) Observe reward rit and joint action at :
i) Update πit (ht (ωi )) using Equation (5.12)
ii) Update Qti (ht (ωi ), ai ) using Equations (5.5) and (5.6)
iii) Update β́i , βi using Equation (5.10)
c) t ← t + 1
Algorithm 5.1: The M-Qubed algorithm for player i.

5.6.1

Security Property

Before giving the main theorem, we give two lemmas related to the random walk
of β́it since its behavior relates closely to the performance of M-Qubed. The first
lemma shows that the interval (0, 1) is a reflecting boundary for β́it when M-Qubed
is being exploited (it reflects β́it upward). The second lemma states a property of
reflected random walks.
Changes in β́it are related to the losses of agent i. Let lit = (mi − rit ) be agent i’s
loss at time t. Then, β́it is updated using (adapted from Equation (5.10))
(
β́it − λlit Strategy Rule 2
(5.13)
β́it+1 ←
β́it + λlit Strategy Rule 1
Thus, when the agent receives a payoff less than its minimax value, β́it moves away
from the strategy rule that was played during that episode. Recall that the closer
β́it gets to 0 (or below) the more likely the agent is to play Strategy Rule 1, and the
closer β́it gets to 1 (or above) the more likely the agent is to play Strategy Rule 2.
Pt−1 j
Let Lti = j=0
li be agent i’s accumulated loss prior to time t, and let [τ, ρ] be
an interval such that β́it ∈ (0, 1) for all t ∈ [τ, ρ]. Also, we say that agent i is being
exploited if µti < mi .
Lemma 5.1. E[β́iρ − β́iτ ] > 0 if M-Qubed is being exploited during time t ∈ [τ, ρ].
Proof. Let ξ1 be the subset t ∈ [τ, ρ] in which M-Qubed uses Strategy Rule 1, and let
ξ2 be the subset t ∈ [τ, ρ] in which it uses Strategy Rule 2. Then M-Qubed’s expected
loss during the time interval [τ, ρ] is
E[Lρi

−

Lτi ]

=

ρ
X

E[lit ] =

X

t=τ

t∈ξ1
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E[lit ] +

X
t∈ξ2

E[lit ]

(5.14)

P
When µti ≤ mi , then t∈ξ2 E[lit ] ≤ 0 since M-Qubed plays πim .6 That is, when agent i
is being exploited, its expected loss when it uses Strategy Rule 2 is non-positive since
it uses its minimax strategy. Thus, agent i’s expected loss (when it is being exploited)
is bounded by its expected losses during the times in which it plays Strategy Rule 1.
Formally, agent i’s expected loss is bounded (using Equation (5.14)) by E[Lρi − Lτi ] ≤
P
P
t
t
t∈ξ1 E[li ] > 0 when
t∈ξ1 E[li ]. Thus, M-Qubed can only have positive loss if
β́it ∈ (0, 1). Since β́it increases whenever M-Qubed has positive loss while playing
Strategy Rule 1, if E[Lρi − Lτi ] > 0, then E[β́iρ − β́iτ ] > 0. Thus, if M-Qubed is
exploited, then E[β́iρ − β́iτ ] > 0 when β́it ∈ (0, 1) for all t ∈ [τ, ρ].
Let W be a random walk in which the mean increases (i.e., E[Wt+1 − Wt ] ≥ 0) for
all Wt provided that it encounters no boundaries. Let there be a reflecting boundary
such that whenever Wt < b, E[Wt+1 − Wt ] = d, where d is a positive constant. Also,
let P r(·) denote a probability.
Lemma 5.2. P r(Wt < b) → 0 as t → ∞.
Proof. We consider the worst case, which occurs when E[Wt+1 − Wt ] = 0 whenever
Wt ≥ b. Since the process must increase (on average) by some positive constant
d when Wt < b, it follows that E[Wt+1 − Wt ] = d · P r(Wt < b) > 0 (for all t).
This must mean that for all t and for all c, P r(Wt+T < c) < P r(Wt < c) for
all T > τ , where τ > 0. Thus, we know that f (t) = P r(Wt < b) decreases as
t → ∞. But does P r(Wt < b) asymptotically approach some value greater than 0 as
t → 0? Suppose that it does. Then limt→∞ P r(Wt < b) → a, for some a > 0. But,
since the difference between P r(Wt+1 < b) and P r(Wt < b) is positively correlated
with E[Wt+1 − Wt ], this requires that limt→∞ E[Wt+1 − Wt ] → 0. However, since
E[Wt+1 − Wt ] = d · a, E[Wt+1 − Wt ] → 0 only if a → 0 (since d is a positive constant).
Thus, P r(Wt < b) → 0 as t → ∞.
We are now ready for the main theorem.
Theorem 5.1. M-Qubed satisfies the security property (in the limit) in all repeated
general-sum matrix games, regardless of its associate(s).
Proof. We will show that limt→∞ Lti /t ≤ 0 in the worst case. Note that this implies
security since limt→∞ µti /t ≥ mi when limt→∞ Lti /t ≤ 0.
The worst case can occur when playing against an omniscient opponent, a seer
agent, that knows everything about M-Qubed including its strategy, but not its actual
actions (a priori).
If Lti ≤ 0 for all t ≥ T (i.e., µti ≥ mi for all t ≥ T ), then limt→∞ Lti /t ≤ 0.
Otherwise, we must address three cases when µti < mi (when the agent is being
exploited).
6

Since ηi → 0 as t → ∞ we can assume ηi = 0.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.3: (a) Average payoffs over time in the game matching pennies against a seer
agent. Results are an average of 50 trials. Note that for M-Qubed(2), mi is replaced
t(mi −µmin
)
i
, mi ) (see Equation (5.8)). (b) Average
+ 30000
by the function f (t) = min(µmin
i
payoffs over time in the game matching pennies in self play. Results are an average
of 50 trials.

Case 1: β́it ≤ 0 for all t ≥ T . Since βit = 0 when β́it ≤ 0, M-Qubed uses Strategy
Rule 1 with probability 1. Thus, Equation (5.10) assures that β́it = β́iT − λ(LTi − Lti ),
β́ t −β́ T
−β́ T
so agent i’s loss during t ≥ T is Lti − LTi = i λ i . Since β́it ≤ 0, Lti − LTi ≤ λi (a
constant), so limt→∞ Lti /t ≤ 0.
Case 2: β́it ≥ 1 for all t ≥ T . Using similar logic as in case 1 (using Strategy Rule
2 rather than Strategy Rule 1), limt→∞ Lti /t ≤ 0.
Case 3: β́it ∈ (0, 1) for all t in some arbitrary time interval(s) [τ, ρ]. Lemma 5.1
shows that E[β́iρ − β́iτ ] is proportional to M-Qubed’s losses during the time t ∈ [τ, ρ].
This means two things. First, a seer agent cannot increase M-Qubed’s expected
accumulated loss by more than a constant when β́it ∈ (0, 1). Second (in conjunction
with cases 1 and 2), M-Qubed’s expected accumulated loss can increase by no more
than a constant except when β́it repeatedly crosses 0 or 1. Each time β́it crosses 0
or 1, M-Qubed can experience a small loss (bounded by (mi − µmin
i )). However,
t
t
since M-Qubed uses Strategy Rule 1 when β́i ≤ 0, β́i ≤ 0 is a reflecting boundary.
Since β́it also satisfies the preconditions of Lemma 5.2 it follows from Lemma 5.2 that
P r(β́it < 0) → 0 as t → ∞. Thus, β́it crosses 0 increasingly less frequently as t → ∞.
A similar argument can be made for β́it crossing 1 since Lemma 5.1 shows that (0, 1)
is also a reflecting boundary (thus, β́it < 1 is a reflecting boundary). Therefore,
limt→∞ Lti /t ≤ 0.
Figure 5.3(a) shows the average payoffs of various learners against a seer agent
in the game Matching Pennies, shown in Figure 5.4(a). Since a Q-learner (unless
exploring) plays the action corresponding to its max Q-value, a seer agent exploits
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a
b

a
b
1, -1 -1, 1
-1, 1 1, -1

c
d
c 3, 3 0, 5
d 5, 0 1, 1

(a) Matching Pennies

(b) Prisoner’s Dilemma

a
b
c
a 0, 0 0, 1 1, 0
b 1, 0 0, 0 0, 1
c 0, 1 1, 0 0, 0

c
d
c 4, 4 -5, 3
d 3, -5 2, 2

(d) Shapley’s Game

(e) Staghunt

c
d
3, 3 2, 3.5
3.5, 2 1, 1

c
d

(c) Chicken

a
b

a
b
0, 3 3, 2
1, 0 2, 1

(f) Tricky Game

Figure 5.4: Various 2-agent matrix games.

it indefinitely. Also, if M-Qubed uses only Strategy Rule 1 (labeled M-Qubed(1)),
then it may be exploited somewhat. However, if M-Qubed uses Strategy Rules 27
or 3 (labeled M-Qubed(2) and M-Qubed(3), respectively), it learns to play πim and,
therefore, cannot be exploited. Figure 5.3(b) shows M-Qubed’s average payoffs in self
play.
5.6.2

Cooperate and Compromise Property

In this subsection, we present empirical results showing that M-Qubed (in self
play) displays the C/C property in many general-sum matrix games. In doing so, we
compare its performance with the self play of other learning agents (see Table 5.2) in
a number of games. We also show that M-Qubed does not always display the C/C
property in some games when associating with other kinds of learners. Additionally,
we compare the M-Qubed algorithm with aspiration-based satisficing learning.
Self Play
We compare the performance (in self play) of four reinforcement learning algorithms shown in Table 5.2 in the following games: the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
(see Figure 5.4(b)), chicken (see Figure 5.4(c)), Shapley’s game (see Figure 5.4(d)),
staghunt (see Figure 5.4(e)), tricky game (see Figure 5.4(f)) [8], and the MASD
(n = 3, k = 0.6) for various values of M (M + 1 = |Ai | for all i) [71].
In comparing the algorithms, we will plot the mean payoffs received by the agents
over time. Also of interested is the distribution of payoffs produced by the strategies
which the agents learn. We show these results by box and whisker plots, generated by
MATLAB. These box and whisker plots show the median (line in middle of box), the
median of the upper and lower quartiles (top and bottom of box), and extremes of the
7

In Figure 5.3(a), mi is replaced by the function f (t) = min(µmin
+
i

100

t(mi −µmin
)
i
, mi ).
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data (top and bottom of whiskers). Data points which fall outside of 1.5∗IRQ, where
IRQ is the interquartile range, are considered outliers, and are plotted as *’s. Notches
in the boxes represent a robust estimate of the uncertainty about the medians for boxto-box comparison. Boxes whose notches do not overlap indicate that the medians of
the two groups differ at the 5% significance level. We note that tighter distributions
are generally more desirable than distributions which vary widely.
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Figure 5.5(a) shows the mean payoffs obtained by the agents
over time in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The mean is obtained from 50 trials
(thus, 100 samples since there are two agents). M-Qubed almost always learns to
always cooperate, resulting in a payoff of 3 to both agents. The other learners learn
strategies that produce inferior payoffs. Note, however, that QL, which stops exploring, is more successful than rQL, which continues exploring. WoLF-PHC generally
learns to defect since it plays a stochastic (unpredictable) policy while learning.
The box and whiskers plots for the algorithms in the prisoner’s dilemma is shown
in Figure 5.5(b). The figure shows that M-Qubed nearly always learns to always
cooperate, with the exception of 2 of the 50 trials8 . In one of the trials the agents
learned to alternate between receiving 5 and 0 points per episode. In the other
trial in which the agents did not learn mutual cooperation, the cycle (c, c) − (c, d)
was played repeatedly. While QL shares the same median payoff with M-Qubed,
its payoff distribution varied much more, and was frequently significantly lower than
this value. Note that the variance of the distribution of rQL’s average payoffs is high
due to its continued exploration. Thus, in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, continued
exploration can be detrimental to an agent’s long-term average payoffs.
Figures 5.6(a) and (b) show the average payoffs to agent 1 when M-Qubed agents
use different values of α and γi . The parameter values of the two agents are shown
along the x and y-axes respectively. Lighter colors indicate that agent 1 received high
payoffs. The figures show that M-Qubed is more successful when using low values of
αi and high values of γi . Also, having a slower learning rate (i.e., smaller αi ) than
one’s associate can sometimes result in a significantly higher average payoff.
Chicken. M-Qubed also learns mutual cooperation in chicken, giving it the highest
average payoffs of the learners (see Figure 5.7(a)). Also, M-Qubed’s distribution is
tighter than the other agents (see Figure 5.7(b)). We note also that QL once again
outperforms rQL due to the fact that it stops exploring.
Shapley’s Game. Many learning algorithms do not converge in Shapley’s game [33,
8]. However, M-Qubed does converge to a cooperative solution which yields an average
payoff of 12 to each agent (see Figure 5.8(a)). QL learns to play similarly. The other
learners play strategies that yield only slightly lower average payoffs, but do not
8

In one trial, M-Qubed converged to alternating between the solutions (C, D) and (D, C), yielding
an average payoff of 2.5 to each agent. In the other trial in which M-Qubed did not converge to
mutual cooperation, it converged to alternating between the solutions (C, C) and (D, C), yielding
an average payoff of 1.5 to one of the agents and 4 to the other.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.5: (a) Average payoffs over time for the iterated prisoners dilemma (in self
play). Results are an average of 50 trials. (b) Box and whiskers plots of the final
1,000 episodes (i.e., episodes 99,001–100,000).

(a)

(b)

Figure 5.6: Average payoffs in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma to player 1 of learned
strategies for M-Qubed in self play when parameter values are varied by the agents
as shown along the axes.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.7: (a) Average payoffs over time for chicken (in self play). Results are an
average of 50 trials. (b) Box and whiskers plots of the final 1,000 episodes (i.e.,
episodes 99,001–100,000).

typically converge.
Staghunt. While all the other learners typically learn to play the joing action
(d, d) in staghunt, M-Qubed (like the S-Algorithm) learns to play the joint action
(c, c), which results in a significantly higher payoff (see Figure 5.9(a)). Figure 5.9(c)
shows the results of varying α, which again shows that lower values of α are more
successful.
Tricky Game. Figures 5.10(a)-(d) show the performance of both the row and
column players in tricky game. As a row player, M-Qubed outperforms the other
agents and QL outperforms rQL. However, QL slightly outperforms M-Qubed (in self
play) as a column player. This is because QL learns to share high payoffs in a slightly
different manner than does M-Qubed. We note, however, that M-Qubed’s average
payoff (row and column) is much higher than is QL’s. Additionally, the variance on
learned payoffs is much smaller for M-Qubed.
MASD. We now move to the MASD, described in [71] and reviewed in Section 3.3.2. In this 3 × 3 game (results shown in Figure 5.11), M-Qubed learns (as
does the S-Algorithm) mutual cooperation (i.e., each agent gives all to the group) in
almost all trials, while the performance of the other algorithms is much worse (on
average).
Figure 5.12 shows the average payoffs to M-Qubed (after learning) in MASDs of
3 to 6 actions. As can be seen, M-Qubed scales quite well in this game, (although
performance does trail off slightly in games with more actions). Note that M-Qubed
does not need to vary its learning rates to achieve these results. However, the state
space does grow quickly with increasing numbers of actions.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.8: (a) Average payoffs over time for Shapley’s game (in self play). Results
are an average of 50 trials. (b) Box and whiskers plots of the final 1,000 episodes (i.e.,
episodes 99,001–100,000).

(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 5.9: (a) Average payoffs over time for the staghunt game (in self play). Results
are an average of 50 trials. (b) Box and whiskers plots of the final 1,000 episodes (i.e.,
episodes 99,001–100,000). (c) Average payoffs to player 1 when α is varied by the
agents.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 5.10: (a) Average payoffs over time to the row player in tricky game (in self
play). Results are an average of 50 trials. (b) Box and whiskers plots of the final
1,000 episodes (i.e., episodes 99,001–100,000). (c) Average payoffs over time to the
column player in tricky game (in self play). Results are an average of 50 trials. (d)
Box and whiskers plots of the final 1,000 episodes (i.e., episodes 99,001–100,000).

(a)

(b)

Figure 5.11: (a) Average payoffs over time in self play of the MASD (m = 2, n = 3,
k = 0.6). Results are an average of 50 trials. (b) Box and whiskers plots of the final
1,000 episodes (i.e., episodes 199,001–200,000).
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.12: (a) Plot showing the average payoffs of learned strategies (over 50 trials)
in the MASD (n = 3, k = 0.6) for various values of M . (b) Box and whiskers plots
of learned strategies.

Varying ωi
In all of the previous games we have analyzed, M-Qubed learns to play cooperatively (in self play), which leads to higher average payoffs (to all agents) over time.
We now present a game that M-Qubed (as well as the other learners) have a more
difficult time learning. This game is shown in Figure 5.13(left). In this 2 × 2 game,
each agent can guarantee itself no more than a payoff of 0 (its minimax value). However, both agents can receive an average payoff of 0.5 if they alternate between the
solutions (C, d) and (D, c).
None of the agents learn to play this game effectively (see Figure 5.13)9 . However,
once again, M-Qubed outperforms the other agents (on average). In most runs,
one of the M-Qubed agents learns to play the action that can give it a payoff of 1,
while the other agent learns to play randomly, resulting in an average payoff of 0.5
(approximately) to one agent and an average payoff of 0 to the other agent. This can
hardly be consider a compromise.
However, M-Qubed is able to learn to offer and accept the profitable compromise
of alternating between winning and losing if it uses a larger history of joint actions
(i.e., ωi > 1). Figure 5.14 shows that both agents receive an average payoff close to
0.5 (in most cases, but not all) when ω1 = ω2 = 2 and ω1 = ω2 = 3.
We note that learning this cooperative solution (alternating between winning and
losing) does not require an agent to consider a history of joint actions greater than
1. However, when ωi = 1, the Q-values of the agents must become aligned so that
the joint action (D, c) is played in the state Dc while the joint action (c, D) is played
9

The performance of rQL is not shown as its behavior is similar to that of QL and WoLF-PHC
in this game.
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C
D

c
0, 0
1, 0

d
0, 1
0, 0

Figure 5.13: Payoffs to the agents in the game shown at left. Although M-Qubed outperforms the other learning algorithms, its play can hardly be considered cooperative
(or compromising).

C
D

c
0, 0
1, 0

d
0, 1
0, 0

Figure 5.14: Payoffs to M-Qubed in self play for varying values of ωi in the game
shown at left. For ωi > 1, M-Qubed agents learn a profitable compromise, as the
agents learn to alternate between winning and losing.
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in the state Cd. This rarely occurs when ωi = 1 for each agent i. However, when
ωi > 1, there are multiple opportunities for Q-values to become aligned properly. For
example, the joint action (D, c) need only be the solution played by the agents in one
of the following states: Cc-Dc, Cd-Dc, Dc-Dc, or Dd-Dc.
An additional reason for increasing ωi is to allow M-Qubed to learn when associating with a larger class of agents. For example, when ω1 = 1, M-Qubed will learn
to play optimally when associating with TFT (always cooperates) and Tit-for-2-Tats
(alternates between defecting and cooperating), but not Tit-for-3-Tats (TFT3). This
is because optimal behavior when associating with TFT3 in the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma requires that the joint action (c, d) be played twice, followed by the play of
the joint action (c, c). Thus, when ωi = 1, a solution sequence can include no more
than one of each solution.
Associating with Other Learners
So far, we have shown that M-Qubed possesses the C/C property in many games
in self play. Unfortunately, M-Qubed does not satisfy the C/C property to as great
a degree when associating with other learning agents. We show and discuss the
performance of M-Qubed when associating with WoLF-PHC, QL, and rQL in two
games.
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The performance of M-Qubed when it associates with other
learners in the prisoner’s dilemma is shown in Figure 5.15. As can be seen, MQubed receives average payoffs greater than (and never below) the minimax value in
most trials when associating with these agents. However, it does not reach mutual
cooperation in all trials when associating with any of the agents. We note that MQubed does perform better against rQL and WoLF-PHC than these agents do against
themselves (see Figure 5.5). Also, M-Qubed performs only slightly worse against QL
in this game than QL does against itself.
Staghunt. M-Qubed does not perform as well in the matrix game staghunt as it
did in the iterated prisoners dilemma when it associates with other learning agents.
Its performance is shown in Figure 5.16. When associating with each agent, MQubed learns (as do QL, rQL, and WoLF-PHC in self play; see Figure 5.9) to play
its minimax strategy (which is to defect) in nearly all trials with each agent. This
result is to be expected somewhat, since it is difficult to teach these algorithms to play
cooperatively against such risks, particularly without knowledge of the other agent’s
payoffs. However, it is possible to teach these algorithms to play cooperatively in this
game.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.15: (a) Average payoffs over time to M-Qubed when it associates with other
learners in the iterated prisoners dilemma. Results are an average of 50 trials. (b)
Box and whiskers plots of the final 1,000 episodes (i.e., episodes 99,001–100,000).

(a)

(b)

Figure 5.16: (a) Average payoffs over time M-Qubed when it associates with other
learners in the staghunt game. Results are an average of 50 trials. (b) Box and
whiskers plots of the final 1,000 episodes (i.e., episodes 99,001–100,000).
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5.7

Comparison of M-Qubed and Satisficing Learning

Up to this point in this chapter, we have compared M-Qubed to Q-learning. While
M-Qubed is closely related to Q-learning, it is also similar in nature to aspirationbased satisficing learning (as discussed in the previous two chapters).
Like the S-Algorithm, M-Qubed uses a relaxation search to find a profitable strategy. However, while the S-Algorithm relaxes a single variable (its aspirations) until a
suitable (mutually satisficing) solution is found, M-Qubed relaxes multiple variables
(one for each state-action pair (h(ωi ), ai ), or Q-value). The relaxation of each Qvalue is carried out at a different rate dependent on a) the rewards received, b) the
values of subsequent states and c) the frequency with which a state-action pair is
visited/updated. This creates a gradient over the Q-values (see Figure 5.2) which can
be used to perform informed trembles (i.e., acting randomly with probability ηi when
a state with a near maximum global Q-value has not been visited recently).
Like the S-Algorithm, M-Qubed ceases to explore its environment when it becomes
satisfied. M-Qubed is satisfied when its current strategy allows it to periodically
revisit a state with a near-global Q-value. Viewed in this light, M-Qubed is essentially
a satisficing learner.
While M-Qubed and satisficing learning have much in common, M-Qubed has
several advantages over the S-Algorithm since it can observe the actions of other
agents. First, M-Qubed possesses the security property. Second, M-Qubed can learn
when the payoff matrix has non-deterministic payoff functions. Third, M-Qubed is
able to learn to alternate between winning and losing in order to reach a profitable
compromise. This is made manifest in Shapley’s game (see Figures 3.21 and 5.8) and
in the results shown in Figure 5.14.
A fourth advantage of M-Qubed over the S-Algorithm is that M-Qubed is able to
overcome security and preclusion critical events that exclude cooperative behavior.
For example, in the game shown in Figure 5.17 (a game with a security critical event),
M-Qubed usually receives payoffs of 4 (row player and 3 (column player), whereas
the S-Algorithm does not usually perform so well (see Figure 3.24)10 . Although this
particular game can be solved when an agent learns to tremble its aspirations (see
Figure 4.9), this is not always the case in some games with preclusion critical events.
Fifth, M-Qubed can learn a best response when associating with static (stochastic)
strategies. For example, in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, the S-Algorithm cannot
learn to play a best response to an agent that plays c with probability 0.7 and d with
probability c, while M-Qubed does (see Figure 5.18).
10

Note in Figure 5.17 that WoLF-PHC, QL, and rQL are even more subject to the security critical
event than is the S-Algorithm.
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A
B

a
3.5, 2
1, 4

b
3.5, 1
4, 3

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 5.17: (a) Average payoffs over time to the row player in the matrix game
shown above (in self play). Results are an average of 50 trials. (b) Box and whiskers
plots of the final 1,000 episodes (i.e., episodes 99,001–100,000). (c) Average payoffs
over time to the column player. Results are an average of 50 trials. (d) Box and
whiskers plots of the final 1,000 episodes (i.e., episodes 99,001-100,000).

Figure 5.18: Average payoffs over time in iterated prisoners dilemma against a static
agent that plays c with probability 0.7 and d with probability 0.3. Results are an
average of 50 trials.
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5.8

Summary and Discussion

We have advocated that learners in repeated games should a) never learn to
receive payoffs below the minimax value of the game and b) have the ability to
cooperate/compromise. No algorithm from the literature is known to satisfy both of
these properties simultaneously without knowledge of the payoffs of other agents. We
presented an algorithm (M-Qubed) that provably satisfies the security property and
displays the C/C property (in self play) in many games. In these games, M-Qubed
learns (without the knowledge of the payoffs of associates) the solutions proposed
in [53], which are pareto efficient. These results support the hypothesis that learning
agents should act predictably in non-competitive games, and unpredictably otherwise.
M-Qubed has a number of weaknesses, one of which is that it can be “bullied”
(see, for example, [54]) by certain agents (though it still gets a payoff as great as
its minimax value)11 . Additionally, M-Qubed does not have the C/C property when
associating with many other learners in many games. We believe that future learning
algorithms should use principles such as reputation, teaching, etc. in order to satisfy
the C/C property when associating with a larger class of learners [22, 62].
Another weakness of M-Qubed is that it may not be suited for environments in
which the intended actions of the agents are not guaranteed to be carried out. Under
such circumstances, cooperative behavior is more difficult to achieve since the signals
sent by agents (via actions) are not as clear. We note that extending these algorithms
to perform well in such environments may require explicit communication (such as
the technique used in [67]).

11
We note, however, that this “weakness” is present (at best) in all other learning algorithms in
the literature that do not use information about associates’ payoffs.
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Chapter 6
M-Qubed in Repeated General-Sum Stochastic Games
6.1

Introduction

In the previous chapters, we limited our discussions to general-sum matrix games.
Matrix games form the basis of simultaneous move games. However, they cannot
capture “real world” situations in which agents often make and carry out decisions
over a sequence of actions and observations. In this chapter, we move to the more
general case of stochastic games (also called Markov games). These games are more
descriptive than matrix games since they can be designed so that agents can (and
must) make and carry out decisions over a sequence of actions and observations.
Learning in repeated stochastic games is more difficult than in matrix games for
a number of reasons, of which we mention two. First, the state space of stochastic
games is much larger than that of matrix games. Second, the payoffs of the agents
are dependent not only on the strategies used by the agents in the current state, but
also on the strategies employed by the agents in subsequent states of the episode.
In this chapter, we extend the M-Qubed algorithm that we presented in the previous chapter to infinitely repeated stochastic games. We show (empirically) that
the extended M-Qubed algorithm satisfies the same two properties as it does in infinitely repeated matrix games in several important infinitely repeated stochastic
games. Multiagent learning algorithms in the literature do not satisfy these two
properties in many of these games.
We note that the extended M-Qubed algorithm uses several additional free parameters. Each one of these parameters is added to the algorithm to respond to a
different challenge that arises in stochastic games. While we consider this algorithm a
first of its kind for learning non-myopic strategies in these games, we do not present a
detailed analysis of how changes in the values assigned to these free parameters affect
M-Qubed’s behavior. Rather, we show that M-Qubed demonstrates the security and
compromise/cooperate properties for a set of these parameters.
Given the number of free parameters and the complexity of the algorithm, it is
especially important to show that the algorithm is more than an ad hoc collection
of various rules. In addition to empirically showing that the algorithm possesses
the security and compromise/cooperate properties in self-play in many games when
certain conditions are met, we also establish a consistency property which states that
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the extended algorithm does not change the behavior of M-Qubed (as is presented
in the previous chapter) in matrix games. Furthermore, we show that, in self play,
its performance is comparable or superior to the WoLF-PHC algorithm on a set of
interesting infinitely repeated stochastic games.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 6.2, we formally define
stochastic games. Related to stochastic games is some important related work that
we have not discussed up to this point. We review some of this work in Section 6.3. In
Section 6.4, we overview how M-Qubed can be extended to learn in stochastic games.
We present the details of the algorithm in Section 6.5. In Section 6.6, we show the
performance of M-Qubed in several important stochastic games. In the final section,
we summarize the chapter and discuss future work.
6.2

Stochastic Games

As in the previous chapters, let I be the set of n agents playing the game. Also,
let Σ be the set of states (or stages) of the stochastic game. A stage is a particular
configuration of physical state that the game can take on. This physical state includes
the status of matter (walls, gates, etc.) as well as the status (location, velocity, etc.)
of the agents playing the game. Let B be the set of possible start (beginning) stages
of each episode (which is usually a singleton) of the game, and let G be the set of goal
(or terminating) stages of the game. The set of actions available to agent i ∈ I in
stage σ ∈ Σ is denoted by Ai (σ). Then, let A(σ) = A1 (σ) × · · · × An (σ) be the set of
joint actions that can be played in stage σ. Let ati (σ) ∈ Ai (σ) be the action taken by
agent i in stage σ in episode t. Hence, at (σ) = (at1 (σ), · · · , atn (σ)) is the joint action
taken by the |I| agents in stage σ in episode t.
Let στt ∈ Σ denote the τ th stage of episode t. When a joint action is taken in
stage στt two things happen. First, each agent receives an immediate reward (which
we denote νi (στt ) for agent i). νi (στt ) is a sample taken from the random variable
Vi (στt , at (στt )). Second, when a joint action is taken in stage στt , play transitions
to the next stage of the episode (denoted στt +1 ). This transition is governed by
the probability transition function P (στ |στ −1 , at ). Once a terminal stage is reached
(i.e., στt ∈ G), the agents are automatically transitioned to a beginning state (i.e.,
some stage in B), and a new episode begins. We assume that V(σ, a) and P (σ) are
stationary for all σ ∈ Σ and a ∈ A(σ).
We are now ready to formally define a stochastic game.
Definition 6.1. The tuple (I, Σ, B, G, (A(σ))σ∈Σ , (V(σ, a))σ∈Σ,a∈A(σ) , (P (σ))σ∈Σ ) is a
stochastic game, where I, Σ, B, G, A(σ), V(σ, a), and P (σ) are defined previously.
Note that, according to this definition, a matrix game is a special kind of stochastic
game. Thus, stochastic games generalize matrix games.
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Figure 6.1: Example stochastic game.

As in the previous chapter, we assume that an agent can observe the actions of
all agents as well as its own payoffs νit (σ). Additionally, we assume that agents can
observe the current stage (or state) σ ∈ Σ.
To better understand the terminology given, consider the stochastic game (a coordination game) depicted in Figure 6.1, which is described by Hu and Wellman in [42].
In this game, the two agents begin each episode as indicated in the figure. In each
stage, the players simultaneously move in one of the four compass directions. The
first agent to reach its goal receives a payoff of 100. In the event of a tie, both agents
are rewarded a payoff of 100. Hitting a wall results in a no-op (the player stays put)
and if the two players collide (i.e., both try to enter the same position), then they
both receive an immediate payoff of -1 and no motion occurs.
Let (1, 1) denote the grid position corresponding to the bottom-left hand corner
of the grid (player A’s start position), and let the point (3, 3) denote the the upperright hand corner of the grid. The 4-tuple (xA , yA , xB , yB ) denotes a stage of the
game, where (xA , yA ) and (xB , yB ) are the players positions on the board. Then, in
this game, Σ = {{1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3}}, B = {(1, 1, 3, 1)}, and
G = {(1, 3, i, j), (i, j, 3, 1)}, where i and j can take on the values 1, 2, and 3.
6.3

Related Work

In this section, we review some work related to learning in stochastic games.
First, we briefly review some important elements of reinforcement learning related to
estimating future rewards. Second we review work on learning in stochastic games.
6.3.1

Reinforcement Learning

In matrix games (as we discussed in the previous chapter), an agent is faced with
learning/predicting the sum of future rewards for taking a particular action in the
current episode. To do so, M-Qubed combines the payoff received in the current
episode with the estimated value of the subsequent state (which is based on the
history of joint actions). In this way, M-Qubed is able to learn/predict the rewards
to be received in future episodes.
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In repeated stochastic games, an agent must not only predict the sum of rewards
to be received in future episodes, but it must also predict the sum of future payoffs to
be received within the current episode. To help us solve this problem, we will turn,
once again, to principles of standard reinforcement learning.
There are three elementary solution methods of reinforcement learning. These
methods are: dynamic programming, Monte Carlo methods, and temporal differencing. The goal of each of these methods is the same: to learn/predict the sum of
future rewards resulting from taking a given action from a given state (or stage).
However, each of the three methods is suited for different situations. Since dynamic
programming requires a model of the state transitions probabilities, and since we are
restricting attention to games where the transitions probabilities are not known, we
turn to the other two methods (Monte Carlo and temporal differencing) for guidance.
We now briefly review these two methods. A more detailed description of each can
be found in [75].
In Monte Carlo methods, the value of taking an action is updated using the
(possibly discounted) sum of rewards received by the agent from the time it takes the
action until the end of the current episode. Then, in a Monte Carlo algorithm, rit (στt )
is given by
rit (στt )

=

lt
X

γ (k−τ ) νit (k)

(6.1)

k=τ

where lt is the number of stages played in episode t and γ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount
factor.
Let Vit (σ, a) be the estimate of the sum of future rewards at episode t when the
action a is taken in stage σ. In Monte Carlo methods, this estimate is given by
1 X j
Vit (σ, a) =
(6.2)
r (σ)
|T | j∈T i
where T is the set of episodes in which the agent took the action a on the first visit to
stage σ and rij (σ) is given in Equation 6.1. Note that only the first visit of each stage
is counted in the update. This is known as a first-visit Monte Carlo method [75].
One disadvantage of Monte Carlo methods is that they require that an episode
be completed before updates can be made. In contrast, temporal differencing typically allows updates to be made much sooner. This is because temporal difference
learning bootstraps. We say that an algorithm bootstraps if it uses estimated values
of subsequent states to predict the sum of future rewards. Q-learning is one example
of a reinforcement learning algorithm that bootstraps, as it uses Q-values in the subsequent state to update the Q-values in the current state. Q-learning and M-Qubed
(as discussed in the previous chapter) are temporal differencing algorithms.
As we mentioned, M-Qubed uses temporal difference learning to learn the future
rewards obtained in subsequent episodes. However, as we will explain in the next
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sections, M-Qubed uses a Monte Carlo method to estimate payoffs across a particular
episode.
6.3.2

Algorithms for Learning in Stochastic Games

Many of the algorithms in the literature that we discussed in previous chapters are
designed for stochastic games. Such algorithms include minimaxQ [51], NashQ [41],
WoLF-PHC [9], friend-or-foe Q-learning [52], and Correlated Q-learning [39]. However, we note that as these algorithms do not learn profitable solutions in many matrix
games, they perform similarly (if not worse) in stochastic games. We note that each
of these algorithms do not estimate future rewards across episodes. Rather, they
learn based only on payoffs received in the current episode.
6.4

M-Qubed in Stochastic Games: An Overview

The M-Qubed algorithm as described in the previous chapter is not suitable for
stochastic games. In this section, we explain why M-Qubed (as described in the
previous chapter) does not learn effectively in these games. Additionally, we present
an overview of how M-Qubed can be extended to learn effectively in stochastic games.
We leave many of the more formal details until the next section.
6.4.1

The Stage Game

In each stage σ ∈ Σ of a stochastic games, the agents play a stage game. The
stage game is a matrix game defined by the set of players I, the set of joint actions
A(σ), and the set of payoff matrices R(σ) = {R1 (σ), · · · , Rn (σ)}. Let Ri (σ, a) be
a random variable giving the distribution of agent i’s future payoffs when the joint
action a is played in stage σ. The mean of this distribution can be estimated using
a temporal differencing method or a Monte Carlo method. We use a Monte Carlo
method for reasons that will become clearer in the next section.
Let rit (στt ) be the sum of future payoffs to agent i in the τ th stage of episode t.
Thus, rit (στt ) is a sample of the random variable Ri (στt , at (στt )). Formally, rit (στt ) is
given by
rit (στt ) =

lt
X

νit (σjt )

(6.3)

j=τ

where lt is the number of stages played in episode t and νit (σjt ) is the immediate payoff
to agent i in episode t after the joint action at (σjt ) was played in stage σjt .
In stochastic games, a separate copy of M-Qubed, one for each σ ∈ Σ, is used
to learn the appropriate mapping from stage to action. Although this extension is
obvious and natural, the stage game of a stochastic game has certain qualities that
matrix games do not have. In the rest of this section, we discuss these differences and
show how M-Qubed can be extended to deal with them.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 6.2: (a) A simple single-agent grid game. Note how the payoff matrix for
the stage σ2,4 (indicated by the circle) varies according to the agent’s strategy in
subsequent states. (b)-(d) show example policies.

6.4.2

Comparing the Stage Game with Matrix Games

While the stage game is similar in nature to matrix games, the set of payoff
matrices that define the stage game are often non-stationary (though the transition
probabilities are stationary). This is because an agent’s payoff for the current stage
is based on the joint strategies played by the agents in all subsequent stages of the
episode. Since the strategies of the agents changes as they learn, the payoffs for a
given stage change over time. Thus, the payoff matrices that define the stage game
are non-stationary.
To see this, consider the single-agent1 stochastic game depicted in Figure 6.2(a).
In this game, the agent begins each episode in the lower left-hand corner (labeled S)
and attempts to move to the cell in the upper right-hand corner (labeled G). From
each cell, the agent can move in any of the four compass directions (N, S, E, W).
If an action carries the agent into a wall (the black cells) it receives a reward of -1
and remains in the same cell (stage) as it was prior to taking the action. The agent
receives 20 points when it reaches the goal. Additionally, the agent incurs a cost (a
reward of -1) for each move that it takes. Thus, an agent should learn to reach the
goal in as few moves as possible.
To see how changes in the joint strategies used in subsequent states affect Ri (σ),
1
We use a single-agent example for simplicity. However, this discussion applies directly to multiagent scenarios by using joint actions rather than the single agent’s actions.
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consider the situations depicted in Figure 6.2(b)-(d). In the figures, the agent, located
in cell (2,4) (cell (1,1) is the start position S), which is indicated by the circle, must
select an action. Let this stage be denoted σ2,4 . Also, let Rit (σ2,4 ) be agent i’s payoff
matrix of stage σ2,4 at episode t, and let µti (σ2,4 , a) (where a ∈ A(σ2,4 )) be the mean
of the distribution Rit (σ2,4 , a).
In the situation depicted in Figure 6.2(b), the agent employs an optimal policy
(as indicated by the arrows in each cell) in all (possible) subsequent states (assuming a deterministic transition function). These strategies result in the mean payoffs
µ1 (σ2,4 , a) (for each a ∈ A(σ2,4 )) of
N S E W
15 13 15 13
However, if the agent’s policies in subsequent states are as indicated in the situation
depicted in Figure 6.2(c), then the mean payoffs would be2
N
S
E
W
13 ≤ 13 ≤ 13 13
The distributions of the agent’s payoff matrix in stage σ2,4 would be different still
if the agent were to act as indicated in the situation depicted in Figure 6.2(d). In
this situation, the means of the entries of the payoff matrix would be
N
S
E W
15 ≤ 13 15 13
Thus, as joint strategies in subsequent states change, the payoff distributions of
joint actions that lead to these states can change also. As we mentioned previously,
this violates the stationarity assumption of the previous chapter. Thus, M-Qubed
will behave differently in the stage game of a stochastic game than it will in a matrix
game (with a stationary payoff matrx) unless Ri (σ) becomes stationary (or relatively
stationary) prior to learning.
As demonstrated in the previous example, the payoff matrix of stage games can be
non-stationary in single-agent scenarios as well as in multiagent scenarios. Thus, all
reinforcement learning algorithms must deal with this challenge. However, in singleagent scenarios, this is not (theoretically) a problem since each state-action pair must
be visited infinitely often (see [75]). Thus, the payoff matrix will eventually become
stationary as policies in each stage σ ∈ Σ converge3 .
In contrast, many multiagent scenarios require that an agent should act so as to
influence the future actions of other agents if it is to learn to play desirable solutions.
2
For the actions S and E, the policy indicates that the agent would move back and forth forever
between two states. We will define rules for breaking these cycles later in this chapter.
3
Note, however, that if an implementation of a reinforcement learning algorithm does not explore
all actions from all states infinitely often, then the non-stationarity of the payoff matrix can become
a problem in single-agent domains as well.
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M-Qubed attempts to influence the future actions of other agents by ceasing exploration once it becomes satisfied4 . Thus, if M-Qubed becomes satisfied in a particular
stage before desirable joint strategies are learned in subsequent stages, then M-Qubed
will often learn strategies that produce undesirable payoffs.
6.4.3

Dealing with the Differences

M-Qubed (as described in the previous chapter) cannot learn effectively in stochastic games for two reasons, both of which are caused by the non-stationarity of
the payoff matrices of stage games. We now discuss these two reasons and outline
how M-Qubed can be extended to overcome these challenges. We omit the formal
details until the next section.
The first reason that M-Qubed cannot learn effectively in stochastic games is that
t
Ri (σ, a) (the random variable that governs the distribution of payoffs to agent i at
episode t when the joint action a ∈ A(σ) is played) is unknown and changing. In the
previous chapter, we assumed knowledge of µti (σ, a) (the mean of the random variable
Rit (σ, a)) for each a ∈ A(σ). However, this assumption is impractical in many stage
games.
Being able to estimate µti (σ, a) for all a ∈ A(σ) is important for a number of reasons. First, it allows each agent i to compute an estimate of its minimax value mti (σ)
and minimax strategy πim (σ; t) at episode t in stage σ. Second, it allows an agent to
know µmax
(σ) and µmin
i
i (σ), which are the maximum and minimum mean payoffs to
agent i (at episode t) in stage σ. These values are necessary for setting/updating various parameters, including initializing Q-values. Third, knowing µti (σ, a) is important
for tracking changes (or potential changes) in the agent’s payoff matrix. Changes (as
well as potential changes) in an agent’s payoff matrix can (and should) trigger various
behaviors in M-Qubed to help it to overcome myopia in these games.
Thus, extending M-Qubed to learn the stage game of stochastic games requires an
estimate of µti (σ, a) for each a ∈ A(σ). µti (σ, a) in stochastic games can be estimated
using samples taken from distributions of Ri (σ, a) over time. In doing so, M-Qubed
must ensure that the environment is sampled sufficiently. Additionally, sampling
Ri (σ, a) effectively requires a good estimate of credibility. Credibility indicates how
likely a sample is to be drawn from the final distribution of Ri (σ, a) (when strategies
have converged in all stages). We describe how M-Qubed does this in Section 6.5.1.
A second challenge for M-Qubed in stochastic games arises from the fact that
M-Qubed stops exploring its environment when it becomes satisfied. Thus, care must
be taken to ensure that changes in the payoff matrix (or at least important parts of it)
4

Recall from the last chapter that M-Qubed is satisfied when the strategies of the agents result
in visits to some state (history) s ∈ S ∗ , where S ∗ is the set of states that have nearly maximum
Q-values (for that stage).
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c
d

c
d
c 3, 3 0, 5
d 5, 0 1, 1

c
d
1, 1 0, 5
5, 0 1, 1
(a)

(b)

Figure 6.3: (a) Possible payoff matrix of the stage game at episode T0 . (b) Possible
payoff matrix of the same stage game at episode T1 > T0 . In (b) a more profitable
compromise is available, but M-Qubed will not learn it if its relaxation search takes
place prior to episode T1 .

do not compromise the relaxation search. The relaxation search can be compromised
when an average payoff increases significantly during (or after) the relaxation search.
For example, consider the payoff matrix of a hypothetical stage game shown in
Figure 6.3. Let the payoff matrix shown in Figure 6.3(a) give the payoffs of the stage
game at episode T0 , and let the payoffs shown in Figure 6.3(b) be the payoffs of
the same stage game at episode T1 > T0 (note that this stage game is a prisoner’s
dilemma). In the stage game shown at episode T0 , a good compromise (and the one
often learned by M-Qubed when ωi > 1) consists of the agents learning to alternate
between the solutions (c, d) and (d, c), which yields an average payoff of 2.5 for each
agent. A more profitable compromise can be reached at episode T1 , since the solution
(c, c) yields a payoff of 3 to each agent at this time. However, if the agents stop
exploring prior to episode T1 then the agents may not learn this more profitable
compromise.
Thus, in order to avoid convergence to undesirable (less profitable) solutions in
stochastic games, M-Qubed must be extended so that strategies in (certain) subsequent stages converge before it stops exploring in the current stage. Doing so enables
the payoff matrix of a stage to become nearly stationary, or at least stationary in
relevant entries; we call this pseudo-stationarity. In order to achieve this, we require
M-Qubed to restart its learning process in a stage whenever the stage’s payoff matrix violates the pseudo-stationarity property. Additionally, M-Qubed in stochastic
games estimates the potential payoffs of subsequent stages, as these potential payoffs
can indicate when the agent should continue to explore (with some probability η) in
a given stage. We describe these extensions in greater detail in Section 6.5.2.
6.5

M-Qubed in Stochastic Games: Formal Algorithm

In this section, we formally present extensions to M-Qubed to make it suitable
for repeated stochastic games. These extensions take place in two phases. In the
first phase (called the sampling phase), M-Qubed estimates its mean payoffs µti (σ, a).
The second phase is the learning phase. In this phase, M-Qubed learns in much the
same way as it did in the previous chapter. However, various techniques must be used
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in this phase so that M-Qubed does not converge until strategies have converged in
(relevant) subsequent stages.
As these discussions require a heavy use of terms that we have already defined (or
will define), we provide Table 6.1 as a reference for these terms and their definitions.

6.5.1

Using Samples to Estimate Current Average Payoffs

A sample from the random variable Rit (σ, a) is obtained in each episode in which
the joint action a is taken in stage σ ∈ Σ. Denote this sample rit (σ). In this subsection, we describe how µti (σ, a) can be estimated from samples of the distribution
Ri (σ, a). First, we discuss the credibility of a sample. Second, we discuss how samples
and credibility can be combined to update µti (σ, a). Third, we discuss a criteria for
sampling µti (σ) (the mean payoff matrix) sufficiently before learning begins in stage σ.
(σ).
We say that learning has begun in stage σ when Q-values are initialized to µmax
i
Credibility
Credibility is an estimate of how likely rit (σ) is a sample taken from the final
distribution of Ri (σ, at (σ)) after play has converged in all stages. We say that strategies have converged in stage σ if π t (σ, h(σ, ωi ))) = π j (σ, h(σ, ωi )) for all j ≥ T and
all histories h(σ, ωi ). This includes exploration. We now describe the way in which
M-Qubed estimates the credibility of the sample rit (σ).
Let κti (σ) be agent i’s estimate of the credibility of the joint strategy π t (σ), which
determines the joint action played in stage σ of episode t. Thus, κti (σ) is an estimate
of the probability that π t (σ) will be the joint strategy played by the agents in stage
σ when the strategies of all agents have converged in this stage. M-Qubed estimates
κti (σ) as
(
1
if πit (σ) is reliable
κti (σ) =
(6.4)
1
otherwise
|Ai (σ)|
where reliability is an estimate of whether agent i’s strategy πit (σ) has converged
(which we discuss in Section 6.5.3). Thus, when the agent’s strategy appears to have
converged, then the credibility of the joint strategy is 1. Otherwise, the agent is
considered to be exploring, meaning that the joint action has a random chance of
being a sample drawn from the final joint strategy. Thus, κti (σ) = |Ai1(σ)| in this
situation5 .
Notice that Equation (6.4) uses only agent i’s strategy πit (σ) in determining reliability rather than the joint strategy π t (σ). This is permissible since M-Qubed’s
5

In Section 6.5.1, we modify κti (σ) (slightly) in the event that strategies do not converge in stage

σ.
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Variable
t
lt
στt
at (σ)
ati (σ)
π t (σ)

Meaning
The current episode.
The number of stages played in episode t.
The τ th stage of episode t.
The joint action of the n agents in stage σ of episode t.
The action taken by agent i in stage σ of episode t.
The joint strategy taken by the agents in stage σ of episode t.
The immediate payoff of agent i in episode t when the joint
t
νi (σ)
action at (σ) is played in stage σ. Note that νit (σ) is a sample
taken from the distribution Ni (σ, at (σ)).
Ri (σ)
Player i’s (time generic) payoff matrix for the stage σ.
Ri (σ, a)
The (time generic) payoff random variable to agent i in stage σ
for the joint action a.
Rit (σ)
Player i’s payoff matrix on episode t for the stage σ.
Rit (σ, a)
The payoff random variable to agent i on episode t in stage σ
for the joint action a.
The stage payoff for player i on episode t when the joint action
rit (σ)
a is played in stage σ. rit (σ) is a sample taken
of the random variable Rit (σ, at (σ)).
µti (σ, a)
E[Rit (σ, a)], where E[·] denotes an expected value.
µti (σ)
The payoff matrix with entries µti (σ, a) for all a ∈ A(σ).
mti (σ)
Agent i’s estimated minimax value in stage σ at episode t.
πim (σ; t)
Agent i’s estimated minimax strategy in stage σ at episode t.
t
h (σ, ωi )
The previous ωi joint actions played in stage σ prior to episode t.
t
t
πi (σ, h (σ, ωi )) Agent i’s strategy in stage σ at episode t given the history of
joint actions defined by ht (σ, ωi ).
κti (σ)
Agent i’s estimate of the credibility of the joint strategy π t (σ)
Kit (σ)
Agent i’s estimate of the credibility of the sample rit (σ).
The accumulated credibility to agent i for the joint action a in
t
Ψi (σ, a)
stage σ from episode at which the agent begins to sample its
environment through the current episode t.
θI
Accumulated credibility needed to adequately sample µti (σ, a).
Ωti (σ)
The set of relevant actions in stage σ at episode t for agent i.
t
ζi (σ)
Agent i’s estimate at episode t of the payoffs it will receive in
stage σ when play has converged (in all stages).
t
εi (σ, a)
The error tolerance for ε-stationarity for (σ, a) at episode t.
0
ti (σ)
The episode in which agent i last initialized its Q-values
(i.e., began learning) in stage σ.
t
Mi (σ)
Agent i’s potential matrix at episode t.
t
Θ (σ)
The set of joint actions a for which Mit (σ, a) > µti (σ, a) + φ.
Θti (σ)
Agent i’s set of actions corresponding to the joint actions in
Θt (σ).
Table 6.1: Various terms and their definitions.
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learned strategies are generally dependent on the strategies of other agents in repeated games. Thus, an agent can assume that as its strategies converge, so will the
strategies of other agents. This makes an agent’s own strategies an adequate estimate
of the reliability of the joint strategy currently being played.
The credibility of the sample payoff rit (στt ) is derived from the credibility of joint
strategies used in the subsequent stages of an episode. Let Kit (στt ) be agent i’s estimate
of the credibility of the sample rit (στt ). Then, Kit (στt ) is given by
(
1
if πit (σ) is reliable
(6.5)
Kit (στt ) = Qlt
t
t
j=τ +1 κi (σj ) otherwise
Thus, the credibility of a sample is 1 if the agent considers its strategy to be reliable.
Otherwise, it is the product of the credibilities of joint strategies in subsequent stages.
Thus, joint actions that lead to stages with converged policies will produce highly
credible samples. On the other hand, those joint actions that lead to stages in which
policies have not converged will produce less credible samples6 .
In addition to assisting in estimating µti (σ, a), credibility has a role in updating
Q-values and in determining whether a distribution has been sampled sufficiently (see
Section 6.5.1).
We are now ready to describe how µti (σ, a) is estimated.
Using Samples to Estimate Payoffs
After each episode t in which σ ∈ Σ is visited, each agent i can update its estimate
of the mean payoff µti (σ, at (σ)) using
 t
µ
µ
t
t
t
t
t
µt+1
i (σ, a (σ)) = 1 − λi (σ, t)Ki (σ) µi (σ, a (σ)) + λi (σ, t)Ki (σ)ri (σ)

(6.6)

where λµi (σ, t) ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, the estimated mean is sequentially updated using a
convex combination of old estimates and new information.
Sampling Sufficiently Prior to Learning
In the previous chapter, we assumed knowledge of µti (σ). However, in stochastic
games, µti (σ) is not immediately available. Since M-Qubed must initialize its Q-values
µmax (σ)
to i1−γi , it must (at the least) know µmax
(σ) before it officially begins learning.
i
t
This is achieved by estimating µi (σ) during an exploration period prior to beginning
learning.
There are two central questions concerning the exploration (or sample) phase.
First, how can an agent determine when it has sufficiently explored (i.e., sampled)
the environment so that it has an accurate estimate of µmax
(σ)? Second, how should
i
6
We note that [29] attempts a Bayesian approach for estimating the credibility of a sample when
learning using Q-learning.
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an agent act during this exploration period to ensure that the state space is adequately
sampled? We answer these two questions in the following discussion.
t
First, we define the notion of accumulating credibility. Let Ttkq (σ, a) be the set of
episodes in which the joint action a is taken in stage σ. Then, we say that a joint
action a in state σ accumulates X units of credibility between episode tk and tq (where
tq > tk ) if
X
Kij (σ) ≥ X
(6.7)
t

j∈Tt q (σ,a)
k

where Kij (σ) is the credibility of the sample obtained in stage σ of episode j.
Let Ψti (σ, a) be the accumulated credibility to agent i for the joint action a in stage
σ from the episode at which the agent begins to sample its environment through the
current episode t. Thus, the higher the value of Ψti (σ, a), the more sure the agent
becomes of its estimate of µti (σ, a) (provided that the distribution Ri (σ, a) has not
changed). M-Qubed begins the learning process (i.e., initializes all of its Q-values to
(σ)
µmax
i
) when Ψti (σ, a) ≥ θI for some a ∈ A(σ).
1−γi
The notion of accumulation of credibility allows us to alter (slightly) how MQubed estimates the credibility of the joint strategy played in the stage σ in episode t
(κti (σ)). When a joint strategy does not converge in a stage for long periods of time,
then one might say that the agents’ strategies have become “reliably unreliable” in
this stage. This suggests that κti (σ) should be considered more reliable if play has
not converged in this stage while it has accumulated large amounts of credibility. To
reflect this, we change κti (σ) (from Equation (6.4)) to be
(
t
1
 if πi (σ) is reliable
t
κti (σ) =
(6.8)
Ψ (σ,a)
min 1, |Ai1(σ)| + i C
otherwise
where C is a large constant. Note that this equation is identical to Equation (6.4)
Ψt (σ,a)
except that when the joint strategy appears unreliable, the term i C is added to
the random term |Ai1(σ)| . If the accumulated credibility Ψti (σ, a) is small, then this
change does not affect κti (σ) significantly. However, in the event that play does not
converge for long periods of time, this assures that κti (σ) will eventually go to 1, which
is necessary to ensure that the payoff matrix is eventually estimated accurately.
The second question, that of how an agent should act while sampling Ri (σ), ties
into the trade-off between exploration and exploitation. Since an agent is mostly
concerned during this time period with determining µmax
(σ), it should (in order to
i
learn quickly) sample the actions that appear to produce the highest payoffs more
often than those that appear to produce lower payoffs. At the same time, the agent
must be careful to explore all actions sufficiently so that it does not underestimate
µmax
(σ).
i
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In stochastic games, M-Qubed uses a relaxation search to explore the outcomes
of actions in each stage. It does this, as before, by initializing its Q-values to a very
high value, and then learning (i.e., updating Q-values) as it would normally. For
the duration of this sampling period, M-Qubed’s Q-values must remain greater than
µmax
(σ)
i
to ensure that each stage’s payoff matrix is sampled sufficiently. Otherwise,
1−γi
M-Qubed might become satisfied with a solution during the sampling period, which
could cause it to cease sampling its environment prematurely.
During the sampling period of a stage (let this stage be σ), Q-values are updated
at the end of each episode that σ is visited as follows:
 t

t
t
t
t
t
t
t t+1
Qt+1
(σ))
(6.9)
i (s (σ), ai ) = (1 − αi (σ))Qt (s (σ), ai ) + αi (σ) ri (σ) + γi Vi (s
where st (σ) is the ordered pair (σ, ht (σ, ωi )) (where ht (σ, ωi ) is the previous ωi joint
actions taken in stage σ), αit (σ) = αi Kit (σ), and
X
Vit (st+1 (σ)) =
πit (st+1 (σ), bi )Qti (st+1 (σ), bi )
(6.10)
bi

where πit (st+1 (σ), bi ) is the strategy that agent i expects to play in the next episode
that it visits stage σ given the history ht+1 (σ, ωi ). The differences between this
Q-update and the one used for matrix games (in the previous chapter) are a) the
sample reward rit (σ) is used rather than the mean µti (σ, at (σ)) and b) the learning
rate is multiplied by the sample’s credibility.
We note that using the sample reward rit (σ) and multiplying the learning rate
by the credibility is necessary until µti (σ, at (σ)) can be determined with sufficient
confidence, at which point M-Qubed updates its Q-values using
 t

t
t
t
t
t
t t+1
Qt+1
(σ)) (6.11)
i (s (σ), ai ) = (1 − αi )Qt (s (σ), ai ) + αi µi (σ, a (σ)) + γi Vi (s
which is identical to the Q-update used in the previous chapter. We begin using
this Q-update equation (rather than the one given in Equation (6.9) when the statejoint action pair (σ, at (σ)) has accumulated θI units of credibility. Thus, in essence,
Equation (6.9) is the Q-update for the sampling phase and Equation (6.11) is the
Q-update for the learning phase.
Two rules must be followed to ensure that the relaxation search during the exploration period adequately samples the agent’s environment. They are as follows:
• During the sampling period, ωi = 0. This causes the agent to explore the potential of each action more thoroughly before it accumulates θI units of credibility.
• Only the first visit to a stage in an episode should result in parameter updates.
This means that, in subsequent visits to a stage within an episode, the “optimal”
policy (i.e., the action with the highest Q-value) need not be used. Rather, if
the policy being used in a stage is not reliable, the agent should use a random
policy on subsequent visits so that the episode will eventually terminate.
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6.5.2

Avoiding Premature Convergence

The second challenge of extending M-Qubed to stochastic games is ensuring (in
each stage of the game) that M-Qubed does not converge prematurely. That is,
M-Qubed must not converge in any stage until (relevant) subsequent stages have
converged. Otherwise, M-Qubed is likely to converge to undesirable strategies since
it stops exploring when it becomes satisfied.
When the agent’s strategies have converged in (relevant) subsequent stages of
stage σ, then relevant entries of the payoff matrix of stage σ will be stationary. We
call this kind of payoff matrix pseudo-stationary, a term which we will define formally
in Section 6.5.2.
In addition to the extension presented in the previous subsection, we extend MQubed in two other ways so that strategies in (relevant) subsequent stages converge
before the strategy in the current stage. First, we modify M-Qubed so that it restarts
the learning process in a stage whenever that stage’s payoff matrix violates the property of pseudo-stationarity. We describe this extension in Section 6.5.2. Second, we
extend M-Qubed to estimate the potential payoffs of subsequent stages, as these estimates of potential payoffs can indicate when the agent should continue to explore
(with some probability) in a given stage. We discuss this extension in Section 6.5.2.
Pseudo-Stationarity
In this chapter, we have discussed the stationarity of payoff matrices. Formally,
we consider the payoff matrix Ri (σ) to be stationary if, for all a ∈ A(σ) and for all
j < t, µji (σ, a) − µti (σ, a) = 0. We say that Ri (σ) is ε-stationary if, for all a ∈ A(σ)
and for all j < t, |µji (σ, a) − µti (σ, a)| ≤ ε for some ε > 0. In general, we say that
Ri (σ) is stationary if it is ε-stationary for some small ε.
Since Ri (σ) is often non-stationary in stochastic games until the joint strategies
of all (possible) subsequent stages have converged, it is tempting to delay learning in
each stage σ ∈ Σ until Ri (σ) becomes stationary.7 Unfortunately, this is not possible
(for all σ) since the payoffs of neighboring stages depend upon each other’s converged
strategies.
However, it is possible to ensure that some of the entries of Rit (σ) are stationary while M-Qubed learns in stage σ. Thus, rather than requiring that |µji (σ, a) −
µti (σ, a)| ≤ ε for all a ∈ A(σ) and j < t, we can require that |µji (σ, a) − µti (σ, a)| ≤ ε
for the more relevant joint actions (for all j > t). That is, let Ωti (σ) ⊂ A(σ) be the
subset of relevant joint actions in stage σ. Then Rit (σ) is pseudo-stationary if, for all
a ∈ Ωti (σ) and all t0i (σ) < j ≤ t (where t0i (σ) is the episode at which agent i initialized
its Q-values in σ), |µji (σ, a) − µti (σ, a)| ≤ εti (σ, a), where εti (σ, a) is some positive value
(possibly unique to the stage-joint action pair (σ, a)).
7

We say that a stage begins learning when it initializes its Q-values to
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µmax
(σ)
i
1−γi .

c
d
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Figure 6.4: (a) Payoff matrix of agent i of a stage game at episode T0 . (b) Payoff
matrix (of agent i) of the same stage game at episode T1 > T0 . If the threshold
ζit (σ) > 3 for all t ≤ T1 , then this payoff matrix is pseudo-stationary.

We must now define relevance. Let ζit (σ) be agent i’s estimate (at episode t) of the
average reward that it will receive in stage σ when play has converged in all stages.
A joint strategy a is relevant if µti (σ, a) > ζit (σ) + εti (σ, a). Thus, Ωti (σ) is given by
Ωti (σ) = {a : µti (σ, a) > ζit (σ) + εti (σ, a)}

(6.12)

We describe how ζit (σ) and εti (σ, a) are determined later in this section.
For an example of pseudo-stationarity, consider Figure 6.4(a), which shows agent
i’s payoff matrix in a particular stage of episode T0 . Suppose, after episode T0 ,
that agent i’s payoff for the solution (c, c) gradually changes over time until at some
episode T1 > T0 , its payoff matrix in this stage is as shown in Figure 6.4(b). If agent
i estimates, for all t ≤ T1 , that its average reward will be greater than 3 − εti (σ, a)
when policies have converged in all stages (i.e., ζit (σ) > 3 − εti (σ, a) for all t ≤ T1 ),
then this payoff matrix is pseudo-stationary (at least through episode T1 ).
We note that the definition of relevance just given is not suitable for instances
in which an agent plays its minimax strategy πim (σ; t). When an agent’s current
strategy is πim (σ; t), then the agent’s minimax value mti (σ) is also relevant. Thus,
in this circumstance, a payoff matrix is not pseudo-stationary if changes in Ri (σ)
increase mti (σ) by more than εti (σ, a).
When Ri (σ) is pseudo-stationary, M-Qubed is not guaranteed to learn as effectively as it does in matrix games since pseudo-stationarity does not guarantee that
strategies have converged in (relevant) subsequent stages. It only indicates that strategies in (relevant) subsequent stages are currently producing (for agent i) samples from
a nearly stationary distribution. Thus, if M-Qubed converges prematurely (even if
its payoff matrix is currently pseudo-stationary), it can learn behaviors that produce
low payoffs. Thus, we will introduce additional exploration methods shortly.
We note that the extensions of M-Qubed described in Section 6.5.1 (the previous subsection) do appear to be sufficient for learning in deterministic single-agent
games. To see this, consider Figure 6.5(a), which illustrates a simple single-agent
maze game. This game has identical physics to the world shown in Figure 6.2. The
order in which M-Qubed’s strategies converge in each stage in this game is shown
in Figure 6.5(b). In the figure, darker colors indicate that convergence occurred at
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(b)

(c)

Figure 6.5: (a) A simple single-agent grid world game. (b) The order in which the
strategy in the stages converged. Darker shading indicates later convergence times. A
× indicates that convergence never occurred in that stage. (c) The converged policies
when learning began in stage σ1,4 (marked by the O). Arrows indicate converged
policies. These results were generated using θI = 40.

later times. Figure 6.5(c) shows the agent’s converged strategies at the episode that
Q-values were initialized in stage σ1,4 (marked by the O). When the agent takes the
actions N or E (the agent’s optimal policies that it eventually learns) in this stage,
the strategies (indicated by the arrows) in all subsequent stages of the current episode
have converged. Thus, Ri (σ1,4 ) is pseudo-stationary while it is learning.
However, in multiagent environments as well as single-agent environments in which
the world is non-deterministic, the extensions of Section 6.5.1 are not sufficient (although they do help).
Restarting Learning
As before, let t0i (σ) be the episode at which agent i begins learning in stage σ.
Then, if Rit (σ) violates the property of pseudo-stationarity for any t > t0i (σ), then
M-Qubed restarts the learning process in stage σ. Restarting the learning process
includes re-sampling the environment as discussed in Section 6.5.1, meaning that
Ψti (σ, a), agent i’s accumulated credibility in stage σ for the joint action a, is set to
0 for each a ∈ A(σ).
The payoff matrix of a stage game is pseudo-stationary when joint strategies in
future stages (at least those reached by relevant8 joint actions) have converged. Thus,
a restart in a stage occurs when joint strategies in these future stages are changing
(and, thus, have not converged). Thus, a learning restart allows joint strategies in
subsequent stages more time to converge before learning is again attempted in stage σ.
The result of this process is that in multiagent and/or nondeterministic environments,
8

Recall that relevance in stage σ is dependent on the variable ζit (σ). We discuss how ζit (σ) is
derived later in this section.
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as in single-agent deterministic worlds, strategies in stages closer to goals typically
converge before strategies in stages further from goals.
A challenge of restarting learning when the payoff matrix of a stage violates the
pseudo-stationarity property occurs when (relevant) payoffs in adjacent stages are
dependent on each other’s strategies. In this case, the two stages might take turns
restarting, and, thus, neither would ever converge. Because of this possibility, εti (σ, a)
(which is agent i’s error tolerance at episode t for the mean payoff µti (σ, a)) is increased
over time based on a) the number of times that agent i has restarted learning in σ
up to the current episode t and b) the number of times that it restarted learning
when its estimate of converged payoffs was similar to the agent’s current estimate of
converged payoffs (ζit (σ)). In this way, the requirements of pseudo-stationarity can
be relaxed over time (if necessary) until the strategies of the agents in both stages
are able to converge.
Formally, let υi be agent i’s initial tolerance for error given by

υi = p0i µmax
(σ) − µmin
i
i (σ)

(6.13)

where p0i ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Let Di (σ) = (d0 , d1 , · · · ) be the times at which agent
i has restarted the learning process in stage σ, where dj is the episode of the j th
restart. Also, let ci (σ, ζit (σ)) be the number of restarts by agent i in stage σ such that
d
(µti (σ, at (σ) − ζi j (σ)) < υ|Di (σ)|, where |Di (σ)| is the number of times that agent i
has restarted the learning process in stage σ. Then, εti (σ, a) is given by
t

εti (σ, a) = υB ci (σ,ζi (σ))

(6.14)

where B > 1 is a constant.
Estimating Potential and Adding Policy Trembles
M-Qubed explores its environment largely by initializing its Q-values high and
then relaxing them with experience. Additionally, in matrix games (as we saw in the
previous chapter) M-Qubed trembles its policy with probability ηi if it believes that
another policy has greater potential than its current policy (see Section 5.5.3).
In stochastic games, M-Qubed trembles its policy with an additional probability
P
ηi when it perceives that payoffs obtained by acting in subsequent stages might
improve over time. It does this by constructing a potential matrix Mit (σ) for each σ ∈
Σ and comparing relevant entries of its potential matrix to the estimated mean payoff
matrix µti (σ). M-Qubed guesses that policies in subsequent states might improve
when there exists a joint action a ∈ A(σ) such that Mit (σ, a) > µti (σ, a) + φ (where
φ is a small positive constant) and Mit (σ, a) > ζit (σ) + εti (σ, a). In words, M-Qubed
guesses that its policies in subsequent states might improve if there is a solution that
has a potential payoff higher than its actual estimated payoff, and this solution is
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potentially relevant. In such cases, M-Qubed trembles its strategy to play its portion
of one such joint action with probability ηip .
More formally, let Θt (σ) be the set of joint actions a ∈ A(σ) for which Mit (σ, a) >
µti (σ, a) + φ and Mit (σ, a) > ζit (σ) + εti (σ, a). Let Θti (σ) be the set of player i’s actions
corresponding to the joint actions in Θt (σ). That is, Θti (σ) is the set of actions
ai ∈ Ai (σ) such that Mit (σ, (ai , a−i )) > µti (σ, (ai , a−i )) + ε for some a−i ∈ A−i (σ).
Then, with probability ηip , player i plays action ai ∈ Θti (σ) with probability |Θt1(σ)| ,
i
where |Θti (σ)| is the cardinality of Θti (σ). Like ηi , ηip should be decayed slowly over
time.
Because of this additional random exploration, if Mit (σ) adequately (or optimistically) estimates the potential of subsequent states, its avoids converging prematurely.
Thus, it is better for Mit (σ, a) to overestimate the potential payoffs of subsequent
states than to underestimate them, although Mit (σ, a) should approach µti (σ, a) (from
above) as t → ∞.
The potential matrix Mit (σ, a) is updated in each episode that a is played in stage
σ using
 t−1

t
t
t
t t
Mit (σ, a) = 1 − λm
(σ, a) + λm
i (σ, t)Ki (σ) Mi
i (σ, t)Ki (σ) νi (σ) + ζi (στ +1 )

(6.15)

t
where λm
i (σ, t) ∈ (0, 1] and στ +1 is the subsequent state. Thus, this is a traditional
convex combination form of a sequential estimate.
Recall that ζit (σ) is the value for determining relevance in stage σ. Hence, when
ζit (σ) is optimistic, Mit (σ, a) will usually be greater than µti (σ, a) (at least until the
joint strategies in subsequent stages converge).
Thus, ζit (σ) takes on one of two optimistic values, depending on the state of
the learning process. If maxa∈A(σ) Ψti (σ, a) < θI , then ζit (σ) = maxa∈A(σ) Mit (σ, a).
In words, if the stage has not been sufficiently sampled (it is still in the sampling
period), then ζit (σ) is the maximum potential payoff in the stage. However, if the
sampling period is completed (and learning has begun), ζit (σ) is given by ζit (σ) =
t−1
(σ) is the set of histories seen in σ in the
maxai ∈Ai (σ),h∈H t−1 (σ) Qti (σ, h, ai ), where Ht−T
t−T
previous T episodes that σ has been visited. Note that in most cases, ζit (σ) will be
equal to the highest global Q-value in stage σ (if T is big enough). However, this will
not always be the case since a given history of joint actions might be unreachable due
to the strategies used by other agents.
Formally, ζit (σ) is given by
(
maxa∈A(σ) Mit (σ, a)
if maxa∈A(σ) Ψti (σ, a) < θI
ζit (σ) =
(6.16)
maxai ∈Ai (σ),h∈H t−1 (σ) Qti (σ, h, ai ) otherwise
t−T

As we discussed previously, after each episode in which a is played in stage στt , the
potential payoff Mit (στt , a) is updated using the potential estimate of the next stage,
which is ζit (στt +1 ). However, when Q-values are re-initialized after learning restarts in
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stage σ (after its sample period), ζit (σ) can change suddenly (usually in the upward
direction). As a result, potential payoffs estimated in adjacent stages that were based
(in part) on previous values of ζit (σ) can become pessimistic unless they are corrected.
Hence, we must have a method for correcting pessimistic potential payoff estimates. Let Ziσ (ϑ, a) be the average value of ζit (σ) used to update the potential
payoff Mit (ϑ, a) (where ϑ ∈ Σ) in past episodes and let Υσi (ϑ, a) be the percentage
of Mit (ϑ, a) that has been influenced (by updates using Equation (6.15)) by past estimates of ζit (σ).9 Then, when Q-values are re-initialized in stage σ, the following
correction is made

Mit (ϑ, a) = Mit (ϑ, a) + ζit (σ) − Ziσ (ϑ, a) Υσi (ϑ, a)

(6.17)

Thus, Mit (ϑ, a) is changed to reflect the idea that the stage σ always had a potential
of ζit (σ). Note that this correction must be made for each (ϑ, a) that the stage σ has
influenced.
We have previously used the term reliability, which estimates whether or not
a strategy has converged in a given stage. We now describe how this estimate is
constructed.
6.5.3

Reliability

Reliability estimates whether a strategy has converged in a given stage σ. MQubed uses two different indicators to determine the reliability of a stage’s current
strategy. They are a) how much credibility has accumulated since a strategy for
any ht (σ, ωi ) ∈ H t (σ, ωi ) last changed in episode tc and b) whether or not there
exists a joint action a ∈ Ωti (σ) such that Mit (σ, a) > µti (σ, a) + ε (i.e., whether
potential estimates reflect actual payoffs). If the stage has accumulated TC units of
credibility since episode tc and there does not exist a joint action a ∈ Ωti (σ) such that
Mit (σ, a) > µti (σ, a) + ε, then the strategy in that stage is considered reliable.
6.5.4

Algorithm Summary

We have now formal described how M-Qubed is extended to repeated stochastic
games. In this subsection, we summarize the algorithm. First, we review the extensions discussed in this chapter. Second, we discuss how these extensions do not affect
M-Qubed’s behavior is matrix games. Third, we discuss how these extensions affect
how an agent selects its actions in the stage game. Fourth, we review the parameters
that must be updated (at the end of the episode) in each stage visited in the episode.
9

Note that both Ziσ (ϑ, a) and Υσi (ϑ, a) should be updated after each update of Mit (σ, a).
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Extensions Summary
As described in this section, M-Qubed (as described in the previous chapter)
must be extended in three ways so that it can learn successfully in the stage game of
a stochastic game. We now review these extensions.
First, since an agent’s payoff matrix of a stage of a stochastic game is unknown,
it must be estimated using sample payoffs obtained from acting in the environment.
This can be a difficult task, however, since the payoff matrix can be non-stationary
due to its dependence on joint strategies played in subsequent stages of an episode.
Because of this, M-Qubed associates a measure of credibility to each sample payoff,
which is used to determine how the sample payoff should affect the agent’s mean
payoff estimate. Credibility is also used to determine when the payoff matrix has
been sufficiently sampled so that learning can begin in this stage. These extensions
to M-Qubed were described in Section 6.5.1.
Second, since the payoff matrix of a stage game is non-stationary, various measures
must be taken to ensure that M-Qubed does not stop exploring prematurely. One
method used by M-Qubed to avoid premature convergence is to require that its payoff
matrix be pseudo-stationary while it learns. A pseudo-stationary matrix has certain
(relevant) entries that remain nearly stationary. If the payoff matrix of the stage game
violates the property of pseudo-stationarity any time after learning has begun, then
M-Qubed restarts the learning process in this stage (which begins by re-sampling the
environment). These extensions are given in Section 6.5.2.
The third extension of M-Qubed that we have discussed in this section is also
made to ensure that M-Qubed’s strategy does not converge prematurely in any stage.
This extension involves estimating a potential payoff matrix, which estimates the
potential payoffs that joint actions from a given stage will produce when the strategies
of subsequent stages converge. If entries of the potential payoff matrix exceed the
agents actual estimates (generated by sample payoffs), then M-Qubed explores its
environment with additional probability. In this way, M-Qubed can avoid converging
prematurely to strategies that produce undesirable payoffs.
Matrix Games Revisited
We now discuss how these extensions affect M-Qubed’s behavior in matrix games
(from what we saw in the previous chapter), which are a special class of stochastic
games.
In the previous chapter, we assumed that the agent knew its payoff matrix prior
to learning. However, in this chapter we have assumed that the payoff matrix is
unknown. Thus, M-Qubed must estimate its payoff matrix during an exploration
period prior to learning. However, if M-Qubed samples its payoff matrix sufficiently,
then the other extensions (presented in this chapter) do not change the behavior of
M-Qubed in matrix games (as presented in the previous chapter).
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To see this, consider each extension made to the algorithm. The first extension
which we consider is credibility, which affects how parameters are updated. However,
in matrix games, there are no subsequent states, so the credibility of each sample is
1. Thus, credibility does not affect M-Qubed in matrix games.
Second, we consider how restarts affect M-Qubed. M-Qubed restarts the learning process whenever its payoff matrix appears to violate the property of pseudostationarity. However, in matrix games, the payoff matrix is stationary, so it is also
pseudo-stationary. Thus, if the environment is sampled sufficiently prior to learning,
then M-Qubed will never restart its learning process in matrix games. Thus, restarts
do not change the behavior of M-Qubed in matrix games.
Lastly, we consider how potential payoff estimates affect the behavior of M-Qubed
in matrix games. Since matrix games do not have subsequent states in an episode, the
potential payoff estimate will be identical to the actual payoff estimates if the payoff
matrix has been sampled sufficiently and if λµi (σ, t) = λm
i (σ, t) (see Equations (6.6)
µ
m
and (6.15)). Since both λi (σ, t) and λi (σ, t) should approach zero (or some low
value) as time goes on, this requirement is fulfilled. Thus, this extension does not
affect M-Qubed’s exploration strategies in matrix games.
Hence, this extended version of M-Qubed behaves the same in matrix games as
the algorithm presented in the previous chapter.
The extensions presented in this chapter introduce changes in both the action
selection and parameter update components of the algorithm. We now review these
changes.
Action Selection
M-Qubed determines its strategy in a stage of a stochastic game in the same way
as explained in the previous chapter (see Section 5.5.2), with two exceptions. The
first difference has to do with the treatment of multiple visits to a stage during an
episode. The second difference is the additional exploration introduced by differences
between the potential payoff matrix Mit (σ) and the actual mean payoff matrix µti (σ).
While an agent is learning in stochastic games, its current strategies do not always
result in the agent entering a goal state. Thus, to avoid long cycles in an episode, an
agent acts randomly when it visits a stage for a second (or more) time in an episode.
The exception to this rule is when the agent believes that its policy in a stage is
reliable (see Section 6.5.3), at which time the agent acts according to its current
strategy.
When the potential payoff matrix Mit (σ) and the actual mean payoff matrix µti (σ)
do not agree, M-Qubed explores its environment with higher probability than otherwise. Otherwise, it selects a strategy according to the rules defined in the previous
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chapter. Thus, M-Qubed in stochastic games selects its strategy in the following way:

w/ prob ηiP when Θti (σ) 6= ∅
rand(Θti (σ))
t
t
(6.18)
πi (σ, h (σ, ωi )) →
Equation 5.12 otherwise
where rand(Θti (σ)) is a random selection from the set Θti (σ) (which is defined formally
in Section 6.5.2).
We note one other exception, which is not reflected in Equation (6.18). This
exception is strategy selection during the exploration (or sampling) period. During
this period, M-Qubed’s actions are determined solely by its Q-values (it does not
explore its environment). Thus, in these cases, πit (σ, ht (σ, 0)) is given by
πit (σ, ht (σ, 0)) → argmax Qti (σ, ht (σ, 0), ai )

(6.19)

ai ∈Ai (σ)

Note the use of ωi = 0, which is in accordance with our discussion in Section 6.5.1.
Parameter Updates
At the end of each episode t that stage σ is visited, M-Qubed in stage σ updates
the following parameter values:
• Mit+1 (σ, at (σ)) using Equations (6.15) and (6.17)
t
• µt+1
i (σ, a (σ)) using Equation (6.6)

• ζit+1 (σ) using Equation (6.16)
• πit+1 (σ, ht (σ, ωi )) using Equation (6.18) or Equation (6.19) (depending on whether
or not the sample period is complete)
• Ψ(σ, at+1 (σ)) as discussed in Section 6.5.1
t+1
t
t
t
• Qt+1
i (σ, h (σ, ωi ), ai (σ)) using Equation (6.11) if Ψi (σ, a (σ)) ≥ θI or Equation (6.10) otherwise

• mt+1
i (σ)
• πim (σ; t + 1)
• β́it+1 (σ) and βit+1 (σ) as in the previous chapter.
We emphasize that these updates only occur for the first visit to each stage in the
episode.
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Name
M-Qubed

Parameter details
αi = 0.1, γi = 0.95,
θI = 20,
 ωi = 1,0.01α
20000
ηi = 0.04 20000+t , λ = µmax −µimin ,
i
i
p0i = 0.02 (see Equation (6.13)),
B = 1.5 (see Equation
(6.14)),

λµi (σ, t) = max 0.01, Ψ(σ,a1t (σ))

√ 1t
λm
i (σ, t) = max 0.01,

WoLF-PHC

(see Equation (6.6)),

(see Equation (6.15))

Ψ(σ,a (σ))
ai
αi = 1/(10 + 0.001κs ), γi = 0.95,
ai
δw = 1/(1000.0 + κ10s ), δl = 4δw

Table 6.2: Learners and their parameter values. κas i is the number of times that action
ai has been played in state s.

6.6

Results

Our extension of M-Qubed to stochastic games requires the use of several additional free parameters. Each one of these parameters has been designed to deal with
one or more challenges of learning in stochastic games. In this section, we demonstrate that these parameters can be set so that M-Qubed displays the security and
compromise/cooperate properties (at least in self play) in many stochastic games. We
note that, while the behavior of the algorithm does not seem to change significantly
with small changes in parameter values in most situations, these results might not
hold for all sets of parameter values. However, we do not include a complete analysis
of how these free variables affect the performance of the algorithm.
In this section, we compare the performance of M-Qubed in self play with the
performance of WoLF-PHC in self play in a number of stochastic games. We choose to
compare the performance of M-Qubed to WoLF-PHC since WoLF-PHC demonstrates
typical behavior of multiagent learning algorithms found in the literature in these
games. Unless stated otherwise, all results in this chapter are generated using the
parameter values shown in Table 6.2.
A number of stochastic games have been presented and analyzed in recents years.
These games have similar characteristics to the matrix games we have analyzed in past
chapters. We describe five of these games and compare the performance of M-Qubed
and WoLF-PHC in them.
6.6.1

A Coordination Game

First, we discuss the performance of the algorithms in the coordination game that
we described in Section 6.2 (see Figure 6.1). In this game, both of the agents can
receive the maximum payoff of 100 if they learn to coordinate their actions (to avoid
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.6: Average payoffs over time to the agents (in self play) for the coordination
game depicted in Figure 6.1.
(a) Average payoffs over time to the agents (in self play) for the coordination game
depicted in Figure 6.1. Results are an average of 25 trials. (b) Box and whisker plots
showing the distribution of the agents’ payoffs after 2000000 episodes.

collisions) while moving toward the goal. Both M-Qubed and WoLF-PHC learn to
do so in this game, as shown in Figure 6.6.
6.6.2

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Goodrich et al. presented a multi-stage (stochastic game) version of the prisoner’s
dilemma in [36]. We analyze the performance of M-Qubed and WoLF-PHC in a
smaller version of this game, which is shown in Figure 6.7. In this game, two agents
(labeled A and B) begin on opposites sides (corners) of the world. The world is divided
by a wall containing four different gates which are open to begin each episode. The
goal of each agent is to move to the other side of the world, at which point it receives
a payoff of 10. However, the agent also loses 1 point for every move it takes, so the
agents should try to move to the other side of the world in as few moves as possible.
The “physics” of the world are as follows:
• Agents may move up, down, left, and right.
• Moves into walls or closed gates result in the agent remaining where it was
before the action was taken.
• If one agent moves through gate 1 and the other agent does not, then gates
1, 2, and 3 close (after the defecting agent moves through the gate). This is
demonstrated in the situation shown at the bottom left of Figure 6.7. The result
of this action sequence is that the agent that moves through gate 1 receives a
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Figure 6.7: Stochastic game version of the prisoner’s dilemma.

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.8: (a) Average payoffs over time to the agents (in self play) for the prisoner’s
dilemma game depicted in Figure 6.7. Results are an average of 25 trials. (b) Box and
whisker plots showing the distribution of the agents’ payoffs after 1000000 episodes.
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net payoff of 7, while the other agent receives a net payoff of 1 (assuming the
agents do not waste moves).
• If both agents arrive and attempt to move through gate 1 at the same time,
gates 1 and 2 close (without allowing either of the agents to pass through the
gate). This situation is demonstrated in the situation depicted at the bottom
center of Figure 6.7. Both agents receive a net payoff of 2 in this case.
• If both agents move through gates 2, 3, or 4, then none of the gates close (and,
thus, neither of the agents are denied passage). The situation in which the
agents both move through gate 2 is shown in the bottom right of Figure 6.7 and
results in both agents receiving a net payoff of 5.
Note that the net payoffs just mentioned define a prisoner’s dilemma. Thus,
moving through gate 1 can be considered defection, and moving through gate 2 can
be considered cooperation.
Due to the non-stationarity of the stage game, learning non-myopic solutions
(i.e., learning to offer and accept profitable compromises) in this multi-stage prisoner’s dilemma is more difficult than learning non-myopic solutions in the equivalent
prisoner’s dilemma matrix game. Nevertheless, M-Qubed still learns mutual cooperation most of the time, resulting in an net average payoff of nearly 5 to each agent
(in each episode). This result is shown in Figure 6.8. This figure shows the results
of 25 trials, of which M-Qubed learned mutual cooperation 22 times (resulting in a
net average payoff of 5 to both agents). In the first trial that M-Qubed did not learn
mutual cooperation, the agents learned to alternate between the solutions (D, D) and
(C, C), resulting in an average net payoff of 3.5 to both agents. In the second trial
that it did not learn mutual cooperation, the agents learned to alternate between the
solutions (D, C) and (C, C), resulting in average net payoffs of 6 and 3, respectively.
In the last such trial, the M-Qubed agents learned to alternate between the solutions
(D, C) and (C, D), resulting in the average net payoffs of 4 and 310 , respectively.
Thus, even in the instances in which M-Qubed did not learn mutual cooperation, it
was able to make and accept compromises that yield average net payoffs greater than
its minimax value (which is 2). Meanwhile, WoLF-PHC learns mutual defection in
self play in all 25 trials, resulting in a net payoff of 2 to each agent.
Note that M-Qubed learns quite slowly in this game. Thus, it receives very low
payoffs for nearly the first 100000 episodes of the game.
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Figure 6.9: Stochastic game version of Shapley’s Game (modified from [19]).
c
d
C 0, 0 0, 1
D 1, 0 0, 0
Figure 6.10: Payoff matrix of stage games played in the stochastic version of Shapley’s
game shown in Figure 6.9.

6.6.3

Shapley’s Game

Cook has created a multi-stage version of Shapley’s game [19]. A simplified, but
essentially equivalent, version of this game is depicted in Figure 6.9. In this game, the
two agents (labeled 1 and 2) begin in the left-most column. At each iteration, each
agent can take one of two actions: up or down. An up action moves the agent up
and to the right, while a down action moves the agent down and to the right. When
the agents reach the rightmost column (after four joint actions), payoffs are assigned
based on the episodal actions of the agents, which are determined by the label of
the cell that each agent occupies (R, P, S or no label) at the end of the episode.
Payoffs are assigned as in the game Rock (R) Paper (P) Scissor (S) (except that the
losing agent receives a payoff of 0 rather than a payoff of -1). If an agent moves to
an unlabeled goal state (in the rightmost column), the agent automatically receives
a payoff of 0, and the other agent receives a payoff of 1 if it moves to a labeled goal
state. Otherwise, it also receives a payoff of 0.
While this game models Shapely’s game to some degree, some of its stage games
become identical to the matrix game shown in Figure 6.10, which we studied in the
previous chapter (see Section 5.6.2). Unlike Shapley’s game in which each agent has
a minimax value of 13 , each agent has a minimax value of 0 in this game. Thus, in this
10

The second agent only received a payoff of 3 since it learned to “waste” a move in each episode.
While this behavior might seem undesirable on the surface, this agent learned that it should do so
to achieve the compromise. As a result, it received a higher average net payoff than its minimax
value of 2.
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(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 6.11: (a) Average payoffs over time to the agents (in self play) for Shapley’s
game depicted in Figure 6.9. Results are an average of 25 trials. (b) Box and whisker
plots showing the distribution of the agents’ payoffs after 1000000 episodes. (c) The
average payoffs to the agent that receives the lowest payoff. In the figures, M-Qubed
(1) indicates M-Qubed agents with ωi = 1 and M-Qubed (2) indicates M-Qubed
agents with ωi = 2.

multi-stage Shapley’s game, an agent can guarantee itself a payoff of no more than
0. However, profitable compromises can be reached in this game (as demonstrated in
Section 5.6.2).
The performance of M-Qubed and WoLF-PHC in this game is shown in Figure 6.11. M-Qubed with ωi = 1 (labeled M-Qubed(1) in the figure) receives an
average payoff of approximately 0.45 in this game, and WoLF-PHC receives an average payoff of approximately 0.4. However, in both cases, this is a result of one of the
agents receiving an average payoff close to 1 on most episodes while the other agent
receives an average payoff close to 0 (see Figures 6.11(b) and (c)). Thus, neither of
the algorithms learns to play cooperatively consistently, although M-Qubed (1) does
reach a compromise on some occasions.
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Figure 6.12: Stochastic game version of the game chicken.

However, as we showed in the previous chapter (see Section 5.6.2), if ωi is increased
for each agent i, then M-Qubed usually does learn to compromise so that the agents
alternate between winning and losing in this game. Thus, when ωi = 2 (labeled MQubed (2) in the figure), the average payoff to the M-Qubed (2) agent that receives
the lower payoff is significantly higher (on average) than for M-Qubed (1) and WoLFPHC. This result is shown in Figure 6.11(c). In most instances, each of the M-Qubed
(2) agents receives an average payoff near 0.5. This results in a higher average payoff
to both M-Qubed (2) agents (approximately 0.49).
6.6.4

Chicken

Figure 6.12 depicts a stochastic game related to the matrix game chicken. This
game, which has been studied in [9, 52, 39], is similar to the coordination game shown
in Figure 6.1 except that a) the agents share the same goal cell (which they are allowed
to enter simultaneously) and b) a probabilistic barrier is place above each agent’s start
position. This barrier stops half of the agents’ attempts to move upward from their
start states. Thus, it is more profitable (on average) for an agent to move to the
center column before moving upward. However, since both agents cannot occupy the
same cell simultaneously (other than the goal cell), this action risks a collision with
the other agent.
The performance of the agents is shown in Figure 6.13. While M-Qubed learns
slightly faster in this game than WoLF-PHC, both algorithms learn to play the same
solution. That is, one agent learns to move to the center, while the other learns to
test the barrier. This results in a net payoff of 100 to one agent, and 50 to the other
(and a combined average of 75). Since 50 is an agent’s minimax payoff neither of the
agents learns a profitable compromise11 in this game.
One reason that M-Qubed fails to learn to compromise in this game is because
learning restarts make one agent more selective than the other, which results in
unbalanced payoffs. One possible way to overcome this is for the agents to coordinate
11

One such profitable compromise is for the agents to alternate between winning (moving to the
center) and losing (testing the barrier).
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(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 6.13: (a) Average payoffs over time to the agents (in self play) for the game
chicken depicted in Figure 6.12. Results are an average of 25 trials. (b) Box and
whisker plots showing the distribution of the agents’ payoffs after 2000000 episodes.
(c) The average payoffs to the agent receiving the higher and lower payoffs respectively.
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Figure 6.14: A modified version of soccer (the original was designed by Littman
in [51]). (Left) the initial board position. (Right) A situation requiring a probabilistic
choice for both agents.

trembles (as with SAwT in Chapter 4). However, coordinating trembles is not easily
done in the case of M-Qubed without explicit communications. We leave this for
future work.
It is possible that M-Qubed is unable to learn to compromise in this game for
some of the same reasons that it is unable to compromise in the stochastic version
of Shapley’s game (see also Section 5.6.2). Thus, increasing ωi for each agent i could
possibly increase M-Qubed’s ability to cooperate. However, doing so makes the state
space very large, which would result in very slow learning. For this reason, we do not
provide this analysis in this disseration. We leave further analysis of the behavior of
M-Qubed in this game to future work.
6.6.5

Soccer

All of the stochastic games that we have discussed so far are either cooperative
games (in the case of the coordination game) or games of conflicting interest (prisoner’s dilemma, chicken, and Shapley’s game). We now discuss the performance of
M-Qubed in a competitive stochastic game. This game, shown in Figure 6.14, is a
modified version of the soccer game presented by Littman in [51]. The initial board
position of each episode is depicted in Figure 6.14 (left).
In this game, two players, A and B, occupy distinct squares and can move in any
of the four compass directions or stay in place (stand)12 . After both players have
selected their actions, the two moves are executed in random order.
The circle in the figure represents the “ball.” When the player with the ball steps
into the appropriate goal (the left-most cell for player A and right-most cell for player
B), that player scores a point (and the episode ends).
When the player with the ball selects an action that would move it into the cell
occupied by its opponent, possession of the ball changes. Additionally, if an agent
12
As we have done for other stochastic games, we eliminated unnecessary actions to increase
learning speed.
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Figure 6.15: Average payoffs to various agents in the game of soccer.

tries to move into the square of a standing agent that has possession of the ball, then
possession changes with probability 0.2.
Figure 6.14 (right) shows a situation in this game in which the agents must learn
to act probabilistically (when associating with intelligent agents) since a deterministic
strategy by either agent in this a situation could easily be exploited.
Figure 6.15 shows the payoffs for a single trial to M-Qubed in self play, WoLFPHC in self play, and M-Qubed against WoLF-PHC. While M-Qubed learns extremely
slowly in this game (due to an overuse of learning resets), it does eventually learn to
avoid being exploited in self play and against WoLF-PHC. In fact, M-Qubed eventually learns to exploit WoLF-PHC somewhat in this game. We, note, however, that
the figure shows that WoLF-PHC can also exploit itself in self play.
6.7

Summary and Discussion

While the stage game of a stochastic game is a matrix game, it is more difficult to
learn than matrix games that we discussed in previous chapters. This is because the
payoff matrix of a stage game is non-stationary due to the changing strategies of the
learning agents in subsequent stages. Thus, the M-Qubed algorithm presented in the
previous chapter is not suitable for learning stage games of stochastic games. In this
chapter, we extended the M-Qubed algorithm to learn strategies in the stage games
of stochastic games. We demonstrated (empirically) the algorithm’s performance in
several imporant stochastic games.
In this chapter, we have shown (empirically) that the extended version of M-Qubed
demonstrates the security property in self play in several important stochastic games.
Additionally, we showed that M-Qubed demonstrates the security property against
WoLF-PHC in the stochastic game of soccer. However, while M-Qubed satisfies the
security property in all matrix games, it does not appear to do so in all stochastic
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games. In games with very large state space and certain probability transition functions, potential payoffs might not propogate from stage to stage fast enough. As a
result, M-Qubed might still converge (because it stops exploring) prematurely to undesirable policies in certain stages, resulting in low payoffs. We note, however, that if
M-Qubed does learn the stage payoffs properly (in the correct order), it does satisfy
the security property.
We have also shown that M-Qubed demonstrates the compromise/cooperate property in self play in some important stochastic games. In particular, we showed that
M-Qubed satisfies this property in a multi-state prisoner’s dilemma and in a multistate version of Shapley’s game. Multiagent learning algorithms in the literature do
not learn to offer and accept profitable compromises in many of these games. In this
chapter, we demonstrated this result for the case of WoLF-PHC, which demonstrates
typical behavior of traditional learning algorithms in these games.
While M-Qubed appears to be the first learning algorithm of its kind to offer and
accept profitable compromises in some theoretically important stochastic games, there
is much potential for future work. First, while each free parameter of the extended
algorithm is used to overcome specific challenges, it would be useful to reduce the
number of free parameters. Second, M-Qubed learns very slowly in many stochastic
games. This is caused by several factors including learning restarts, dependence on
first-visit Monte Carlo methods (which do not effectively use much of the data that
the agent gathers via experience), and small parameter updates (when the credibility
of a sample is low). Additionally, M-Qubed’s state space (like most reinforcement
learning algorithms) grows exponentially with increasing numbers of states, actions,
and agents.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Future Work
7.1

Introduction

In repeated general-sum games, the goal of an agent is to maximize its own payoffs over time. However, most existing multiagent learning algorithms found in the
literature learn to play myopically when associating with other learning agents. As
a result, agents employing these algorithms often receive low payoffs in many important general-sum games. In this dissertation, we analyzed and developed multiagent
learning algorithms that behave less-myopically in many of these games. Thus, these
algorithms receive higher average payoffs than those found in the literature.
In this chapter, we summarize these results and present future work.
7.2

Summary

In Chapters 3 and 4, we considered the case in which an agent can observe its own
actions and payoffs, but it cannot observe the actions and payoffs of other agents.
The S-Algorithm, developed by Karandikar et al. [46] and Stimpson et al. [71, 70],
is an aspiration-based satisficing learning algorithm for such situations. Stimpson
et al. analyzed this algorithm in a particular multiagent social dilemma, and found
that it converges in this game (in self play) to pareto efficient solutions with high
probability given that certain conditions are satisfied. In Chapter 3, we analyzed the
S-Algorithm in general-sum matrix games, and showed that it converges with high
probability to near pareto efficient solutions (in self play) in most of these games
(and all 2-player matrix games), provided, again, that certain conditions are met. In
Chapter 4, we extended the S-Algorithm to include aspiration trembles. We showed
that this extended algorithm can learn to tremble its aspirations over time to increase
its own long-term payoffs. Additionally, this algorithm (called SAwT) eliminates the
S-Algorithm’s dependence on initial parameter settings (for convergence to pareto
efficient solutions).
We also considered the case in which an agent can, in addition to observing its
own actions and payoffs, observe the actions of other agents. Given such information,
an agent should learn to satisfy two properties. First, an agent should never learn
to play strategies that produce average payoffs less than the minimax value of the
game. Second, in noncompetitive games, an agent should learn to offer and accept
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profitable compromises (when possible) so that it receives average payoffs higher
than its minimax value. We present an algorithm (called M-Qubed) in Chapter 5
that provably satisfies the first property (regardless of its associate) in all generalsum matrix games, and empirically displays the second property in self play of many
important matrix games. We know of no algorithm in the literature that satisfies
these two properties simultaneously in general-sum games under these knowledge
restrictions.
In Chapter 6, we consider learning in repeated stochastic games. Stochastic games
generalize matrix games and are much more difficult for agents to learn. No algorithm
presented in the literature effectively learns in many of these games. In this chapter,
we extended the M-Qubed algorithm so that it can learn effectively in these games.
We showed (empirically) that M-Qubed possesses these same two properties in some
important general-sum stochastic games. Multiagent learning algorithms from the
literature do not satisfy these two properties in many of these same games.
7.3

Future Work

Although we believe that the contributions of this dissertation are important, they
leave many questions unanswered. In addition to the future work we mentioned at
the end of each chapter, we emphasize two important issues that we have left for
future work.
First, in the main body of this dissertation, we considered only the specific cases
in which a) an agent has full knowledge of its own actions and payoffs (and cannot
observe the actions and payoffs of other agents) and b) an agent has full knowledge of
the actions of other agents as well as its own actions and payoffs. However, practical
applications of multiagent learning involve games in which these variables are only
partially observable. Future work should analyze and develop multiagent learning
algorithms for such situations.
Additionally, none of the algorithm analyzed in the main body of this dissertation
consider the payoffs of other agents. However, evidence shows that people do use the
payoffs of other agents to determine how to behave [12]. In the appendix, we present
a learning algorithm which also uses knowledge of the payoffs of other agents to learn
more effectively. While this work can be considered preliminary, we give empirical
results showing that this algorithm learns effectively when associating with a large
class of learning agents in 2-player matrix games. In contrast, both the S-Algorithm
and M-Qubed struggle to find ways to offer and accept compromises when associating
with other kinds of learning agents in some games.
Second, in this dissertation, we considered only infinitely repeated games between
the same agents. Many practical applications of multiagent learning, however, involve
finitely repeated games between the same agents. This makes the multiagent learning
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problem much more difficult since the speed of learning becomes much more important. Additionally, compromises that are profitable in infinitely repeated games may
not be profitable in finitely repeated games. Thus, future work should include the
development of algorithms that learn non-myopic (yet payoff maximizing) solutions
in these games.
Another area of future work is that of multiagent learning in repeated games in
which the same agents do not play all episodes of the game. Some of these situations
have been studied in detail (see, for example, [33]), but it is typically assumed (particularly if agents are unlikely to meet again) that an agent’s actions do not affect
the subsequent actions of other agents. However, real world situations dictate that
agents can often observe (as onlookers) the actions of future associates. Thus, even
in these situations, it cannot be assumed that an agent’s actions do not influence the
future actions of associates.
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Appendix A
Learning to Teach and Follow in Repeated Games
A.1

Introduction

In the main body of this dissertation, we focused on learning in situations in which
the payoffs of other agents cannot be observed. We now consider the case in which
agents can observe the payoffs of other agents.
Past algorithms designed for repeated games generally fall into one of two categories. The first category of algorithms, which we will call follower algorithms,
adapt their strategies with the goal of finding a best response to the play of their
associate(s). This approach allows an agent to accept good compromises offered by
associates. However, follower agents are often unable to offer acceptable compromises
to others. Consequently, follower agents often earn low average payoffs over time in
many important games. The second category of algorithms, which we will call teacher
algorithms, seek to “teach” their associate(s) to play acceptable (for the teacher)
strategies. These agents are often capable of offering acceptable compromises, but
are generally unable to accept profitable compromises suggested by others.
In this paper, we present a technique for combining teacher and follower strategies into a single agent/algorithm. We call this algorithm SPaM (Social and Payoff
Maximization). We show that combining follower and teacher attributes as does
SPaM results in an agent receiving high average payoffs over time when associating
with a large variety of learning agents (including self, best-response learners, and,
perhaps, humans) in many important 2-agent matrix games. Prior preliminary research also suggests that SPaM can be implemented effectively in multi-state repeated
games [21].
A.2

Background and Related Work

As we mentioned in the introduction, past work in multiagent learning for repeated
general-sum games can be separated into two categories: follower algorithms and
teacher algorithms. In this section, we review some of this work.
A.2.1

Follower Algorithms

Development of the theory of follower algorithms (or adaptive learners [12]) has
occupied the energy of most research in multiagent learning. Follower approaches
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include fictitious play [33], Q-learning [76, 66, 54], Q-learning variants (e.g., [51, 52]),
policy gradient methods (e.g., [9]), and no-regret algorithms (e.g., [43, 8]).
The goal of follower algorithms is typically to learn a best response to the assumed stationary strategies of other agents. When all agents play a best response to
the strategies of the other agents, the results is a Nash equilibrium (NE). However,
achieving this goal has been challenging. Despite some successes, follower algorithms
have been mostly unsuccessful at learning non-myopic equilibrium in repeated games.
A.2.2

Teacher Algorithms

Follower algorithms frequently have the characteristic of ignoring the payoffs of
other agents in the game. This characteristic is actually necessary in many important
contexts since the payoffs (and actions) of other agents may be completely unknown.
However, in many other contexts, at least some knowledge about the payoffs of other
agents is available. Evidence suggests that humans do use information about the
payoffs of other agents when making decisions [12]. Teacher algorithms use this
information to coax other agents to play differently.
Perhaps the most famous teacher is tit-for-tat (TFT) [2], which was designed
for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. TFT plays the action played by its associate
in the previous time period. The desired result is that TFT’s associate learns that
cooperation yields higher average payoffs over time than does defection. Thus, TFT
receives higher payoffs than it would otherwise.
The economics literature provides several important teacher algorithms (e.g. [12]).
Some of the earlier work involved reputation formation [47, 56]. These works show
that, in repeated market games, a firm may benefit by establishing a “tough” reputation in early rounds, even though establishing such a reputation may produce low
immediate payoffs.
Additional teacher algorithms (called leader algorithms) were given by Littman
and Stone [54] for 2-player matrix games. These teacher algorithms (called Bully
and Godfather) were each shown to induce desirable behavior from certain kinds
of associates in many games. Using Godfather, Littman and Stone developed an
algorithm (which we will call Godfather++) for calculating a repeated-play NE for
2-player matrix games [53]. We now discuss this algorithm in more detail.
Let player i be the agent in question, and let player −i be its associate1 . Let,
Aj (s) be the actions available to player j in state s, and let atj ∈ Aj (s) be player
j’s action at time t (from state s). The joint-action at = (ati , at−i ) is a vector of the
actions taken by the agents at time t.
Godfather++ calculates a target solution (which may require that the agents alternate between joint-actions) which maximizes the product of the agents’ (positive)
1

We prefer the term associate to opponent, since the agents may not be competing.
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advantages2 . Let cti and ct−i be the target actions (corresponding to the target solution) for players i and −i at time t, respectively. As long as at−i = ct−i , player i plays
ct+1
at time t + 1. However, if at−i 6= ct−i , then player i punishes player −i for the
i
next n (calculated from the game matrix) rounds of the game by playing an attack
strategy. This results in player −i receiving an expected reward of no more than its
minimax value each of the n punishment rounds. Thus, an agent’s best response to
Godfather++ is to play ct−i at each time t.
Godfather++ has some very nice theoretical properties, although it does have
several issues that should be addressed. Some of these issues include the following:
1 The length of the punishment phase of Godfather++ (denoted by the variable
n) may be unnecessarily large (as Littman and Stone acknowledge). Long punishment phases make it difficult for a learner to determine which of its action
is being punished or rewarded (credit assignment problem). Thus, to increase
teaching effectivness, the punishment phase should be as short as possible. Additionally, the majority of learning algorithms in the literature typically only
condition utilities on very recent action histories, meaning that these agents are
unable to “perceive” long punishment phases.
2 Godfather++ does not specify how the agents should coordinate their actions
when the target solution is a sequence of joint-actions. This means that agents
may never play cooperatively in some games.
3 The strategy used by Godfather++ in the punishment phase (i.e., the attack
strategy) does not take into account the agent’s own payoffs. Thus, vengeance
may be overly costly. While this is not extremely problematic (in the limit)
if the associate eventually learns to cooperate, there is no guarantee that the
associate will learn to cooperate.
4 The target solution is not guaranteed to be unique. Thus, the agents may be
unable to coordinate cooperative behavior (particularly in self play). Additionally, a similar (but different) solution may be proposed (and enforced) by an
associate, which the algorithm cannot learn to accept.
5 The algorithm requires complete knowledge of the game matrix, as well as
perfect knowledge of all agents’ actions.
The algorithm we present next addresses points 1-3 (at least in part). We do not
address points 4 and 5.
2

The advantages of the agents are the agents’ payoffs minus their minimax value.
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1. S = {ai : T (s, ai ) ≥ 0} ∪ {argmaxa T (s, ai )}
2. Select action ati

 argmaxai ∈S F (s, ai ) with probability 1 − η
argmaxai F (s, ai )
with probability ρη
ati =

random
with probability (1 − ρ)η
Algorithm A.1: Action selection in SPaM. In the figure, T (·) and F (·) represent
teacher and follower utilities (respectively).

A.3

An Algorithm for Teaching and Following

Littman and Stone [54] concluded that neither teacher nor follower strategies
alone are sufficient for successful multiagent learning. Rather, agents should employ
mixtures of teacher and follower techniques. It is, however, unclear how teacher and
follower strategies can be mixed successfully. One methodology is offered by Powers
and Shoham [63, 62], in which an agent uses a teacher strategy (either Godfather or
Bully) in early rounds of the game. After a deterministic number of iterations, the
algorithm evaluates whether or not the associate is responding to the teacher strategy.
If it is not, the algorithm switches to a follower strategy. However, their approach
does not take into account both teacher and follower strategies simultaneously.
In this paper, we propose a methodology for combining follower and teacher strategies. Although incomplete, the methodology offers a first step towards employing
follower and teacher strategies simultaneously. We call this algorithm SPaM (Social
and Payoff Maximizing).
SPaM learns both a teacher and a follower (payoff maximizing) utility function.
The teacher utility function estimates how well actions induce “good” behavior from
associates. The follower utility function, as always, estimates the actual material
payoffs that an action yields.
Let T (s, ai ) and F (s, ai ) be (respectively) the teacher and follower utilities for
playing action a from state s. SPaM uses T (s, ai ) and F (s, ai ) to select its actions
using the constrained maximization technique shown in Algorithm A.1. In words,
S is the set of actions that have non-negative teacher utility (if no action has nonnegative teacher utility, then S contains only the action with the highest teacher
utility). With high probability (i.e., probability 1 − η), SPaM selects the action in
the set S with the highest follower utility. With a small probability (i.e., probability
ρη) SPaM selects the action with the highest follower utility (whether or not it is in
the set S). Otherwise, SPaM explores randomly.
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We now describe how SPaM learns T (s, ai ) and F (s, ai ) in repeated matrix games3 .
A.3.1

Learning a Teacher Utility Function

The goal of a teacher algorithm is to make player −i’s best response desirable for
the teacher. This entails that an associate should be a) rewarded for playing “good”
actions and b) “punished” (if necessary) for deviating from those “good” actions.
For “good” actions to be player −i’s best response, the punishment must exceed the
profit of deviating.
SPaM, like Godfather++, determines that “good” actions contribute to a sequence
of joint-actions that maximize the product of the agents’ (positive) advantages (as
justified by Nash [59])4 . Let this sequence of joint-actions, called the target solution,
be denoted by c and let ct = (ctj , ct−j ) be the joint-action which c specifies at time
t. Also, let |c| denote the length of the sequence of c. In games in which |c| > 1,
we must determine how agents cycle through the sequence of joint-actions. In our
current implementation, ct = ct−1 if ct−1 is not played at time t − 1. Otherwise, the
current joint-strategy of the target solution updates as in Godfather++5 .
SPaM uses the notion of guilt (denoted Gtj for player j’s guilt at time t) to determine whether an agent should be rewarded or punished. When Gtj > 0, then player
j has some level of guilt. When Gtj ≤ 0, then player j is guiltless. As a rule, a guilty
agent should be punished while a guiltless agent should be rewarded. We describe
how SPaM determines guilt in the discussion that follows.
Let rjt be the payoff to agent j at time t. Also, let rj (ct ) be the expected payoff
P
1
t
to agent j when the joint-action ct is played, and let rj (c) = |c|
ct ∈c rj (c ) be the
average expected payoff to player j if both agents play the target solution.
Initially, each agent is guiltless (i.e., G0j = 0). Thereafter, the guilt of each player
j is updated using the tree shown in Figure A.1, which specifies six unique cases
(labeled 1-6). Each of the six cases is represented by a unique path through the tree.
For example, case 1 is the situation in which atj = ctj , Gtj > 0 and at−j = ct−j . We now
explain and justify how guilt is updated in each case.
1 The joint-action ct is played when player j is guilty. Since player j is not being
punished (while guilty) in this case, its guilt would normally be maintained.
3

In [21], we described how SPaM can be used in two-player repeated multi-state games.
The maximum possible product of the agents’ (positive) advantages in competitive games is
zero. In 2-player competitive games, a teacher algorithm has nothing to offer. Thus, T (s, a) = 1 for
all pairs (s, a), meaning that the teacher utility function has no effect on the behavior of the agent
(see Algorithm A.1). The rest of this section deals with the case in which the maximum product of
the agents’ advantages is nonzero.
5
This implementation is sufficient for all games discussed in this paper, but should be modified
for the general case.
4
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Figure A.1: Tree showing how player j’s guilt value (Gj ) is updated after each round
of the game.

However, in this special case, to avoid the possibility that player j may attribute future punishment to the playing of the target solution, player j’s guilt
is absolved6 .
2 When player j is guilty and plays cooperatively, its guilt is updated by Gt+1
=
j
t
t
t
Gj + rj − rj (c). This means that player j’s guilt is reduced if its payoff (rj ) is
less than rj (c). Note that if rj (c) is at least Gtj more than rjt , then player j’s
guilt is absolved.
3 Player j follows the target strategy while guiltless. Thus, it remains guiltless.
4 Player j deviates while guilty. Its guilt is updated as in case 2, except that its
guilt cannot be completely absolved (since it deviated). Thus, its new guilt is
the max of some small value ε > 0 and Gtj + rjt − rj (c).
5 Player j deviates when its associate is guilty. In this case, player j is justified
in deviating (so it remains guiltless).
6 Player j deviates when its associate is guiltless. In this case, player j acquires
guilt to the degree that it profits from the deviation (the difference between rjt
and rj (c), plus some small value ε > 07 ). Thus, if deviating yields a profit less
than or equal to -ε, an agent remains guiltless.
Note that SPaM measures its own guilt as well as its associate’s guilt. Thus,
SPaM’s associate can hold SPaM accountable in the same way that SPaM holds its
6

We note that this rule could possibly (in a small set of games) allow deviating to be a best
response. We leave this to future work.
7
ε is added to player j’s guilt to require that player j be punished by more than it gains from
deviating.
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associate accountable. In this way, SPaM can (potentially) teach and follow simultaneously.
In short, player j’s guilt is the (positive) profit it has obtained from deviating in
the past. When guilt is positive, the agent has benefited from deviating and should
be punished. Otherwise, the agent should be rewarded (with cooperative actions from
its associate). We now specify how a teacher utility function is constructed from the
guilt values to obtain the desired behavior.
The action selection methodology in Algorithm A.1 requires that teacher actions
have positive utility only if they induce “good” behavior from the associate. Thus, if
action a does not serve to induce player −i to play c−i in the future, then Tt (s, ai ) < 0.
If action a does induce player −i to play c−i in the future, then Tt (s, ai ) > 0.
In the case in which player i’s associate is guiltless, player i should conform to the
target solution. Thus, in this case, the teacher utility Tt (s, ai ) is given by

1
if (ai = cti )
(A.1)
Tt (s, ai ) =
−1 otherwise
In the context of Algorithm A.1, Eq. (A.1) assures that, with at least probability
1 − η, SPaM will play cti when Gt−i ≤ 0.
We now turn to the case in which Gt−i > 0. As we have mentioned, in this case,
player i should punish player −i. Thus, the teacher utility Tt (s, ai ) is a function of
how well action a punishes player −i. Thus,
Tt (s, ai ) = r−i (ct ) − E[U−i (s, ai |Gt−i > 0)] − Ep

(A.2)

where E[U−i (s, ai |Gt−i > 0)] is the expected payoff to player −i based on the empirical
distribution of past actions taken by both agents (when player −i is guilty) and Ep
is the expected level of punishment.
We make the following observations about Eq. A.2. First, E[U−i (s, ai |Gt−i > 0)] is
the value of the teacher utility function that is learned. Second, when the difference
r−i (ct ) − E[U−i (s, ai |Gt−i > 0)] is greater than Ep , then Tt (s, ai ) > 0. Third, when
multiple actions produce satisfactory punishments, SPaM will select the least costly
of those actions (see Algorithm A.1). Therefore, SPaM can lower its own loses while
punishing its associates (see point 3 of the issues discussed in Section A.2).
We discussed in Section A.2 that the punishment phase should be brief (if possible). The variable Ep (the expected punishment level) dictates the duration of the
punishment phase. For quick punishments, we use
Ep = min(Gt−i , r−i (ct ) − m−i ),

(A.3)

where m−i is player −i’s minimax value. We use this value of Ep since a) player −i
need not be punished by more than its guilt value Gt−i and b) since player −i can
guarantee itself a payoff of m−i by playing its minimax strategy, an agent should not
expect to punish its associate by more than r−i (ct ) − m−i .
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1) Observe the game matrix; compute c
2) Gi = G−i = 0, T (s, ai ) = 0, F (s, ai ) = 0
3) Repeat,
a) Take action ai according to Algorithm A.1
b) Observe reward r and actions ati , at−i :
i) Update Gi and G−i using Figure A.1
ii) Updated U−i (s, ai |G−i > 0)
iii) if G−i ≤ 0
compute T (s, ai ) using Eq A.1
else compute T (s, ai ) using Eq A.2
iv) Compute F (s, ai )

Algorithm A.2: The complete SPaM algorithm.

A.3.2

Follower Utility Function

The follower algorithm used by SPaM can be any follower algorithm. However, the
weaknesses of the algorithm chosen reflect on the performance of SPaM. In general,
we favor a learning algorithm which learns quickly, thus, we use a variant of fictitious
play [33] (which we call FP). FP varies from standard fictitious play in that it looks
ahead an extra time period (rather than just the current time) in determining the
action that maximize expected payoffs. Additionally, the previous joint-action taken
by the agents is used for state s (as in the teacher utility function).
A.3.3

Algorithm Review

The complete algorithm is sketched in Algorithm A.2. As we mentioned in Section A.2, the algorithm empirically exhibits the following desirable characteristics.
First, the length of the punishment phase is minimized provided that E[U−i (s, ai |Gt−i >
0)] is accurate. As an example, whereas Godfather++ requires 3 rounds of punishment in the game battle of the sexes, SPaM typically requires no rounds of punishment, although one or two rounds of punishment are sometimes necessary. Second,
SPaM is able to successfully coordinate profitable cooperative actions even in nondeterministic environments. Third, when punishing an associate, SPaM may select
between multiple punishing actions (provided that multiple punishing actions have
been shown to be effective). This allows SPaM to select the action that is most profitable to it. SPaM empirically exhibits these properties while maintaining the other
positive characteristics of Godfather++ (it appears).
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a
b
a 3, 3 0, 5
b 5, 0 1, 1

a
b
a 4, 4 2, 5
b 5, 2 0, 0

(a)

(b)

a
b

a
b
0, 3 3, 2
1, 0 2, 1
(c)

Figure A.2: Payoff matrices for (a) prisoner’s dilemma, (b) chicken, and (c) tricky
game [8]. Payoffs to the row player are given first, followed by the payoffs to the
column player.

A.4

Results

SPaM performs well when associating with a large variety of agents. We now
present some results.
A.4.1

With Automated Agents

Figure A.3 shows the mean average payoffs when SPaM, FP, and WoLF-PHC [9]
are matched with each other in the three repeated matrix games show in Figure A.2.
In each game, the intended actions of all the agents were executed with probability
0.95 and the opposite action was executed with probability 0.05.
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Figures A.3(a)–(c) show results from the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (see Figure A.2a). In this game, the target solution is for each agent
to play a. Although action a is dominated by action b (for both agents), SPaM is able
to teach its associates to play a, resulting in an average payoff per iteration of nearly
3. In this game, SPaM significantly outperforms FP and WoLF-PHC when matched
with each of the three agents.
Chicken. Figures A.3(d)–(f) show results from the game chicken (see Figure A.2b).
In chicken, the target solution is for each agent to play a, despite the fact that each
agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. Again, SPaM teaches each of the three
associates to do so, resulting in an average payoff per iteration of nearly 4. Again,
SPaM outperforms FP and WoLF-PHC in this game when playing with each of the
three associates.
Tricky Game. Figures A.3(g)–(l) show results when the agents are matched
with each other in tricky game (see Figure A.2c). In tricky game, the target solution
is for the row player to play a and the column player to play b, which results in
payoffs of 3 and 2 to the row and column players respectively. While the prisoner’s
dilemma and chicken both generally require only a single round of punishment after a
deviation, tricky game frequently requires two rounds of punishment after a deviation.
Since our implementations of both FP and WoLF-PHC encode state s as the previous
joint-action of the agents, none of the agents are able to “perceive” some of SPaM’s
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punishments. However, SPaM still performs better than both WoLF-PHC and FP
when matched with all three associates, both as a row player and a column player.
However, its payoffs are not as high as they otherwise would be had each of the agents
used longer histories for state.
A.4.2

With Humans

Preliminary results suggests that SPaM performs very well when playing some
games with humans [23, 21]. Future work should more thoroughly explore the performance of SPaM when associating with humans in general-sum games.
A.5

Discussion and Future Work

We have described some of our work in progress on combining teaching and following strategies using SPaM. While as yet incomplete, results show that SPaM performs
well in many 2-player matrix games when matched with a wide variety of agents, include itself, follower algorithms, and (in preliminary results not shown here) humans.
Although promising, SPaM suffers from a number of weaknesses. One of these
weaknessses is that it does not perform as well as desired when matched with static
agents, since static agents cannot be “taught.” One possible method for overcoming
this challenge is to increase the parameter η when the associate does not respond to
teaching. However, we have not as yet found a way to do this effectively without
decreasing average payoffs when matched with agents that learn slowly. Additionally,
there remains much progress to be made before these these techniques can be used in
practical environments (i.e., multi-state environments, environments with incomplete
information, and environments with more than two agents).
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(j)

(k)

(l)

Figure A.3: Payoffs given different pairings of artificial agents. The figures plot the
mean (of 50 trials) average payoff per iteration against time. One standard deviation
is shown after 5000 iterations. (g)–(i) show the payoffs to the row player in tricky
game and (j)–(l) show payoffs to the column player. For SPaM, η = 0.1 and ρ = 0.8.
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